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HISTORY

OF THE

CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

OF

FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO

"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

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BY

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&c. &c. &c.

VOL. XII.

LONDON:

WILLIS AND SOTHERAN, 136, STRAND.

1856.

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LONDON:
M. S. MYERS, PRINTER, 64, LUPUS STREET, PIMLICO.

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HISTORY

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NAPOLEON.

BOOK XXXVIII.

CONTINENTAL BLOCKADE.

NAPOLEON, vanquisher at Wagram, of Austria, and the last efforts of Germany, enriched by new territorial spoils in Gallicia, Bavaria, and Illyria, lavishing on his Polish, German, and Italian allies, the provinces torn from his enemies, having extended yet farther towards the East his empire, already so vast in the North, the West, and the South, and husband of an archduchess, seemed to have arrived at that summit of human glory from which his enemies hoped and his friends feared he must now fall. The world, which judges by that which is external, was yet for a time dazzled and had good reason to be so, for with the exception of Russia, where Napoleon was still regarded with much respect, and of Spain, where a vast popular insurrection disputed with him the extremities of the peninsular, the whole continent displayed towards him a profound

submission, and the humility of peoples as well as of kings appeared to be without bounds—England alone, protected by the ocean, continued to escape from this wide spread subjection.

Struck by this spectacle, the royalist and religious party, of all parties the slowest to see clearly and to submit, perceived that its strength was well nigh gone. It began to attach itself to the Imperial dynasty, and many of its members accepted places at court; spreading, either because they believed them or because they sought some excuse for their weakness, the most extraordinary reports. According to these, Napoleon, allied to Marie Antoinette since his marriage with Marie Louise, was about to set aside the proceedings of the past, to reinstate gloriously the memory of Louis XVI, to drive the regicides from the government, perhaps even from the country, and to surround himself with the old court. To these reports a new one was added even more singular; which was, that Moreau, who was very popular amidst the friends of the Bourbons, was about to be recalled from exile and raised to the dignity of Marshal, with the title of the Duke of Hohenlinden. As for the republicans, it would have been difficult to gather any of their expressions of opinion, for they seemed no longer to exist.

A few of them only just survived; hiding both their errors and excesses in darkness and oblivion. But in their place arose a certain disposition both to enquire and to blame, which presaged a state of public feeling very different from that which then prevailed. As yet, however, this germ of an independent spirit was scarcely perceptible, and the prestige which had so long enveloped Napoleon, appeared to be completely re-established.

But there were not wanting reflective minds, which could discern some dangerous elements beneath this outward splendour. Napoleon, by espousing an Austrian Princess, had banished all appearance of probability from his project of overturning the old Dynasties, and in some degree assuaged the bitter hatred with which the Austrians regarded him; but he had not recompensed them for the losses which he had compelled them to endure during fifteen years; he had not consoled Prussia for her reverses, nor made Germany forget her humiliations. He had wounded Prussia incurably in the proceedings with respect to his marriage, and by his loyal but haughty refusal of the convention with respect to Poland; and his Austrian marriage had provided it with a most fertile source of suspicions. Italy remained cruelly lacerated by his seizures of territory; the war in Spain was a constantly

bleeding wound, and the hatred of England a source of hostilities to which there appeared no limit. To meet these various difficulties, it was necessary to maintain in the North, the East and the South, innumerable troops, the support of which was thrown by the peace entirely on France, and to supply which, every French household was filled with grief and desolation. To crown all, although there was not, as yet, any direct schism between them, Napoleon was engaged in the most complicated disputes with the Pope. This state of affairs, which was visible to his enemies, who rejoiced in it, unperceived by his friends, who were unwilling to see it, and comprehended in all its bearings by those wise spirits alone, who are always so rare, and so rarely attended to, was by no means wholly concealed from the discernment of Napoleon; and presented no insurmountable difficulties, if only a moderation which was foreign to his proud and passionate character, and a determination to complete the designs on hand before entering on new ones, had aided him in his struggle with the circumstances by which he was surrounded.

If, for example, he had devoted his utmost attention towards deriving from his recent marriage, the advantages which it offered; gradually instilling a feeling of confidence into Austria, inspiring it with hope, and restoring to it, as the price of a sincere alliance, the Illyrian provinces, which were of no advantage to himself; if he had appeased Germany by a complete evacuation; if he had rather restricted the limits of the Empire, than extended them by continual additions; if, whilst he was endeavouring to render the continental blockade more vigorous, he had not made it a pretext for fresh invasions; if he had thrown into Spain an overwhelming army, and that mightiest of all his forces, himself; if he had refrained from every war until that had been concluded; if he had inflicted on England such a blow in the Peninsular, as would have forced her to sue for peace; if he had known how to manage those religious parties, which he had only flattered for his own ends, and to bring Pius VII. to an arrangement which he desired from the bottom of his heart; if, having secured the Empire from danger without, by a general peace, he had known how to grant some liberty to the spirit which was beginning to arouse itself from within,—he might have hindered a great catastrophe, or at least have prolonged the existence of the too vast edifice which he had raised; we say prolonged, for to have rendered it enduring, he must have courageously removed acquisitions which the very nature of things condemned, he must have renounced the prefectships at Rome, at Florence, and at Laybach, and have confined his dominions

to those limits between the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees, which Europe at that period would not have been inclined to dispute with us; and how magnificent an empire would that have been, which would have comprised Gênoa, mount Cenis, the Simplon, Geneva, Huninguen, Mayence, Wesel, Antwerp, and Flushing.

It is said, that before it hurls men to destruction, Providence, even as an indulgent mother, warns them and invites them to reflection and amendment. At Eylau, at Baylen, at Essling, Providence had clearly indicated to Napoleon the bounds beyond which he should not attempt to pass, and in granting him the victory at Wagram, after the difficult Austrian campaign, in bestowing upon him a wife of the blood of the Cæsars to bear him an heir to his new empire, it seems to have been granting him time to retrace his steps, and to attain a position of safety. Napoleon's rare penetration perceived the true value of the moment, and was anxious to seize the good it offered; since his return to Paris he had devoted himself to reassuring Europe, of appeasing Germany, of putting an end to the war in Spain, of disarming or of vanquishing England, of arranging the French finances, silencing religious disputes, and in short, of bestowing repose upon an exhausted world. Unhappily, he set to work to remove these difficulties in the same spirit as that in which he had aroused them; instead of untying the knot, he strove to break it, and from this period his genius, always vast, was less happy in its movements, and less adroit.

One of his first acts after his marriage, was to address a circular to the diplomatic agents of the empire, from which they were to take their official tone; "This circular," wrote Napoleon to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was charged with its compilation, "will not be printed, but it will serve as a text-book to my agents. You will say in it, that one of the principal means which the English make use of for the purpose of reviving the flame of continental war, is a supposition that I intend to overthrow the Dynasties. Circumstances having placed me in the position of having to choose a spouse, I have been anxious to deprive them of this terrible pretext, for exciting nations and sowing anew those seeds of discord which have already covered Europe with blood. Nothing has appeared to me more calculated to calm these disquietudes than a demand by me in marriage of an Arch-duchess of Austria. The brilliant and distinguished qualities of the Arch-duchess Marie-Louise, of which I have had particular information, have induced me to act in conformity with my policy. My demand having been made, and agreed to by the Emperor of Austria, the Prince of Neufchatel has &c. I

have been much rejoiced at this opportunity of reconciling two great nations, of giving a proof of my esteem for the Austrian nation, and the inhabitants of the city of Vienna. You will add that I desire that their language should be consistent with the ties of kindred which unite me to the House of Austria, without however uttering any expression which could effect my intimate alliance with the Emperor of Russia."

All the policy of Napoleon at this moment was directed to these ends. To enter into an alliance with Austria, to which bonds of kindred now attached him, without becoming alienated from Russia, which he had not ceased to make the groundwork of his system of alliance, was for some time his chief object. He hastened to effect the evacuation of the Austrian States, showed an accommodating disposition in respect to the payment of the war contributions, consented to a loan which Austria desired to open at Amsterdam, and even favoured it by an indirect intervention; and listened complacently to some vague discourse, with reference to the final settlement of the Illyrian provinces, the restitution of which would have been a handsome marriage gift for the court of Vienna. The most gracious reception was accorded to M. de Metternich, whom the Emperor Francis had sent to Paris to arrange the new relations between the two countries, which would be the result of the marriage.

M. de Metternich on entering the Austrian Cabinet, in which he remained for almost forty years, introduced a policy which differed much from that of his predecessors—that of a good understanding with France. In order to prepare the way for this he was anxious to visit Paris; firstly to guide the first steps of the young Empress in a court of which he knew all the intricacies, and secondly to obtain certain knowledge whether the conqueror was about to adopt pacific views in the midst of the sweets of a brilliant marriage, or only intended to make it the starting point for new and vaster enterprises. Some weeks devoted to this twofold object would not be time lost, and the Emperor Francis had consented that his future Minister, before entering on his duties, should undertake at Paris this important mission.

Napoleon received Metternich most graciously and made every effort to please him. He was above all things anxious that he should witness the happiness of the young Empress, and be able to calm the anxiety which the Emperor Francis felt with regard to the fortunes of his daughter. One day, indeed, M. de Metternich having demanded an interview with the Emperor at a time when he happened to be with the Empress, he was immediately conducted to the private apart-

ments of the Palace, and Napoleon himself led him to the chamber of Marie-Louise, saying, "come and see with your own eyes the wretchedness of your young Arch-Duchess and the state of continual terror in which she passes her days;" and then, after a few moments, he added, leaving the room, "I leave you with Madam, that you may receive her confidences, hearken to her complaints, and be able to report them to the Emperor Francis!" M. de Metternich, surprised and almost embarrassed by such freedom, remained with the Empress, who appeared perfectly happy in her new position, and said to him with more spirit than she was in the habit of showing, "I suppose you think at Vienna that I live in great awe of my redoubtable husband! Ah! well, you may tell my countrymen that he is more afraid of me than I of him." And indeed, when Marie-Louise happened to be guilty of some inadvertence, which was very excusable in the midst of persons and circumstances which were equally strange to her, Napoleon scarcely dared to speak to her on the subject, and gave her by the mouth of M. de Meneval or the Arch-Chancellor the advice which he hesitated to give in his own person.

The conversation of M. de Metternich with Marie-Louise had continued almost an hour, when some one tapped at the door and Napoleon entered, saying gaily—"Ah, well! Madam, you have told it all? you have laid bare your whole heart? And this marriage is much to be regretted, is it not, as regards the happiness of the woman whom it has made my wife? Write all that you have heard to the Emperor Francis without scruple and without reserve." He then carried off M. de Metternich to discuss with him those weighty matters which would naturally employ the interviews between Napoleon and a person who was destined soon to become the first Minister of the court of Vienna. Unfortunately, in the midst of all this ostentatious suavity, Napoleon, when serious affairs came to be discussed, when this or that power was the subject of his discourse, would give way to sallies of haughtiness, rancour, and ambition, which terrified him whom he was so anxious to conciliate. Thus this lion which at one moment slumbered beneath the hand which caressed it, would at the next arouse itself with roars, if any unexpected object had excited its terrible instincts.

The relations with Russia were still in an unsettled state, disturbed as they had been by Napoleon's abrupt withdrawal from the projected marriage, by the tone which he had adopted towards that country, immediately upon his alliance with Austria, and his rejection of the convention relating to Poland. With respect to the projected marriage, indeed,

Napoleon had instructed M. de Coulaincourt to assert at St. Petersburg, that the hesitation of the Russian Court, and above all, the extreme youth of the Princess had forced him to accept the Austrian Archduchess, in whose person were united all those qualifications which were most calculated to effect, and had already effected, a sincere intimacy between the courts of Paris and Vienna, whilst there was nothing in this marriage which could cause any alteration in the political system of alliances which remained based, as it ever had been, on an intimate union between the two empires of the east and the west; that Napoleon earnestly desired that the Russians might be victorious over the Turks, and that the Emperor Alexander might secure possession of the left bank of the Danube, namely Moldavia and Wallachia, in conformity with the secret stipulations of Tilsit; that, with regard to Poland, he was at all times ready to sign an agreement not to favour any attempt to re-establish the ancient kingdom of Poland, but that he could not enter into any general, absolute, and too presumptuous engagement, that Poland should never be re-established as a kingdom.—"That," to use his own words, "depends neither on the Emperor Alexander nor on me, whatever may be our greatness, but on God, who is more powerful than either. I can undertake not to provoke, yea, even not to assist the designs of Providence, but I cannot promise to fetter them!" Exquisite modesty! which once more came to his aid, and which was always of such great use to him, as a shield against the arguments of his adversaries! But the point of the sword gleamed out from amidst all this complaisance, as he added expressions of the deep regret with which he saw that Russia desired to pass beyond the line of the Danube, and further expressed an earnest hope, that in return for Finland, which was already, and for Moldavia and Wallachia, which were about to be annexed to her dominions, she would maintain the most rigorous hostility towards England. All which was said in a mingled tone of courtesy, friendship and haughtiness, which would not have wounded a power entirely friendly, but was ill-calculated to reassure an ally partially estranged. M. de Romanoff at St. Petersburg, and M. de Kourakin at Paris, listened to these explanations with an appearance of great satisfaction, for Alexander was unwilling to show any dissatisfaction he might feel, lest it should be attributed to the failure of that matrimonial treaty, to which he had only assented in the hope that it might secure to him the acquisition of the left bank of the Danube; and to fulfil this part of his duty to the utmost of his power, M. de Kourakin, although attacked with gout on the day of the

marriage ceremony, caused himself to be carried, covered with gold and precious stones, to the Chapel of the Louvre, that he might display, in the midst of his anguish, an expression of joy which was sufficiently laughable, and exhaust himself in praises of the beauty of the young Empress, so far as to embarrass M. de Metternich himself, who, not knowing how to reply to the Russian's repeated compliments, at length said: "Yes, she is fair, but not pretty."

Always active, Napoleon lost no time in arranging matters with a view to his wise intention of evacuating Germany. By the last treaty of peace he had preserved the two Tyrols, the German and the Italian, and acquired Salzburg and some districts upon the right of the Inn. Of his former conquests there remained to him the principality of Bayreuth in the high palatinate, Hainault and Fuld in Franconia, Erfurt and many other districts in Saxony, Maidenburg in Westphalia, and Hanover in the north of Germany. These various territories he now resolved to distribute, and, after having extorted part of their value in the shape of money or gifts to his generals, to withdraw from them all the troops which were not necessary for the defence of the new kingdom of Westphalia.

Napoleon, as was natural, transferred to Bavaria all that he had acquired on the Inn and in Upper Austria; and resigned to it L'Inviertel, Salzburg, the German Tyrol, and a part of the Italian Tyrol, reserving to the kingdom of Italy that portion which was necessary to give it a good border line. He granted, moreover, to Bavaria the Principality of Ratisbon, and the Principality of Bayreuth. All which liberality went far to indemnify Bavaria for its exertions and expenses during the last war; and whilst these various arrangements sufficiently enlarged the territories of his allies, they rendered their boundaries more convenient. Ulm fell to the lot of Wurtemberg, whilst Ratisbon and Bayreuth were transferred to Bavaria.

As the price of these concessions of territory, Napoleon demanded that no recompense should be required for the support of his armies whilst in Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden. To Marshal Davoust, whose well known energy and probity were the best of guarantees, was entrusted the due execution of the evacuation.

Napoleon demanded also of Bavaria that the grants which had been made to soldiers of all grades in the ceded provinces, should be confirmed, or redeemed at a fixed rate; and further, that it should advance a sum of thirty million francs in repayment of the vast expenses to which he had

been put by this campaign. But even under these conditions Bavaria obtained advantages which fully balanced the sacrifices she was called upon to make. Napoleon recommended her to bestow upon the Tyrol, the possession of which was now fully confirmed to her, a satisfactory constitution, as he had, in ceding to Baden the various ports of the Palatinate, demanded fair treatment for the Catholics; for it was a remarkable trait in his character, that when the hero was not misled by his passions, the wisdom and humanity of the statesman were alike visible.

Our allies of the south of Germany having been satisfied and their territories evacuated, Napoleon bestowed all his attention upon its central and northern territories; and took into consideration the fortunes of the Prince Primate, late elector and archbishop of Mayence, who had become chancellor and president of the confederation of the Rhine, and whose endowment was partly in the principality of Ratisbon, which had been lately granted to Bavaria, and partly in the tolls of the Rhine navigation, which produced a very variable and uncertain revenue. Napoleon desired to show favour to this prince, who was devoted to his interests, and bestowed upon him the principalities of Fulda and Hainault, on condition that he should cede some portions of territory to the Duchies of Hainault and Hesse-Darmstadt, Ratisbon to Bavaria, and the Rhine dues to the Treasury Extraordinary.

By this arrangement a new advantage accrued to Napoleon, which had reference to the fortunes of Prince Eugene, who remained without princely endowment in consequence of the Austrian marriage. There was no longer any hope of an act of adoption in favour of the Viceroy, since there was every expectation that Napoleon would have children; and as it never entered into Napoleon's views to separate the kingdom of Italy from the Empire, the Prince Eugene, possessed for the term of his own life of the Viceroyalty of Italy, had no territory descendible to his heirs. Of a sweet and submissive temperament, this prince was very dear to Napoleon, who was the more anxious to treat him with no neglect, as he had already caused him deep pain by the repudiation of his mother the Empress Josephine; and moreover, the Princess Augusta of Bavaria, whom the Viceroy had espoused, a lady worthy of her rank and endowed with a remarkable strength of character, attacked him with earnest remonstrances, reminding him of the duty he had imposed upon himself by taking her from one of the most ancient thrones in Europe to make her the wife of a man who had neither princely birth nor patrimony; and

she urged that he ought not leave her, in the midst of this distribution of crowns, without some endowment for her children. These remonstrances of the princess, and the pining grief of the Prince Eugene, touched Napoleon, and he bestowed upon them the reversion of the new grant which he was creating in favour of the Prince Primate, under the title of the Principality of Frankfort; the feeble health of the Primate affording a fair expectation that he would not long withhold its enjoyment from the family of the Prince Eugene.

In his desire to hasten the distribution and evacuation of the German territories, Napoleon proceeded to arrange with King Jerome various territorial and financial disputes which were still pending, and were the source of much uneasiness to the two brothers. King Jerome had caused some dissatisfaction to Napoleon during the last war, not from want of energy when in action, but from a certain dilatoriness in the conduct of the campaign; besides this, his administration had expended more in the service of luxury than in objects of utility, his system of government was not such as pleased the Germans, and he had permitted those of the French donees who had received grants of territory in Westphalia to suffer such vexations as Napoleon, in his zeal for the welfare of his soldiers would never have allowed them to endure. Nevertheless as King Jerome alone all of his brothers possessed a truly military spirit, and was always submissive and devoted, he continued to treat him with indulgence, although sometimes showing towards him, as towards all his family occasionally, an extreme severity.

He resolved therefore to bestow upon him Magdeburg and also Hanover, which was a large and fair portion yet unappropriated. Nor did this arrangement present any great additional obstacle in the way of a peace with England, for she seemed to have adopted a feeling that Hanover was not English, and it was sometimes even said that she was rejoiced at its loss. In return for this gift King Jerome undertook to maintain during the whole continuance of the war an army of 18,500 French troops, to be quartered in Westphalia; to pay the extraordinary contributions to the war which were still due from Hanover, and to recognize all the grants made in that country to the French soldiers.

Under these conditions King Jerome was declared Sovereign of Hesse, Westphalia and Hanover, having Cassel for his capital, and Magdeburg for his citadel, and becoming second only to the King of Prussia in the order of German Sovereigns.

These arrangements having been made, there remained in

our possession only the town of Erfurt, together with some tracts of country destined for the King of Saxony, grand duke of Warsaw; and the affairs of Germany were now settled in a manner calculated to endure just so long as the French empire.

In the preceding arrangements it will be observed that the support of a body of French troops was the price to be paid for the cession of Hanover; a condition which was at variance with Napoleon's idea of propitiating Germany by the withdrawal of his armies. But two reasons induced him to defer the complete execution of this plan, the one being founded on the state of Prussia, and the other having reference to the execution of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, which constituted what is called the continental blockade. The conduct of Prussia had been at times most unhappy and inconsistent, for nothing is more inconsistent than the agitated movements of distress. Whilst protesting its submission to the hard conditions signed at Tilsit; whilst affecting the greatest resignation, and manifesting an eager desire to repress the revolt of Schill, it sympathized most ardently with the patriotic struggles which it undertook to suppress, and for a moment indulged in the hope that it might be able to escape from the yoke which had fallen upon Germany. Nothing could be more natural and, let us add, more legitimate than this feeling, but unhappily for herself, Prussia had mingled these sentiments with actions of the gravest imprudence. She had recruited her regiments, bought horses, and collected certain bodies of troops under pretext of preparing the contingent promised to France; a pretext which was little calculated to blind a vision so keen as that of Napoleon. Prussia had moreover, in further pursuance of this line of conduct, made great delay in the payment of the contributions due from her, having permitted almost at the commencement of the war of 1809, bills to the amount of 22 millions, which she had subscribed to the treasury extraordinary to be protested. At first Napoleon had appeared to allow this delay to pass unnoticed, but after the peace of Vienna he had demanded the fulfilment of the obligation in a tone too peremptory to be disregarded; for although the Prussian court persisted in dwelling at Konigsberg partly from chagrin and partly from policy, it was no less in the power of Napoleon, and it found itself compelled to pay something, if not the whole. —"You have lost the opportunity," said Napoleon, "of rising, which was open to you by the exercise of simple good faith towards France. Had you been able to foresee that the last rising in Austria would lead only to defeat and fresh confiscations of territories, you would, without being compelled to augment the number of your troops, or

to increase your expenses, have closely allied yourself to me, have furnished me with the contingent of fifteen thousand men, which you promised, have honoured your signature, paid the twenty-two millions, and proved that you had frankly adopted the policy, which must always be yours, of a French alliance. I should then, most probably, have freed you from the remainder of your obligations, have exalted your position, enlarged your territories, and replaced you in the elevated position from which you have fallen. The adoption of this course would, it is very likely, have obtained for you Magdeburg, or even Hanover. But instead of aiding, you have threatened me, instead of spending money in the payment of your debt to me, you have expended it in arming against me; I am the victor, and it is time that you should expiate your errors, not by fresh losses of territory, but by the performance, at least, of your engagements; by the delay of which, you force me to leave garrisons on the Oder, and as a support to these garrisons to maintain troops on the Elbe. This continued military occupation of territory burdens me with heavy expenses and, which I much regret, forces me to make in the bosom of Germany a military demonstration which is an interruption to my political plans. You have deprived me of the revivifying repose for which I longed, and have done me as much moral as material injury. It is necessary that this state of things should come to an end, or I will take measures for paying myself; I will seize one of your provinces, Silesia perhaps, and give it to any one who will pay me what you owe!"

Such was the language which Napoleon held towards Prussia, accompanying it with detailed accounts, of which he demanded the settlement. Prussia, ever since the reduction of her debt, had remained a debtor of eighty-six millions, and Napoleon insisted that this debt should be satisfied by a payment of forty-eight millions, in monthly instalments, whilst the remaining thirty-eight millions were to be supplied by means of a Dutch loan. Terrified, Prussia promised full satisfaction of his demands, whilst she secretly determined to escape from the necessity of obeying them. Napoleon perceiving that if he abandoned the military posts which he held as pledges, his debt would never be paid, resolved to continue to occupy them with French and Polish troops; the latter having become, by training in our school, most excellent soldiers, and although nominally belonging to the King of Saxony, being in reality entirely devoted to the French cause. Glogan, Custrin, and Stettin, received Saxon Polish regiments, and as the French Artillery and Engineer corps of these places formed no more than a fifth-part of the effective

strength, the garrisons appeared to have lost their French character. To the troops in Stettin, which was of most importance, and was on the shore of the Baltic, Napoleon added a regiment of infantry, borrowed from the division of Marshal Davoust. Dantzic had become a sort of Hanseatic town, endowed with a fictitious independence and by treaty bound to receive, when a maritime war should render it needful, a French garrison. Under the specious and well grounded pretext, that the English would be eager to possess themselves of a town which was precious on account of its port, and its situation on the Vistula, he established there a garrison similar to those on the Oder, but of greater strength. And thus in a time of perfect peace, Napoleon took possession, with a force, which under the appearance of being Polish, was in reality French, of those important places, the possession of which gave him complete command of the Oder and the Vistula.

These military occupations were, there can be no doubt, irreconcilable with the peaceable spirit which Napoleon's policy had for the moment assumed, but they served to control Prussia, and would be a formidable base of operations against Russia if ever hostilities should be renewed with that power. Besides the Prussian debt, the threatening presence of the English in the Baltic, and the necessity of occupying the shore of this sea for the sake of watching the execution of the laws of blockade, offered sufficient explanation of the presence of the French troops to prevent their prolonged stay from destroying entirely the good effect produced by the evacuation of the rest of Germany. Besides these measures it was necessary to take others for the support of the garrisons on the Vistula and the Oder, to compel the Hanse towns to renounce commercial intercourse with Great Britain, and to coerce Holland, which paid no more attention to the continental blockade than as if it had been governed by a German or English Prince. Even when the governments attempted to keep good faith the communities under their charge were little affected by the existence of the blockade, and pursued a contraband trade which the most vigorous measures failed to prevent. The circumstance that the English trade was scarcely at all cramped with Holland, which had become a French monarchy, sufficiently proved the difficulty of maintaining efficiently the continental blockade, and Napoleon having just now both leisure and troops at his disposal, determined to conduct in person this kind of warfare, which was certainly the most effective he could possibly have directed against England.

Having carried the policy of evacuation to the furthest

extent, Napoleon distributed his troops with great ability, and with strict regard to the various objects of calming the apprehension of Germany, supporting the garrisons of the Vistula and the Oder, occupying the coasts of the Baltic, the north sea and Holland, of reassembling an army at the camp of Boulogne, of dispatching considerable reinforcements to Spain, and finally of putting in force that system of economy which the state of his finances rendered so necessary. He had sent to Laybach the army of Dalmatia, which had come from Zara to Vienna under the command of Marshal Marmont, and he decided that it should be supported by the Illyrian provinces. He had sent the army of Italy to the plains of Friuli, Venice, and Lombardy. He had from time to time turned back towards Spain all the reinforcements which had been marched upon the Danube, during the negotiations which were to put an end to the Austrian war. There remained the three corps of the Marshalls Davoust, Massena, and Oudinot, which constituted the strength of the grand army at Ratisbon, Essling and Wagram. Withdrawn successively from the Austrian base of operations in Bavaria and Swabia, they had subsisted during the treaty upon the provinces intended for the allies, the cost of their maintenance being defrayed to these monarchs in advance, in the shape of ceded territories. Napoleon finally adopted the following mode of distribution. The corps of Marshal Oudinot, which was composed of a division of old regiments under the brave general, St. Hilaire, and of two divisions of the fourth battalions, was broken up and distributed along the coasts of France. The regiments of St. Hilaire's division were divided between Cherbourg, St. Malo, and Brest, as a menace against England; and the two divisions of the fourth battalions, which belonged to the regiments engaged in the war with Spain, were quartered in the neighbourhood of Rochfort in Bordeaux, to be ready to throw themselves upon the Pyrenees, if the hundred thousand men already sent thither should prove insufficient. The corps of Marshal Massena, more distinguished for its valour than its numbers, passed from Swabia to Franconia, and descended the Rhine to occupy the camp at Boulogne, Brabant, and the frontiers of Holland; the chief division being established at Embden, to be in connection with the Hanse towns.

Napoleon determined that the corps of Marshal Davoust, which was altogether the finest and best disciplined, should supply the troops for the occupation of the North of Germany; and he had many reasons for this choice. By always fixing the residence of this corps in northern climates he

hoped to preserve to it its vigorous temperament, its warlike manners, and to almost entirely destroy its remembrance of its native soil. Its troops, moreover, as sober and steadfast as their chief, were exactly suited to a kind of service which exposed those who were charged with its execution to a dangerous corruption. And finally, if it should ever become necessary to give a decided blow to the Great Empire of the North, this corps would serve as the head of the weapon; for, we must unhappily repeat, Napoleon cherished in the midst of projects for a sincere peace, those warlike ideas which were sooner or later to overthrow the most pacific resolutions.

The three divisions, Morand, Friant, and Gudin, although almost completely organized, yet underwent some modification. One of the regiments of the St. Hilaire division was annexed to them, together with General Bruyère's division of cuirassiers, the light cavalry division of General Jacquinot, and a vast park of siege artillery. The expenses of this superb corps were divided between the kingdom of Westphalia, the Hanse towns, and the places held in pledge. General Gudin was directed to watch Hanover, General Morand the Hanse towns, and General Friant Magdeburg and the Elbe. To Marshal Davoust fell the duty of occupying himself under the cold climate of the North with the instruction of the troops and the rigorous application of the laws of blockade.

The divisions of heavy cavalry which had habitually served under Marshal Davoust re-entered France, with the exception of the Bruyère division, which remained in the North. The cuirassiers of Spain, now the cuirassiers of Padua, were put upon a peace footing and quartered in Normandy, where fodder abounded. The carabiniers and the cuirassiers, formerly St. Germain, were spread over Lorraine and Alsatia. The men past service returned to their homes with rewards; the young soldiers were sent back to their depôts to receive further instructions. The cavalry regiments were reduced from the effective force of a thousand horses to that of about six hundred. The horses of the artillery, always a source of great expense, were partly sent to Illyria, where they were fed at the cost of a conquered province, partly to Alsatia and Lorraine, where Napoleon had sometimes thought of entrusting them to the peasants, partly to Spain where it was necessary to provide vast parks of artillery for the siege of the fortified places. Finally the useless staffs were dissolved; that attached to Davoust's corps alone being retained upon a war footing.

Napoleon, willing to grant some repose to the population

of the Empire, and to permit it to taste the sweets of peace had resolved to levy no conscription in 1810. He calculated on a double saving, by the reduction of the standing army, and the relinquishment for the present year of the expenses of the equipment of recruits. He had proposed to send to Spain, independently of the guard which he wished to forward in all its completeness to the Pyrenees, a reinforcement of a hundred thousand men, to be followed by a reserve of thirty thousand, for the supply of which, the levies of the preceding and the current years were sufficient. We have seen that the provisional demi-brigades, formed of fourth and fifth battalions, at first led towards Swabia, Franconia, and Flanders, and subsequently turned towards Spain, had been definitely forwarded to the Pyrenees. Napoleon supplied them with all that the depôts afforded, in order that they might arrive in the Peninsula as complete as possible. He took all the disposable strength to be found in the depôts of the light cavalry to the twelve regiments of Chasseurs and Hussars, which were still in Spain. He had broken up during the Austrian campaign, the twenty-four regiments composing the Dragoon force, the third and fourth battalions, in order to conduct them to the Danube in temporary groups. When peace had been concluded, he sent them towards the Pyrenees, drafting into their ranks all the conscripts of the last levies, who were suitable for service in this arm; in this manner all the dragoons had been thrown into Spain.

By these various contrivances, in the employment of which he excelled, Napoleon had preserved the nucleus of a powerful army in the north, had surrounded the Hanse towns with a net-work of troops of observation, had lightened as far as possible the expenses of his armies, and thrown upon the Peninsula all his disposable forces. Spain, he said, must pay the expenses of the war of which she is the theatre and the cause. Napoleon entertained an angry feeling with respect to this war, which made itself felt not only by the country, but by King Jerome himself; for the latter, living in a state of humiliating subjection, and discontented with the arrogance of the French generals towards himself and their excesses against the Spaniards, either affected to, or really did believe, that if left to his own course, he could do more by means of his own persuasions towards effecting the pacification of Europe, than Napoleon would ever do by his armies, and had drawn upon himself both blame and suspicion.

Napoleon irritated at the immense expenses which yet left our armies in want of every necessary, wrote to Joseph

the most severe and peremptory letters. "The whole revenue of France will not suffice for the expenses of the Spanish army, unless I put to them some limit. My empire is drained of men and money, and I am compelled to pause. The last Austrian war has cost me more than was estimated; the Walcheren expedition has drawn from my treasury the most considerable sums, and if I continue this extravagance, my treasury will be completely exhausted. It is necessary, therefore, that the war in Spain should support itself, and that the King should furnish the chief part of the expense of the artillery, the remounts for the cavalry, of the hospitals, and of the subsistence of the troops. All that I shall be able to afford, will be a supply of two millions a month for the pay. I can do no more. Spain is a wealthy country, and well able to bear the expenses of which she is the cause. The King is fond of cherishing at Madrid the favourites to whom he owes no gratitude; let him take care of the soldiers to whom he owes his crown. Should he not do this, I will deprive him of the administration of the Spanish provinces; I will govern them by the hands of my generals, and take care to collect from them, as from all the other countries in which my troops have been quartered, the necessary expenses. Let these intimations be attended to, for my determination is irrevocable, and it is irrevocable because it is founded on unavoidable necessity."

Napoleon had good reason to be uneasy with respect to the finances; for to preserve well organised, and well provided, the numerous armies by means of which he controlled Europe, from the Vistula to the Tagus, from Calais to the borders of the Save, he had to expend as much gold as men, and in carrying on an actual campaign, he was in as much danger of exhausting his treasury as of depopulating the country. He had for many years passed the proper limit of expenses by about fifty millions in time of peace, and about eighty or a hundred in time of war. The last Austrian campaign had cost even more than this last amount, and had been maintained out of the "Treasury of the Army," known by the title of the "Treasury Extraordinary;" and this, although very considerable, was now seriously diminished, for it was from this source that Napoleon rewarded his soldiers, furnished grand monuments for the capital, and aided distressed populations. This treasury was reduced, as has already been said, at the moment of the Austrian war, to 292 millions. This war had increased it by 170 millions, the sale of the Spanish wools had added to it ten millions, a cession of the treasure upon the mount Napoleon, ten millions more, and it had

thus reached the amount of 492 millions. Napoleon had borrowed of it, eighty-four millions for the Austrian war, twenty-eight for the Louvre and various public buildings, twelve for dotations, four for some extraordinary expenses of the crown, and it was left at 354 millions.

It must be added, that this sum did not wholly consist of actual treasure, for it was partly made up of charges on the vanquished states, and the chief of these consisted in the eighty-six millions owed by Prussia, the payment of which, Napoleon had some difficulty, as we have seen, in obtaining. And we must observe, that the eighty-four millions borrowed of this treasury, for the Austrian campaign, do not represent the whole expense of that war, which had amounted altogether to a total of 480 millions.

It was necessary then to husband this "Treasure Extraordinary." Napoleon knew very well, that with armies maintained in Illyria, Italy, Germany, Holland, and Spain, although a portion of them were supported by the occupied countries, the sum of 350 millions, granted to the two Ministers of War, would not suffice. He foresaw that an excess of forty or fifty millions would disturb the fictitious balance of the Revenue, and he had provided more than one resource by which to supply this amount. These resources consisted, first, of the possessions of the great Spanish families, prosecuted as guilty of high treason, and secondly, of the numerous seizures of the goods of the false neutrals who had thronged all the ports, both of the empire and its allies, which also amounted to several hundred millions. Napoleon hoped therefore, by observing a rigid economy, to be able to meet the expenses of those armies which the state of Europe, quiet but not resigned, and the Spanish war, successfully prosecuted, but not terminated, required.

We are now able to form some idea on the projects which Napoleon had conceived, for putting an end to his long conflict with Europe. The troops which were to evacuate Germany, were still to hold the north of the continent in check, and to guard the coasts against British commerce, whilst the young recruits which the Austrian war no longer required, were to be incorporated with the old Spanish army, which they would complete and invigorate. He proposed to join his own guard, which he had sent forward in the spring of 1810, after having given it some months of repose, to gather under his own command a hundred thousand men to drive the English into the sea, and by the infliction of a terrible disaster, to give an irresistible preponderance to the peace party in the English parliament.

Besides the infliction of a great blow on the English army,

Napoleon had resolved on another efficacious means of obtaining peace, and this was, the rigorous observance of the continental blockade, which had been maintained with rigor in the ports of old France alone, had been much relaxed in the ports of new France, and had been totally disregarded in the allied states, such as Hanover, Holland, the Hanse towns, and Denmark. His ardour for this kind of warfare was not less than that which he felt for that which is waged on the battle field. To inflict a great blow on England, it was not only necessary to drive from the continent her cotton fabrics, or metallurgical products, but also her colonial merchandize, such as sugar, coffee, unmanufactured cotton, dyes, woods, &c., which constituted the money with which the inhabitants of the West and East Indies paid for the manufactured products of Manchester and Birmingham. Indeed, not only did its own colonies pay in colonial merchandize, but also the French and Dutch colonies which it had become possessed of, and it was obliged to dispose of this in Europe, before it could obtain the price of its commercial and industrial operations. For the disposal of this merchandize, the English had put in practice some sufficiently ingenious contrivances. Thus, besides the great depôt of London, where all the neutrals were obliged to touch, to take in a part of their cargo, they had established other depôts at Acre, Malta, and Heligoland, where they accumulated enormous heaps of merchandize, and whither the contraband traders went to obtain the materials for their clandestine traffic. At Heligoland, for example, they had formed a singular establishment. Heligoland is an island situated in the North Sea, opposite the mouth of the Elbe, divided into a low part where it is easy to disembark from ships, and a high part with which the only communication is by a ladder of two hundred steps, which could be easily destroyed in a few moments. Six hundred English, provided with a numerous artillery, defended this high part and the magazines which were established there, containing merchandize of the value of three or four hundred millions. An English flotilla cruised constantly about the low part of the island to defend the approaches. It was from them that the contraband trades obtained the merchandize which they carried into the continent in spite of the laws of Napoleon. The farmers who cultivated the lands along the coasts were the receivers of these smuggled goods, which were taken from them during the night and spread abroad far and wide; and this kind of fraud was practised not only in the Hanse towns, but throughout the whole of Holland, notwithstanding its connections with France. The populations of these various countries aided the contrabandists to the utmost of

their power, joined with them in assailing the custom-house officers, in disarming them, and seducing them from their duty.

Independently of this contraband trade, almost open smuggling was carried on by pretended neutrals, who introduced the interdicted products in abundance into the ports of France or its allies.

To understand the part played by these false neutrals, we must recall to recollection the English and French decrees, so often cited in this history, and composing then the maritime legislation. The English had in 1806 declared all the ports of France, from Brest to the mouths of the Elbe, in a state of blockade, although they had not sufficient force to close them. Napoleon had immediately replied to this fictitious blockade by a general blockade of the British Isles, had prohibited all communication with them, and interdicted access to his ports, not only to all English ships, but to all that had touched at her shores or those of her colonies.

To this decree England had replied by those famous orders in council of 1807, which forbade any neutral ship from sailing on the seas, which had not touched at the port of London, at Malta, or certain other British ports, for the purpose of having its cargo examined, of paying enormous tolls, and taking out a license of navigation. It was to this extraordinary assumption of authority over the ocean that Napoleon had replied by his decree of Milan, which declared denationalized and fair prizes whatever ships should have submitted to the rules of this odious legislation.

Between these two tyrannies, therefore, the unhappy mariners of neutral nations found themselves; compelled on the one hand to visit London for the sake of obtaining the required license, and exposed on the other hand to capture by the French for having taken it. It is impossible to urge any excuse for either of these tyrannical enactments; unless it may be alleged in extenuation of the second of them that it was provoked by the first. The English pushed their demands to the extent that all the naval commerce of the Mediterranean was compelled to touch at Malta, and all that of other seas at London, to obtain the license, without which a vessel was liable to seizure. The Dutch, for example, who obtained the salt which they required for their salted provisions on the coast of France, were forced to pay in London for permission to import this important element of their chief branch of trade.

The Americans, indignant at this double violation of the rights of neutrals, which they chiefly attributed to the fault of the English, whom they considered to have given the first

provocation, had passed an act, called the law of Embargo, by which they had prohibited their vessels from navigating between France and England, and even from entering Europe. They had thus confined their commerce to their own coasts, and had formed a resolution to manufacture their own cotton, and declared liable to seizure every French or English ship which should touch on the American coasts.

The American owners of privateers, however, less proud than the American government, had to a large extent infringed these laws, which were more dictated by feelings of honour than those of interest. As therefore the Embargo only referred to those which had entered the ports, the greater number of these persons had kept their vessels afloat on the open sea, in the hope that the new regulations would only last for one or two years, and they went from port to port on account of the houses by which they had been chartered. Almost all proceeded to England where they took in cargoes of the colonial produce with which the warehouses of London overflowed, and sometimes on their own account, but more frequently on the account of English, Dutch, Hanseatic, Danish, or Russian merchants, taking out licences, had themselves conveyed by the British fleets, entered Cronstadt, Riga, Dantzig, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Amsterdam, even touched at Antwerp, Havre, and Bordeaux, presented themselves in all these ports as neutrals on the ground of being Americans, declared that they had had no communication with England, were readily believed in Russia, Prussia, at Hamburg, and in Holland, where there existed a great willingness to be deceived, and found little difficulty at Antwerp, Havre, and Bordeaux, in setting at defiance the vigilance of the officers of government, who were seldom able by the most minute search to establish the fact of communication with England or submission to its laws.

In the Mediterranean the Greeks, who then laid the foundation of their commercial prosperity under the Ottoman flag, went to Malta for sugar, coffee, and English cottons, which they transported to Trieste, Venice, Naples, Genoa, and Marseilles, giving themselves out to be neutrals on the ground of their being Ottoman, and there was as much difficulty in proving this fraud as in the case of the Americans.

France had a great interest in putting an end to this illegitimate commerce; for if England should be unable to dispose in Europe of the colonial produce which she received from her own colonies, or that which she received in payment for her manufactures from the colonies of other nations, her immense commerce must instantly come to an end. The enormous number of bills, founded on this colonial merchan-

dize, which were deposited in the Bank of England, would have been protested, to a greater or less extent, the credit of the bank would have received a blow, and its notes which, since the suppression of payments in silver, were the only, or at least the chief medium of exchange in England, would have been struck by an immediate discredit. And the exchange on England which was already very low, the pound sterling which was usually worth twenty-five francs being now worth no more than seventeen francs, would have fallen still lower, the bank note would have been at a discount of thirty per cent, the pound sterling would have been worth on the continent no more than fourteen or fifteen francs, and all affairs, both public and private, would have been thrown into confusion. And how, in that case, would it have been possible to procure those productions of which English luxury was unwilling to be deprived even in time of war? How, moreover, could a maintenance have been provided for the English armies in the Peninsular, which were unable to obtain either bread or wine except by payment? If we consider, also, that there were in England two political parties, whose strength, generally unequal, was nevertheless frequently balanced on certain questions, and that one of these was eager for war whilst the other was as desirous of peace, we shall be easily able to understand that to add to great military reverses a fresh commercial blow, would have been to have given the victory to the peace party, and to have arrived at that moment when, peace prevailing both by sea and land, Napoleon's work would have been at length accomplished.

However violent were the means which Napoleon found himself compelled to employ, we can scarcely fail to excuse them when we reflect on the importance of the ends he had in view. We must even be convinced that his chief mistake consisted in not having sufficiently persevered in carrying out these views. Perceiving immediately, that it was scarcely possible to discover whether the pretended neutrals had or had not submitted to the English regulations, he took an important step which at once cut short the difficulty. He was unwilling that either Ottoman or American vessels should be received into the French ports, and determined with respect to the former, that they should be only received provisionally, that their papers should be sent to Paris, inspected by the director of the Customs and by himself, and that they should only be exempted from confiscation on passing satisfactorily this rigorous examination. There was little inconvenience to be feared from treating with severity the Greek pretended Turks, for the Porte interested

himself but little in their favour, and was, moreover, held but in little esteem.

With respect to the Americans, the difficulty was greater. They not only visited France, but also Holland, Germany, Prussia, and Russia, countries in which a command to be obeyed, required to be supported by plausible reasons and great influence. The American belonged, moreover, to a powerful nation, which required judicious treatment, as there was some chance that by right management it might be induced to declare war against Great Britain. Napoleon prohibited the reception of Americans in the French, or quasi-French ports, and insisted that they should not be permitted to enter those of Prussia or Russia, alleging very justly, that those who attempted to do so, could not but be false Americans. Some of those who took the title had, indeed, assumed it without any just claim, and others were men who, having renounced their own country for a greater or less time, and adopted in its stead the British masts, had no longer any right to the support of their government. It was possible therefore, to contest their right to the protection of the American flag. In putting an end to their traffic, the commerce of Great Britain was demolished and reduced to the nocturnal smuggling which took place along the badly watched coasts.

Napoleon went even farther in respect to them, and not contented with closing against them the ports of the continent, ordered their seizure in the ports of France or its dependents, and energetically implored a similar treatment of them in Prussia, Denmark, and Russia; alleging in support of his demand, a reason, to which he pretended to give more weight than it really had with himself: namely, the seizure in America of the French vessels which, touching at the ports of the Union, had violated the laws of embargo. There were, indeed, three or four which, having had the boldness to venture on the Atlantic had violated, either consciously or not, this American law, and had been seized; there were these three or four, we say, against the hundreds of American vessels which, having entered the French ports, were seized and sequestered. "It is a real injury," said the American minister, who was charged with the duty of defending at Paris his countrymen; "it is a real injury to us for an imperceptible one suffered by France." "The extent of the injury is nothing," said Napoleon, "the honour of the flag is everything. You have laid your hands on French vessels, under the protection of my flag, and a single touch is sufficient to justify me in seizing the whole American marine, were it in my power." But this was merely an

ostensible reason, and Napoleon was not so incensed about the matter as he pretended to be.

He merely sought some specious pretext for seizing in Holland, France, and Italy, the numerous American vessels which carried on a fraudulent traffic for the English. He had, in truth, sequestered a considerable number and found in them what supplied his treasury almost as abundantly as the war contributions which he imposed upon the vanquished. But, nevertheless, perceiving the advantage he might derive from attaching the Americans to himself, he opened a negotiation with General Armstrong, who represented at Paris the government of the United States, and did not hesitate to admit that his decrees of Berlin, were in the nature of an outrage, but an outrage which an outrage had provoked. He maintained, that he had no other way of replying to the insolent pretensions of Britain to levying a toll upon the seas, and declared that he was ready to withdraw his decrees as far as the Americans were concerned, if they would undertake to resist British tyranny, and to oblige the British Cabinet to withdraw its famous orders in council, by the threat of a declaration of war. On this condition, he said, he was ready to restore to the Americans all the rights of neutrals.

This seizure of American vessels was not difficult in France, nor even in the Hanse towns at the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser, where there were encampments of French troops; but it was difficult in Holland, where King Louis opposed the wishes of his brother, and in Denmark, which served as a depôt for prohibited merchandize, and distributed it over the continent by the Holstein frontier; in the ports of Prussia, which felt no great anxiety to annoy its own people for the sake of securing a triumph to Napoleon over England, and in the parts of Prussia, which, having an extreme need of commerce with Britain for the disposal of its agricultural products, the sole wealth of its great noblemen, carried on under the American flag, a part of that traffic which she had promised at Tilsit and at Erfurt completely to resign.

That he met with resistance in Denmark, in Prussia, and in Russia, Napoleon admitted with scorn and anger; but when he found in Holland, a country vanquished by the arms of France, and bestowed as a kingdom upon one of his brothers, an ill-will more decided than in any other part of the European coast, he could not endure it with patience, and every instant threatened with some overwhelming blow, those rash ones who had dared to brave his wrath.

The simple announcement of this source of vexation to him will sufficiently inform us of the motive which led him,

in the recent distribution of his troops, to place a part of his ancient division Massena about the frontiers of Holland. Perceiving that he could not prevent the Dutch from engaging in contraband trade, he had issued a decree prohibiting all commercial intercourse with them. This was striking them a death blow, for being half separated from England by the war, and alienated from the continent by our laws, they were condemned to die of hunger. King Louis had then cast himself at his brother's feet, and promising to alter his line of conduct had obtained the withdrawal of the decree. But these promises had been broken immediately, and the Americans, despite our proclamations, admitted into all the Dutch ports. At this new act of disobedience, Napoleon, no longer able to restrain himself, had renewed the decree of separation and openly avowed his intention of reuniting Holland to France.

During some time, indeed, this idea had occupied his mind; for finding that even under his brother's government he was unable to obtain from Holland either efficient naval aid or genuine obedience to his commercial regulations, he prepared to reabsorb it in his empire. The sad and bitter language employed by King Louis was not calculated to make him change his project. His family, however, some remains of affection, and Europe, still restrained him. A person of whose merit he had taken much notice, and who was well acquainted with himself without being less attached to his country, Admiral Verhuel, took pains to prevent so shameful an affair, and entreated the two brothers to meet. Napoleon was averse to this from a fear that he might permit himself to be turned from his purpose when in his brother's presence; and King Louis dreaded no less that he might fall in Paris under a too powerful hand, and was, moreover, unwilling to meet the Queen Hortense, his wife, from whom he lived separated. However, at the instances of Admiral Verhuel, who took for each of the brothers the steps which neither was willing to take for himself, King Louis had quitted the Hague and come to Paris; and, as a first act of submission, had consented to the seizure of the American vessels which had entered the ports of Holland.

Napoleon had then employed himself in putting into execution the decrees in the other states of the north. To admit pretended neutrals in order to seize them, was a method which much pleased his unscrupulous spirit in the choice of means; he had had them seized by his own agents in the Hanse towns, and urged both Denmark and Prussia to allow them to enter their ports, that they might be able to seize them, reminding

them that they would only be seizing English vessels falsely pretending to be American. Denmark and Prussia timidly objected to this demand, that if there were many fraudulent traders there were also many honest ones, and that they took particular care, by a rigid examination of papers, to discover those which had touched at the English coasts. But Napoleon denied that it was possible to make any such distinction, for the least culpable had at any rate violated the American law, which prohibited American ships from visiting Europe. Some sufficiently bad reasons were murmured in answer to this; and a promise was given that his laws should be observed. There was little excuse for Denmark, for England had behaved towards her with implacable enmity, and France, on the other hand, with faithful friendship; the case in question regarded, moreover, the most sacred rights, for every state was interested in resisting the legislation which England desired to establish over maritime commerce. But Prussia, which was vanquished and oppressed, and had little interest in maritime questions, he readily excused for her unwillingness to forward the success of the political combinations of her vanquisher, and for a disinclination to contribute to it by enormous sacrifices. She did not positively refuse, however, to conform to Napoleon's wishes, but evaded explanations, and, in fact, admitted the American vessels without detaining them. Napoleon, who himself perused the correspondence of his consuls, and maintained the dispute in person, had proposed to Prussia an agreement worthy of the contrabandists against whom he waged war. Having heard that a numerous convoy of vessels sailing under the pretended American flag, was about to enter the ports of Old Prussia, "Let them enter," said Napoleon, "and then detain them; deliver up to me their cargoes, and I will receive them on account of the Prussian debt." And this strange agreement was on the point of succeeding.

Of all this northern coast there remained open to the Americans only Swedish Pomerania, which Napoleon intended to give up to Sweden, in consequence of a revolution which suddenly burst forth, but might have easily been expected under the government of a king whose continual extravagances compromised at times both the dignity and safety of his country.

We have seen how foolishly Gustavus IV. directed his forces in the war of Finland. Enraged against Denmark, instead of turning his attention towards Russia, with whom he might have long disputed the possession of Finland, he had carried the chief part of his forces towards Norway, for

the purpose of invading it, and towards the Sound, for the sake of threatening Copenhagen. The Swedes, exasperated at seeing themselves deprived of Finland by this unhappy disposition of their brave troops, revolted against their foolish king. The faithful servants of Gustavus, in vain entreated him to make the necessary sacrifices to the wishes of a nation justly enraged. He then fell into a kind of frenzy; cast his sword at an aide-de-camp, and had finally been disarmed, and confined as a madman. In this extremity, the States, in an extraordinary assembly, declared him incapable of reigning, and called to the throne his uncle, the Duke of Sudermanie, a wise and gentle prince, who, during the minority of the dethroned king, had already governed the kingdom with great prudence. To avoid the most imminent misfortunes, the new monarch immediately concluded peace with Russia and France.

Finland was the cost to Sweden of peace with Russia; but peace with France obtained for her, on the other hand, the restitution of Pomerania, and of the port of Stralsund, taken by the French in 1807, and occupied by them during the next three years. But Napoleon had made this restitution on condition that English vessels should be absolutely denied entrance into the Swedish ports, especially that of Stralsund, the most important of all, since it was situated on the German continent, and was in a position to neutralise the whole system of continental blockade. Unhappily it happened that after the loss of Finland, Sweden could feel no sacrifice more severely than that of the English commerce. At this epoch almost all the peoples of the Baltic, rich in agricultural products, and in things essential to maritime commerce, such as iron, wood, hemp, pitch and tar, were unable to do without both England and France, and certainly required commercial intercourse with either the one or the other. To be embroiled with France left them at liberty to trade with England, and rendered them, moreover, the medium of a profitable contraband commerce. But to be embroiled with England closed against them the British ports, without opening to them those of France, which were in a strict state of blockade, so that a misunderstanding with England was equivalent to a rupture with both these powers. The Swedes, after having promised to Napoleon to break with the English effectually closed against them the great depôt of Gothembourg, so conveniently situated for contraband purposes. But they had immediately permitted them to transfer this depôt to the isles in the neighbourhood of Gothembourg, and, following the example of all the humble dwellers on the shores of the Baltic, involved themselves in embarrass-

ments with France by means of forced promises perpetually violated.

Napoleon, who received very exact information from his consuls, was excessively displeased on learning that he was deceived in Sweden, as in the case of other nations, reiterated the motives which had induced him to declare war against Gustavus IV., and to conclude a peace with the Duke of Armaine, and announced his determination to re-occupy Swedish Pomerania, and to declare war once more against Sweden itself, whatever might be thonght of it by the Northern cabinets, if his injunctions with respect to British commerce were not exactly observed.

Of all the Northern cabinets, one only, that of Russia, made a show of resistance. This cabinet, dissembling its displeasure at the proceedings of Napoleon, in respect to the marriage question, and at his refusal to ally himself with her in respect to the Polish question, and dissembling also the uneasiness with which it viewed the recent intimacy which had sprung up between France and Austria, had good reasons for doing so for a time; for she was anxious to put an end to the war with the Turks, and to ensure the acquisition of Moldavia and Wallachia. But yet, although resolved to endure much, Alexander sustained the pride of a great nation, as well as that which filled his own heart.

Offended at the sovereignty which Napoleon pretended to exercise over all the coasts of the North, from Amsterdam, Bremen, Hamburg, as far as Riga and even to St. Petersburg, Alexander yet submitted to it patiently that he might keep the more clearly in view the objects of his Eastern policy; but a sentiment of self respect which was easy to be aroused, and agricultural and commercial interests which could not be so readily brought forward, made him desirous that Napoleon should behave with some moderation in respect to the ports in his own states. He urged, therefore, in reply to the French cabinet, the reason which had been adduced by all the other powers, and which availed nothing as long as the American law of Embargo was in force; namely, that all the American vessels were not sailing under false colours, that there were amongst them some which traded in good faith, that he admitted them alone into his ports, and that, being entirely deprived of all commerce with Great Britain, he was especially anxious to continue that with America. This argument was faulty, because the law of Embargo rendered every American vessel trading in Europe a contraband trader; and it was moreover a matter of notoriety that the English did not permit a single vessel to escape without paying the navigation toll, or being freighted with English merchandize.

Unhappily Napoleon, from his immediate desire of laying hold of every possible advantage, had, by granting licences of communication with Great Britain, put a very plausible argument into the mouths of those who nullified the continental blockade. These exceptions of his to his own system brought him into a position not a little embarrassing.

The English were in great need of corn towards the end of 1809, and were at all times in want of the dockyard materials procured from the north. They had, therefore, permitted all vessels, whether of a hostile country or not, to bring them corn, wood, hemp, pitch and tar, levying a toll upon them, which ultimately fell upon themselves, as it raised the price of these materials which were so necessary to them. In consequence of this interested toleration, there could be seen upon the quays of the Thames vessels from Belgium, Holland, the Hanse towns, Denmark, and Russia, all which countries were at war with England. Napoleon perceiving the absolute necessity to the English of the materials which they procured in so exceptional a manner, had formed the plan of deriving a profit by forcing them to purchase French products, and had accordingly granted free passage to vessels which, whilst they carried wood, hemp, and corn, made up their cargo with silks, woollens, wines, brandy, cheeses, &c. He permitted them to bring in return certain fixed articles, not the tissues of Manchester, or the hardwares of Birmingham, not coffees or sugars, but certain things which our manufactures wanted, such as indigo, cochineal, fish, oils, leather, &c. As, therefore, French vessels were to be seen in England, so were English vessels to be seen in France, trading under the protection of passports called licences. The French ships, in fact, being compelled to carry silks with their cargoes of corn, transferred them at the mouth of the Thames, to the contrabandists who undertook this clandestine introduction into the country. The English in their turn, presented themselves in our ports with the permitted articles only, having entrusted to the smugglers on our coasts, the cotton stuffs with which they had also been charged. This was a species of traffic which tainted commerce with corruption, habituating it to falsehood, and even to forgery, for there were in London persons who prosecuted the trade of manufacturing false ships papers. Very great inconveniences resulted, moreover, from this system, in exchange for very slight advantages, for in France, the trade under the protection of licences did not exceed twenty millions, exports and imports together, from 1809 to 1810. But the great misfortune of this species of commerce, was that it placed

France in a contradictory positon with respect to her own decrees, which was perfectly unsustainable in the presence of those from whom she demanded the most rigorous observance of the laws of the continental blockade.

"You require," remonstrated Russia, "that I should forbid my subjects to have any communication with Great Britain, that I should prevent them from selling their cereal products, and the dockyard materials, for which they can only find purchasers in the British merchants, that I should refuse them permission to receive in exchange, the sugars, coffees, and woven fabrics, of which they are in the utmost need, whilst you, on your part, do not hesitate to carry over to England your silks, cloths, and wines, and to receive in return the sugars and coffees, which are so strictly excluded by your laws from the rest of the continent. Be not, then, so rigorous towards others, so indulgent to yourselves, especially since the others have scarcely any interest, and you have an immense one in the universal observance of this system!"

This argument had a force which Napoleon in vain attempted to ignore, and he replied to it with anger, being unable to meet it with good reasons, "All that is said of my system of licences is false," he said, in answer to Russia, "I do not introduce sugar and coffee into France; but the English having need of our corn, I turn their wants to our profit by obliging them to receive silks, cloths, and wines, and I receive in return articles indispensable to French manufacturing industry, especially 'guineas,' which are exported by smugglers, and the loss of which must materially help to deteriorate the English exchange."

There was a certain amount of truth in this answer, but such as it did contain only proved how insignificant was this trade which was carried on under the protection of licences, which produced little profit and much inconvenience, and furnished the numerous opponents of the continental blockade with the most embarrassing arguments.

In the meantime, Napoleon, persisting in his system, watching himself the coasts of France and the allied countries, reading every day the statements of the arrival and the departure of ships, demanding the admission of French custom-house officers and troops into Holland, charging Marshal Davoust with the duty of watching Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, making preparations for the re-occupation of Swedish Pomerania, forcing Prussia to close Colberg and Konigsberg, urging Russia, without however pressing her too closely, to close Riga and St. Petersburg, was on the point of obtaining the most important results from his plans.

It was, no doubt, possible that there might still remain some half open outlets for the products of British industry, but these products being obliged to ascend to distant northern points by sea, that they might be conveyed overland to the south, would arrive at their destination so burdened with costs of conveyance, that the sale of them would be impossible. The continental blockade, thus enforced, could not fail, as we shall presently see, to reduce Great Britain to a state of insupportable distress, had it been maintained with perseverance, but also without provoking a war with the north.

Whilst Napoleon endeavoured to force the English to peace by means of a great reverse in the Peninsular, and by a ruinous system of attacks on commerce, he was not less active, in the mean time, in the conduct of the internal affairs of his empire. At length he grappled with the great religious question, which was not the least of those which drew forth the fiery impetuosity of his character.

The Pope, transported to Savona, was still a prisoner, and obstinately refused to perform the functions of the Apostolic chair. There was no schism, as in the last period of the Revolution, when the clergy, divided amongst themselves and causing divisions amongst the faithful, avenged themselves by the perplexity which they caused to the state, for the persecutions which it had caused them to suffer. The clergy of the present time were united, tranquil, submissive, kept to a uniform method of religious worship, were ignorant of, or feigned to be ignorant of the bull of excommunication hurled against Napoleon, and were tolerably unanimous in blaming the Pope for having recourse to this extreme measure, which must necessarily either expose the weakness of the Spiritual Arms, or cause a quarrel with government, which, despite all its faults, they regarded as still necessary to the security of all. Nevertheless, those who held those opinions, disapproved very strongly of the seizure of the Pope, deplored his imprisonment, and desired the end of a state of things which was afflicting to all good Catholics, and must sooner or later degenerate into schism. There was an unanimous wish that the Pope and the Emperor should come to an understanding, and that the former should obtain such an establishment as was suitable to the head of the Church, whilst their existed neither any expectation nor even desire that he should obtain the re-establishment of his temporal power, now regarded as utterly overthrown. A singular state of things! Under the control of an all powerful government, the church, forgetting at the moment how far the temporal power of the Papacy was necessary to the

independent action of their spiritual power,—the Church. once so exacting, was willing that the Pope should renounce his states, and content himself with a considerable establishment, which, however magnificent, could only be as that of the ancient patriarchs who resided with the Emperor at Constantinople.

Such was the advice of the great majority of the clergy. But there was a zealous minority which had resisted the concordat, which shared all the hatreds of the ancient royalists, pourtrayed in dark colours the sufferings of the Pope, and was active in promulgating the bull of excommunication. It maintained that to lay hands on the domain of St. Peter, was to attack the faith, that the Pope whilst imprisoned ought to refuse to perform any pontifical act, and that the clergy deprived of intercourse with their Head, should refuse to administer the Sacrament. In short, as formerly the parliaments, for the purpose of vanquishing the crown, pretended to stop the course of public justice, so now this portion of the priesthood was anxious, as a means of embarrassing Napoleon, to suspend the exercise of the religious offices.

On the very day even of his marriage, Napoleon met with an example of the annoyances which these malcontent priests leagued with the old Royalists, were able to cause him. He had, as we have already said, summoned to Paris the greater part of the dignitaries of the papal government, and had already assembled around him twenty-eight cardinals, who assisted almost every Sunday in the performance of mass in his chapel, although he was excommunicated. On the day of his marriage, thirteen out of the twenty-eight cardinals failed to attend the ceremony. The motive of this absence was not given, but it was intended to intimate to the people that without the Pope's concurrence, Napoleon was unable to obtain a divorce, and that as the first marriage was still binding on him, this second was irregular. But this motive rested on no real foundation, for the divorce which was refused by the church, could not have been pronounced by the Pope, and every species of ecclesiastical jurisdiction having been exhausted, the marriage with Josephine had been annulled by the ordinary jurisdiction. But although false, this motive, rather pointed at than alleged, tended to nothing less than to place the august Princess whom the Court of Austria had bestowed upon Napoleon, in the position of his concubine, and to render illegitimate the heir of the empire, whom France was expecting with so much impatience.

Napoleon, whose eye nothing escaped, had perceived

during the nuptial ceremony, that all the red robes, as he called them, were not present. "Count them," he said to a prelate of his chapel; and having become certain that thirteen of the twenty-eight were absent, he cried out half aloud, with a vehemence which he could not restrain: "The fools! they are always the same! ostensibly submissive! secretly factious! . . . . But they shall find to their cost what it is to jest with my power!" The ceremony was scarcely concluded, when he sent for the minister of police, and ordered him to arrest the thirteen cardinals, to strip them of their purple, (whence they were afterwards known by the name of the black cardinals) to scatter them amongst the various provinces, to place them under the surveillance of the police, and to sequester not only their ecclesiastical revenues, but also their private property.

In this most violent manner was met this most imprudent and blameable opposition. Amongst the thirteen cardinals was Cardinal Oppizoni, whom Napoleon, notwithstanding certain stains upon his private character, had made Archbishop of Bologna, Cardinal and Senator. The ungrateful prelate being threatened with the severest penalties if he did not give in his resignation of all his dignities immediately, resigned. Overwhelmed with terror, he resigned all that he was required with torrents of tears, and immediately quitted Paris to be partly an exile, partly a prisoner in the retreat which was assigned him.

The day following these deplorably violent proceedings, the secret instigators of the whole affair rejoiced in the accusation of adultery which it in some degree threw out against the marriage, the fruit of which was to inherit the empire, and in the outrageous exercise of power which it had excited, and flattered themselves that these events would furnish an infinite number of sources of annoyance to the detested government. That portion of the clergy which was not yet blinded by party spirit, were equally grieved at the cause of offence and at the chastisement which had followed it, and was exceedingly anxious to see the end of a state of things which was very likely to produce the most disastrous consequences. But it was difficult to incline the Emperor to moderation, the Pope to submission; and the solution of this difficulty offered the only means by which some agreement could be come to between these two spiritual and temporal chiefs.

The Pope at Savona, although closely watched, found means to communicate with the zealous Catholic party, and well comprehending the tactics of the moment refused to perform any political act. He would neither consent to

institute the new Bishops appointed by Napoleon, by which twenty-seven chairs were already vacant; nor continue to the existing Bishops the power of granting certain licences, especially marriage licences; and thus, as far as he was able, checked the exercise of religious worship in France; a state of things which would either turn to the injury of religious worship itself or to the injury of the government, according as the people took the part of the Pope or the Emperor. Pius VII. living in the episcopal palace of Savona, passing the days in saying mass and in giving his benediction to those who often came from afar to receive it, received politely, but sadly, the authorities, and replied, when urged to perform the most indispensable of the pontifical functions, that he was not free, and moreover lacked counsel, since the Cardinals were prisoners, or assembled around the Imperial throne, that in this state of isolation he was unable to perform any act that would avail anything, and that he was even unable to err, so completely was he deprived of the lights of the Church.

Napoleon, informed of all that the Pope did and said, was not behind him in finesse, and declared that he was willing to wait until the Pope became reasonable, and would continue to manage the affairs of the Church in a manner which was, certainly, only temporary, but which would amply suffice for some time to come. He then ordained silence respecting ecclesiastical affairs, and for the space of a twelvemonth abstained from any interference with them, and this not only from policy, but also because he was quite unable to attend to all the affairs which were constantly accumulating on his hands, even since the conclusion of the Austrian war. Nevertheless he was anxious to put an end to his quarrel with the Pope, and to extend to the Church that peace which he desired to bestow on Europe.

The Pope, who, in the midst of his most fervent prayers felt the weight of his chains, saw an innumerable number of important questions solving themselves, and beheld the progress of a long train of treaties, divorces, and marriages, began to be impatient, and at length almost flew into a passion. "They think of every thing," said he, "except God! Busy themselves about every kind of business except that of the Church. But even they have some temporal importance, and it will be discovered when once the course of prosperity is checked. They wish to push me to extremity! Ah! well! I will employ a new species of weapon, and have recourse to those means which God has placed in my hands for the salvation of his Church." * * * And without explaining himself further, the unfortunate

pontiff intimated in threatening terms that he would provoke a schism by a solemn appeal to consciences, and would place the Imperial government in the embarrassing position in which the revolutionary government had found itself, for where schism is, civil war is not far off. After the utterance of these threats he fell back into his dejected and gentle manner, engaged in long conversations with the prefect, and constantly asked how it was that this General Bonaparte, to whom he had shown so much affection, whose elevation he had so assiduously favoured, and for whose sake he had braved so much opposition in order to go to Paris to consecrate him, could repay his services by such gross ingratitude; oppressing and humbling that church which he had formerly so courageously re-established by the glorious act of the Concordat? . . . . . And he displayed the most profound astonishment at such opposite modes of acting.—M. de Chabral offered him consolation, calmed his excitement and persuaded him to hope that everything would be soon arranged, without particularizing the conditions, but leaving him to guess that they would consist of the resignation of his temporal power. Of this the Pope took no notice, pretending that it was respecting his spiritual power alone that he felt any solicitude.

It was necessary, however, that some arrangement should be come to. Napoleon was well aware that the temporary arrangements for the government of the church were very insufficient, and obstinately opposed. Twenty-seven of the bishoprics of the empire had become vacant since the rupture with Rome; and it need not be said, the absence of the bishop or his representative not only throws the ecclesiastical business of the diocese into confusion, and leaves its clergy ungoverned, but also suspends certain civil processes, since amongst Catholics the progress of civil life is conducted under the consecration of religion. But a more serious case than the absence of a bishop, is that of the presence of one who is not recognised by the faithful. And this was, in fact, the danger threatened by the vacancy of these twenty-seven vacant dioceses, for Napoleon, who was not disposed to let his prerogatives lie idle, had lost no time in providing new incumbents. He had proposed to the Pope that he should confer canonical institution upon these nominated prelates, with the understanding that the pontiff might be at liberty to omit in the bulls of institution, the name of the sovereign whose acts he thus confirmed. Napoleon could indulge in this modesty, without endangering his authority, but he was unwilling, and with reason, that the Pope should employ, for these cases, the forms which he used when the twofold

right of nomination and institution, united in his own person; the form, namely, entitled *de propria motu*. It was this form which the Pope had used in the case of M. de Pradt, when he was transferred from the bishopric of Poictiers, to that of Malines. Napoleon rejected these bulls, which did not only omit, but negatived his authority, and desired that the twenty-seven prelates whom he had nominated, should, although not yet instituted, enter upon the government of their dioceses. He discovered an expedient which might enable them to do this in the ancient usages of the church, and had them endowed with the rank of *Vicars* Capitular.

When a bishopric became vacant by the death of the bishop, the chapter of the diocese used to elect, by the title of vicar capitular, a temporary administrator of the affairs of the diocese, who should fulfil the episcopal functions even to the installation of a new bishop, but who, nevertheless, was to limit himself to those acts, the performance of which was absolutely necessary, whilst he enjoyed none of the episcopal honours. In former times, the person who had received the nomination to a bishopric, was sometimes elected vicar capitular, and thus entered at once on the immediate possession of his see. Napoleon being unable to obtain the necessary bulls, was anxious that the objects of his nomination should be thus elected vicars capitular, but he had met in almost every quarter, with the most determined resistance. The chapters had generally elected their vicar capitular before the arrival of the Emperor's nomination. This previous election was put forward as a reason against proceeding to a second, or, in some bolder instances, it was objected that the method of proceeding was but an indirect means of usurping the papal functions, and it was denied that the rules of the church would permit the nominated bishops to take the character of vicars capitular. Good or true or not, this allegation suited the purpose of those who saw that in complying with the provincial administration of the ecclesiastical affairs, they were depriving the Pope of his most effectual means of checking Napoleon in the course he was now taking. But the means adopted were perilous, for it was no easy matter to oppose a man like Napoleon, and to disturb the exercise of religious worship was not very consistent with piety. In vain did some enlightened priests, recalling the fact that Henry VIII. had been able, for his own shameful reasons, to drag from the bosom of the Catholic Church one of the greatest nations of the globe, declare that Napoleon might bring greater evils on the faith than were ever caused to it by the English monarch; especially since there was more to be feared from an age that was

indifferent, than from an hostile one. But the instigators of the clerical opposition, blinded by their passions, and caring little for the danger of religion, made Paris itself the theatre of this perilous conflict. The circumstances which took place with respect to this important diocese, present the most striking picture of the state of the French Church at this period, and of the relations in which Napoleon stood towards it.

The Archbishopric of Paris had become vacant, and Napoleon had nominated to it the Cardinal Fesch, his uncle. Scarcely had the Cardinal's nomination taken place when he, as Napoleon's brothers on their thrones, had devoted himself, not to showing his gratitude to his nephew, but to making himself popular in his diocese. He had, as we have elsewhere said, suddenly changed from being simply a contractor to the army, to a most zealous Catholic and austere prelate, and was eager to make himself the idol of the clergy as Louis was of the Dutch, Joseph of the Spaniards, and Murat of the Neapolitans; and whilst he displayed the utmost submission in the presence of his terrible nephew, he never failed to groan behind his back over the misfortunes of the Church, and to swear that he would rather endure martyrdom than the dictates of tyranny. Napoleon, indignant at such presumption and ingratitude, treated him with severity, and, especially, when he was parading his recently acquired theological knowledge, would the Emperor enquire how he had come by his learning, and whether it were the result of his speculations in the soldier's bread! "Bring to me," he would say, "l'Abbé Emery or M. Duvoisin; they know what they are talking about, and are worth the trouble of being listened to." The Abbé Emery, a clever priest, full of fervour which did not darken his understanding, having refused every mitre which had been offered to him, that he might continue to be superior of the seminary of St. Sulpice, was the beloved head of the establishment which had supplied almost all France with clergy and prelates. He was at least a royalist and the enemy of Napoleon, who knew the fact without caring much about it. M. Duvoisin, the Bishop of Nantes, was a prelate faithful in the performance of his duties, profoundly learned, and endowed with a keen intellect. It was his opinion that instead of striving to weaken the Emperor's power, the clergy should rather seek to moderate its exercise, give it a right direction, and turn it to the advantage of the Church. Napoleon liked to listen to M. Emery, but he only followed the counsels of M. Duvoisin, and, as for his uncle, he never paid the least attention either to his words or his advice.

After having nominated Cardinal Fesch, who was already Archbishop of Lyons, to the Archbishopric of Paris, he desired that he should enter upon his see, and govern it as though regularly instituted. The cardinal hesitated to take this step, from the twofold reason that he was unwilling to displease the clergy, and was also anxious to remain for some time in possession of the two archbishoprics which were the richest sees in the empire. This plurality of sees was not without precedent, but the Pope had refused to sanction it, and had demanded that the cardinal should choose between either Paris or Lyons, whilst he refused him institution to either as he had refused it to the other newly nominated prelates.

The Cardinal, determined to keep the archbishopric of Lyons to which he had been both nominated and instituted, persisted in calling himself Archbishop of Lyons, and simply administrator of the diocese of Paris. And to render the position which he had assumed the more manifest, he declined to inhabit the archiepiscopal palace of Paris, preferring to lodge in an hotel which he possessed in the rue du Mont Blanc. Whilst Napoleon permitted the affairs of the church to languish uncared for, he acquiesced in the cardinal's equivocal conduct. But when the moment arrived in which he gave his serious attention to matters ecclesiastical, he happened to go to Notré Dame on some business or other, and not being able to find the cardinal there, felt the inconvenience of the position taken up by his uncle, and said that when he honoured the clergy of the metropolis with a visit, he expected to find the Archbishop at the foot of the towers of Notré Dame. He then caused the cardinal to be asked which of the two benefices he had decided upon keeping. Obliged to make a choice, the cardinal uncle decided, in accordance with his policy of conciliating the orthodox clergy, upon retaining the see of Lyons, as being that with which he had been canonically invested. Immediately a cry was raised in all the sacristies of France in praise of a prelate so disinterested, so faithful to the church, so courageous and self-denying. The reply of Napoleon to all was the choice of a successor which could not fail to excite his uncle's jealousy to the utmost. He nominated Cardinal Maury to the Archbishopric of Paris.

This illustrious defender of the Church who, in the constituent assembly, had displayed so great an amount of eloquence, spirit, and courage, and who by his sallies of wit and *sangfroid* had defended the clergy as a gentleman of the school of Voltaire might have defended the aristocracy, had retired to Rome, where, during the space of fifteen years, he had consoled himself for his exile by the enjoyment of

the belles-lettres. He accepted with gladness the opportunity of revisiting his country, and because he showed towards Napoleon some gratitude for this permission to return, he lost in a single day the glory of the splendid struggle he had maintained; and he who had been the idol as well of the clergy as the Royalists, became at once the object of their disdain, and even hatred. His character had some of those defects which are frequently found in the company of talent, and even of piety; he was addicted to the pleasures of the table, and enjoyed free conversation; his residence in Italy had not cured him of these defects, and they furnished some hypocrites with subjects of slander against him. He had, moreover, notwithstanding his energy and fame, but little influence with the clergy. Cardinal Fesch, in particular, cherished against him the liveliest dislike.

This nomination had been scarcely signed, when Napoleon demanded that Cardinal Maury should be invested with the administration of the diocese; and this demand the chapter did not dare to oppose, but they accompanied their compliance with an amount of shuffling and trickery which was as degrading to the Imperial authority and the clergy as to the cardinal.

Cardinal Maury hastened to write to the Pope, appealing to his old friendship, and endeavouring to obtain, in default of bulls, at least a provisional institution into the see of Paris. The Pope's reply was awaited without much expectation that it would be of a favourable nature.

It was very manifest that all kinds of difficulties arose from this provisional administration of sees, but Napoleon cared little for this, as he believed that he was on the point of coming to a speedy arrangement with the Pope; to overcome labour by the resolutions which he had already taken, and from which no one could hope that he would recede, he hastened to convert into an organic law, the annexation of the Roman states. The Duchies of Parma and Placentia were already united under the title of the department of Taro, and that of Tuscany under the titles of the departments of the Arno, the Ombrone, and the Mediterranean. On this occasion the Roman states were arranged as the departments of Thrasimene and the Tiber. In the senatus-consultum, one of the most celebrated and the most remarkable of the time, he declared Rome the second city of the Empire; and decreed that the heir to the throne, whose approaching birth he announced as though he were acquainted with the secrets of nature, should bear the title of King of Rome, and be consecrated successively in Notré Dame and St. Peter's. He

decided, moreover, that a Prince of the blood should always hold a court at Rome, that the Popes should reside near the Emperors, should hold their sees in Rome and in Paris alternately, in the enjoyment of a rich endowment, and should swear fealty to the empire; and that all the establishments of the Roman Chancery were to be transferred to Paris, and become institutions of the empire. Having made these decisions, Napoleon gave orders for the immediate commencement of preparations at the Archiepiscopal Palace at Paris, at the Pantheon and St. Denis, for the reception of the pontifical government, and the pontiff himself. He projected also works at Avignon, that the Pope, although generally residing at Paris, near himself, might be able occasionally to visit the various ancient residences of the papacy.

It is difficult to persuade ourselves that we are not dreaming, when we listen to the recital of what the church itself was far from considering as impossible. But Napoleon believed that after some few days' wonder, people would become accustomed to the new state of things, that the Pope residing near him, would become more tractable, that the cardinals dwelling in France would become imbued with a French spirit, and that, in short, the world, dazzled by this prodigious spectacle, which recalled in so striking a manner the empire of the west, would involuntarily salute him with that title for which he was so eager, in exchange for which he was willing to sacrifice everything, even his empire itself; the title of Emperor of the West.

Strongly imbued with this idea, Napoleon, whose only anxiety was now respecting an arrangement with the Pope which he believed to be now at hand, devoted himself to ecclesiastical affairs; and hastened to arrange the ecclesiastical establishment which it would be necessary to leave at Rome; so setting aside what was old and establishing what was new, that the Pope, finding at the commencement of the conferences that all the new plans had been carried out, should be compelled to accept as irrevocably accomplished those changes which he most disliked.

There were in the Roman province thirty sees for a population of 800,000 inhabitants, many of which under the name of *Siéges Suburbicaires* furnished titles and endowments for the principal members of the sacred college. Besides these there were an immense number of richly endowed convents and benefices. Napoleon made no delay in abolishing all the sees of the Roman states, with the exception of three, which were each endowed with an income of thirty thousand francs; he suppressed the monasteries and

nunneries, granting annuities to the members of the suppressed establishments, required the oath of fealty from all incumbents of benefices, and sent into exile all who refused to take it. He ordered, likewise, the suppression of the religious orders of Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, sparing only some nunneries and some establishments devoted to the cause of benevolence; sequestered the whole ecclesiastical property of Rome, which amounted to 250 millions, devoting 100 millions to the payment of the Roman debt, the maintenance of hospitals, the foundation of new sees, the support of the clergy who had been retained in their benefices; and incorporating the remaining 150 millions with the state property.

These decrees, which were issued with incredible promptitude, were sent to Rome to be put into execution. Three columns of infantry were directed towards Rome from Ancona, Bologna, and Perouse, to afford General Miollis a reinforcement of nine or ten thousand men, in case he should require it, to keep in check a population completely under the influence of the monks; he received instructions to act with decision. "By reason of the peace," said Napoleon, "I have both leisure and troops at my disposal, and I intend to employ both to put an end to the present unsettled state of affairs. Within two months I will treat with the Pope, and it will be necessary that, whether willing or unwilling, he should see reason to assent to the changes which I have made in the church establishment.

Napoleon had intended to send some cardinals and bishops to Savona, to convince the Pope that it was time that an understanding should be come to, since the most sacred interests received injury from the protracted dissensions; to assure him that the dogmas of religion were not in the least interfered with, and to express a conviction that a Pope truly attached to the Faith would not compromise its welfare on account of interests purely temporal; to declare that it was impossible not to see that Napoleon was appointed by Providence to re-establish the Church, to guard it well, and to extend its influence as well by the creation of new cures, as by the establishment of a religious element in education; to hint that the contest between the Pope and the Emperor was not regarded as a religious but as a political one, and that wherever the faith prevailed, the Pope would be blamed for sacrificing its interests to his own temporal principality; and, finally, that it would be to his advantage, before Napoleon was provoked to follow the example of Henry VIII. and to declare himself the head of the Church, to sacrifice his temporal power, which was already irretrievably lost, to

the preservation of his spiritual power which was not yet threatened, and by accepting the same position as that which was held by his predecessors under the emperors of the west, to retire from an obstinate course which might lead to the withdrawal from the bosom of the church of two-thirds of Europe. Such were the reasons which Napoleon wished to be urged with the Holy Father, and they appeared so plausible that the greater part of the European clergy considered them not only maintainable, but even conclusive. Napoleon selected the Cardinals Spina and Caselli, who were supposed to be in favour with the Pope, to visit him and to make the first overtures to an agreement, if they found him in a well disposed mood; but if the Pope should display an inflexible obstinacy, Napoleon determined to have recourse to a means which was in common use in the ancient empire of the west; namely, the convocation of a council, which he flattered himself would be entirely submissive to his will. He would take this method of giving such a peace to the Church as he had given to Europe; tracing its conditions with the point of his sword.

Such were the efforts which Napoleon made at this moment to carry on the Spanish war with vigour, and to enforce the strict observance of the continental blockade, that by the one means or the other might be obtained the maritime peace which was so essential to that of Europe. Such were his endeavours to appease religious differences, to give a settled organisation to his vast empire, and so to arrange all things, that at length, with the crown of Charlemagne on his brow, he might sit on the throne of a peaceful empire of the west.

Whilst he was prosecuting these various undertakings his brother Louis arrived in Paris, and the serious question respecting Holland, which was to be for Europe the drop of water which would make the vase overflow, began to demand serious attention. King Louis arrived in France with a disposition to ill-humour, which nothing he would meet with there was at all likely to dissipate. This singular prince, endowed with a noble spirit, loving the right but regarding it with a distorted vision, liberal in theory but despotic in temperament, brave and yet not warlike, of simple tastes and yet consumed with the desire of reigning, distrustful of himself and yet full of the most irritable *amour propre*, possessing the energy natural to a Bonaparte, and turning it to his own ceaseless torment, believing himself devoted to unhappiness, and indulging in the idea that his whole family was engaged in a conspiracy against him, and still further steeped in this depression of spirits by the bad

state of his health, was entrusted with the government of a kingdom which was destined sooner or later to be the source of the greatest misfortunes to the empire, and which was in a condition as miserable as his own ; but whose miseries had an earlier date than either the continental blockade, the French empire, or the French revolution.

The Dutch, established on a region which was neither sea nor land, had with admirable art converted sandy tracts into ample pastures, and were by turns fishermen, agriculturists, graziers, and merchants. Carrying for sale in all directions by means of their ships the fish which they caught upon their coasts, and the produce of their farms, they formed business connections with the most widely distant countries, and soon became the commercial agents of all nations, conveying to each the products of the others, furnishing the south with the wood, iron, corn, and hemp, of the north, and from the south receiving in return wine, oil, silks, and cloths ; traversing every sea in their maritime enterprises, carrying to the Indies the industrial products of Europe, and bringing to Europe the Indian spices. They thus became the earliest merchants, and in the course of time the keenest and the richest. Very courageous and determined to defend their wealth by sea and land, republican, free and eloquent, but capable of keeping their passions in subjection, fond of the arts, and practising them with an originality due to their soil and habits, they had displayed all the phases of war, liberty, and civilization ; and after having shaken off the yoke of Spain, checked the dominion which France was extending over Europe, and contended with Louis XIV. who had humbled them, and whom they had humbled in their turn, they had finished by giving to England for kings those princes whom she had only condescended to make stadtholders.

But from nations as from individuals all things pass away ; youth, glory, fortune, power. Salt fish and cheeses, which were the origin of the enormous Dutch commerce, were not sufficient to furnish an enduring foundation. Their industry had been employed in the conveyance of the industrial products of one nation to another, and Cromwell had inflicted upon them a mortal injury by his navigation law that one nation should only convey to another its own productions. This principal being soon generally adopted, the Dutch, whose vessels had only entered foreign ports laden with foreign products, saw their commerce rapidly decline ; for whilst England was thus closed against them, the heaviness of the dues in their ports turned the trade with Germany to the towns of Bremen and Hamburg, which were less

exorbitant in their demands, and conveniently placed upon the Wesel and the Elbe. And as the wars which had been waged between Frederick the Great and his powerful allies had been carried on without the intervention of Holland on either side, its importance had suffered much diminution, and its political power had fallen as low as its commercial power.

But if everything suffers change, the change is not necessarily sudden. Its ancient wealth had not departed from Holland without leaving considerable opulence, and abundant sources of prosperity. It possessed numerous colonies, an active commerce in colonial products, and an immense capital, the fruit of economy. The sugar and coffee trade was in their own hands. Whoever had any to sell was sure to find amongst the vast warehouses of Rotterdam and Amsterdam purchasers who would pay in ready money, and could afford to wait until a rise in the price made its resale profitable. The Dutch thus became the greatest speculators of all the world in colonial produce; they were thence led to manipulate the articles of which they possessed such immense stores, and became the best refiners of sugar, and the most expert dressers of tobacco; and, finally, turning to advantage the immense wealth which their economy had gradually amassed, and which was exceeded by the requirements of their commerce, they made loans to the governments of all nations, until at length the making of loans became the chief element of their mercantile activity.

By these means the population of Holland had succeeded in maintaining a considerable degree of opulence, up to the period of the French revolution, at which time it was composed of two classes, an upper bourgeoise, entirely devoted to the government of the statdholder, and to the English, whose manners it imitated, and filled with prejudices against France which had their origin in the time of Louis XIV.; and a lower bourgeoise which detested the statdholders, disliked the English, and had a strong feeling in favour of the French, which was chiefly grounded on their having escaped in 1789 from the double bondage of royalty and English supremacy.

But the favour with which France had been regarded by the Dutch democracy, was of short duration, and entirely vanished, when it beheld her passing from a state of sanguinary liberty to subjection, beneath a soldier's rule; especially as in the new state of affairs, Holland became her subject. Almost the whole commercial vigour of the country had suddenly failed; the maritime war had almost entirely stopped the progress of commercial navigation. The

intercourse which Amsterdam and Rotterdam had held with England, and which was so necessary to them, could now only be continued clandestinely; speculations in colonial produce and sugar refining had become almost valueless. The traffic in tobacco had received what was nearly a death blow by the French regulation, which gave to France its exclusive sale. The fisheries, already greatly injured by the English, had completely failed from want of the salt necessary to the curing of their products, since it had to be taken to London for the payment of the navigation tolls. And if, in spite of so many hindrances, some neutral vessels, or those which pretended to be so, brought to Holland the products of the Dutch colonies, the French privateers lying hidden in the entrance to the channels of the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Zuyderzée, seized them, and deprived the needy merchants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam of the remnant of profit which might be derived from the transport and manipulation of the little merchandize which escaped the British blockade. The business of money lending had suffered equally with all others, from the general state of distress. Spain had been declared bankrupt; Austria could scarcely pay the interest of her debt; England managed it by means of a depreciated paper money; Prussia paid with difficulty; and Russia paid its creditors with an exactness which nevertheless left them injured. There was not a Dutchman who had not lost fifty per cent. by means of the loans to foreign states.

The state finances, no less involved than those of private persons, and involved to serve France, showed 110 millions of revenue, to meet expenses amounting to 155 millions, amongst which the debt alone presented an item of 80 millions. And even to obtain these 110 millions of revenue which were after all so insufficient, it was necessary to have recourse to imposts the most severe and vexatious. The works in the timber yards were abandoned, the workmen and sailors fled to England, the naval officers were steeped in poverty. In the midst of such a state of things it is easy to conceive how readily might arise once more the ancient hatreds which after the time of Louis XIV. represented the French as frivolous politicians, bad sailors, and intolerant catholics, alliance with whom was only likely to lead to defeat; and as troublesome neighbours, who were as encroaching by land as the English by sea, and equally to be distrusted.

King Louis had no sooner arrived in Holland than he followed the example of his brothers, and showed a desire to reign for himself and his people, rather than for France

and Napoleon. He took care to provide the emperor with as few troops and vessels as possible, and to let the laws restrictive of commerce become a dead letter. This was natural enough, and Murat at Naples, Jérôme at Cassel, Joseph at Madrid, and Louis at Amsterdam, remonstrated with Napoleon with some reason, that to do him honour, those whom he had made kings should render their subjects happy, and lay a safe foundation for lasting dynasties; as otherwise he would be involved in perpetual wars to support them on their thrones. "Without doubt," replied Napoleon, "I have made you kings that your government may be to the advantage of your subjects, but also that you may comprehend with clearness what is really to their advantage, and that, having been elevated to your positions not by your own merit, but by the arms of France, you may remain her faithful ally. You live by France, and you must live for her. It is in the highest degree to your interest that the power of England should be subdued, for if France does not prevail against her in this struggle, Murat will lose Sicily, Joseph will lose America, and Louis the Indies. You will lose, moreover, the freedom of your commerce and the honour of your flag. It is necessary, therefore, that you should see in my policy the true interest of your subjects, and make them see it also; that you should render yourselves popular, not by compliance with their weaknesses, but by the display of economy, prudence, industry, and courage; and that you should show much consideration for the French party which is in every country the democratic party, and endeavour to gain its attachment. But you have on the other hand surrounded yourselves with great lords, who detest both France and me, and alienated by your folly the only party whose affection we might have gained. And this too, when there is not one of you who could retain your thrones a single day, a single hour, after I lost a battle."

There is no doubt that Napoleon might reasonably have asked of the nations, his allies, whom he had entrusted to the government of his brothers, moderate sacrifices, proportioned to their resources and employed exclusively in the protection of the common welfare; but when, to satisfy his ambition for an universal Empire, he would condemn them to perpetual war, to an indefinite privation from all commerce, and to an overwhelming burden of expense, he demanded what it was impossible that they could grant, and whilst he had cause to blame the weakness of his brothers, he afforded them reasons for resisting his policy. It is at all times only too difficult to obtain from allies the efforts which the common welfare requires. But to deform the cause of the common welfare by

an unbridled ambition, by the demand from friendly nations of unreasonable sacrifices, and the subjecting them to the rule of foreign things, is to aggravate the difficulties which exist in all alliances, to convert the most natural friendships into the bitterest hatreds, and to prepare the way for such cruel mischiefs as those which arose from the dissensions of Napoleon and his brother Louis in respect to Holland.

The accusations which Napoleon brought against his brother, were as follows:—He complained that Holland was of no more assistance to him in maritime warfare, or the suppression of contraband traffic under the sovereignty of his brother, than it had been when still under republican rule, or even under the government of the grand pensionnaire Schimmelpenninck. He pointed out the fact, that he had at that period at Boulogne and Texel double the flotilla which he now possessed at those places. He declared that the whole of Holland was a vast port as open to English commerce as in time of peace; that American vessels had been received into its harbours, in spite of his precise orders, on pretence of their being neutrals; that a hostile feeling towards France existed amongst all classes of its inhabitants, and displayed itself almost as freely as in London; and that King Louis had imprudently strengthened this feeling, by showing favour to the aristocratic party, whilst he alienated the democratic, by reinstating the old noblesse, and adding new members to its ranks, by burdening the treasury with heavy expenses for the support of a royal guard which was useless in Holland, by the creation of Marshals, who were as useless, and by the grant of dotations which were without motive in a country where no one had obtained victories.

Resting his case upon these causes of dissatisfaction, Napoleon made no attempt at concealing his intention of annexing Holland to the empire, if they were not fully atoned for by compliance with the following conditions:—A considerable flotilla was to be maintained in the two Scheldts, a squadron of ships of the line stationed at Texel, and 25 thousand troops on the coast. The royal guard, the marshals, and the dotations, were to be suppressed, and the debt was to be reduced to a third of the existing capital, for this debt being 80 millions upon a budget of 150, rendered the carrying on of the public service impossible. Nor was this all; for he demanded that the contraband system should be rigidly suppressed, and that, to ensure the vigorous action of the French cruisers, that questions respecting prizes should be referred to his own tribunals, and that all the American vessels which entered the Dutch ports should be delivered up to him, to be disposed of for his own profit. Finally,

without explaining himself clearly, Napoleon added that the recent English Walcheren expedition had shown on the line of the frontiers of Holland and France certain defects, to obviate which would require certain rectifications in the direction of the two Scheldts, and perhaps in that of the Rhine itself.

King Louis replied to his brother's complaints very completely on some points, and very incompletely on others. He declared that the flotilla was equal now to what it had been at the time to which Napoleon referred—that the greater part of it guarded the Eastern Scheldt, and that it was absolutely necessary to watch it, lest the French troops occupying the Western Scheldt should be turned, and that the remainder occupied the numerous bays of Holland. He made no satisfactory answer relative to the reduction of the fleet at Texel. As for the troops of the line, he asserted that there were more than the required number of 25,000 men, for that three thousand had been sent to Spain, and that besides the many thousands which were shut up in the fortified places, and the numbers that were sick of the Walcheren fever, there remained about 15 thousand employed in guarding the immense line of coast which extends from the mouths of the Scheldt to those of the Ems. He alleged no reason that was even specious to justify the expense of a royal guard, of marshals, and of other creations of a like nature. Respecting the reinstatement in their honours of the ancient noblesse, and the creation of a new noblesse, he announced that he had re-established the ancient aristocracy as a reward for its attachment to his government, and that he had created the new as a means of acknowledging the friendship of some personal friends of his own; with regard to the dotations, he asserted that they took too little from the public domain to raise any question; and finally, that if he held somewhat aloof from that which was called the French party, and had ingratiated himself with that, which was asserted to be an English party, it was simply because he had endeavoured to rally around him all those persons who were of the most importance in the country.

Louis might have added that he had only followed the example of his brother at Cassel, Naples, and Madrid, of his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, amongst the clergy, and even that of Napoleon himself in France. But through all these disputes the simple truth was apparent, that Napoleon was determined not to leave in his brother's hands the performance of what he could do so much better himself, and that he had both the desire and the means of showing that he was master. It mattered little what were the arguments which one or the

other brother might bring forward; the only question was whether the weaker would obey the commands of the stronger. King Louis promised obedience, or at least undertook, besides the maintenance of a flotilla, the equipment of a squadron of the line at Texel, the rigid suppression of the contraband trade, and the exclusion of American vessels from the Dutch ports. But to reduce the debt to two thirds, to recall the decrees already promulgated with regard to the noblesse, to take away the titles which he had conferred, to deprive his marshals of their batons, to resign the rights of the Dutch crown so far as to send the questions respecting prizes to the Paris tribunals, and to give up to confiscation the American vessels which had been brought into his ports in reliance on his good faith, appeared to him a species of humiliation worse than death, and we are compelled to agree with him. Napoleon, however, with terrible threats insisted upon obedience to his commands, and the unfortunate King of Holland, already overwhelmed with melancholy, began at last to look upon his brother as a tyrant, upon all his relations as selfish cringers before the head of their family, and upon his wife as an accomplice in all the miseries with which he was afflicted. The praise of the Dutch, who were aware of his resistance to his brother, excited him still more, and he permitted himself to cherish the most outrageous plans. Sometimes he determined upon raising the standard of revolt against his own brother, to put the whole country under water by breaking down the ditches, and to throw himself, in short, into the arms of the English, without whose help all resistance to Napoleon was manifestly impossible. He even went so far, on quitting his kingdom, as to make arrangements with the minister of war, M. de Krayenhoff, for the preparation of means of defence against France, and gave orders to the governors of the frontier fortresses of Brabant, such as Bois-le-Duc, Breda, and Bergen-op-Zoom, to refuse admission to the French troops, should they seek to obtain it.

On arriving at Paris, King Louis was anxious to avoid either residing with his wife or at the Tuileries, or with any of the members of his family, and expressed his intention of taking up his residence in the hotel of the Dutch Embassy. When, however, it was pointed out to him that this conduct would increase Napoleon's irritation, he consented to accept the hospitality of his mother who resided in an immense hotel on the faubourg St. Germain. His first act on his arrival was to demand a separation from his wife, and to call together a meeting of his family to decide on the subject. It was agreed, however, that the couple should live apart and the scandal of a separation be avoided. And now, these family

questions being settled, the affairs of Holland engrossed all attention.

The relations of King Louis, especially his mother and sisters, spared no pains to induce him to lay aside his sullen air of defiance and to become reconciled to Napoleon, and were anxious that the subjects in dispute should not be discussed between the brothers personally. Louis was gloomy, excitable, and obstinate, Napoleon quick and imperious by nature, and strengthened in these qualities by the habit of command. There was cause, therefore, for dreading some serious quarrel should these two come into personal contact; and it was arranged that they should meet only in the family circle, and have but little discussion on public affairs except through the intervention of M. Roell, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Holland, and M. de Champagny, Duke of Cadare, Minister of Foreign Affairs for France.

An important personage, whose career was disadvantageously entangled with these affairs, and whose ability was, as we have already said, much weakened by his mania for interfering with everything, M. Fouché, minister of police, perceiving just now an opportunity of mixing himself up with the private disputes of the imperial family, as well as with the most important affairs of the empire, assiduously frequented the dwelling of the empress-mother, to hold interviews with King Louis, and to become negociator between him and Napoleon. But there was little chance of his being accepted in this character, for King Louis, who distrusted even the men most worthy of confidence, had little inclination to be frank with M. Fouché, and Napoleon, although superior to any feeling of distrust, did not care to encourage this officiousness of an over-officious man.

In the meanwhile, however, Louis, from the want of some support in the present emergency, and Napoleon, from a feeling which consisted as much of disdain as of esteem, permitted the interference of this self-constituted mediator; and thus M. Fouché became with M. de Champagny the daily negociator in this long negociation, which was sometimes carried on by word of mouth, and sometimes by letters,* although all the persons concerned in it resided in Paris.

Napoleon was as usual very precise in the expression of his wishes, and declared his intention of demanding of Holland three things in particular—The energetic repression of contraband trade, an active co-operation in the maritime war,

* These letters are very numerous, especially those of King Louis and Napoleon. They have been preserved, and it is from their infallible records that I have composed this account, of the subject of which they treat.

and the reduction of her debt. And he added, that since he was firmly convinced, that he should obtain from his brother, neither compliance with these nor some other necessary demands; that his brother would neither dare to embroil himself with the commercial world of Holland by taking measures for the suppression of the contraband trade, nor venture to displease the capitalists by taking measures for the reduction of the debt, and providing for the expenses of the fleet; but would, on the contrary, on his return to Holland, permit everything to go on in the old way;—he therefore thought, he said, that it would be better that this state of things were put an end to at once by the annexation of Holland to France; and that as his brother was constantly complaining of the burden of a crown, it would be well that he should indulge his tastes by accepting that honourable and calm retreat which the Emperor of the French was well able to grant to him. That he might be quite at ease as regarded the fate of Holland, for that its union with France would assure to it a glorious position in time of war, and a prosperous career in time of peace. And that, in short, it would be well to lose no time in considering the subject of the annexation, which offered the only solution of the questions on hand, which was simple, decided, and not likely to cause disastrous results.

This firm and decided expression of the Emperor's will filled King Louis with consternation. For although he was unceasing in his declaration of the fatigues of the cares of government, he was most anxious to continue to bear them. And this, not only from a natural ambition of governing, but also from a feeling of *amour propre* which, as naturally, made him very unwilling to resign a kingdom after having shown himself incapable of governing it, or of observing fidelity to France. Always regarding himself as a blighted being, as the only unhappy one in the midst of the happiest family in the world, he saw in this project of dethroning him a frightful fulfilment of his destiny; and felt, especially, that it would be a withering condemnation pronounced by a judge whom the world would regard as both just and well-informed. Rather than endure such a humiliation, then, he was ready to brave every extremity.

At first he deplored his journey to Paris, as a sort of wilful murder, and was anxious to depart suddenly for Holland, to declare war against his brother, with the English for allies. But he believed that he was watched and despaired of reaching the frontiers of the empire without falling again into the hands of an irritated brother, whom his flight would have enlightened as to his plans of resistance. He then

yielded to another set of ideas, and casting himself as it were, at the feet of Napoleon, declared himself willing to do all that was demanded of him, and promised compliance on all the contended points, if his brother would only grant him one more trial.

Napoleon answered, that Louis would not keep his word, but after having made the fairest promises, would no sooner have returned to Amsterdam than he would fall into the hands of the contrabandists and Dutch capitalists, and have no strength of mind to keep one of his engagements. Moved, however, by his brother's grief, and influenced by the prayers of his mother and his sisters, who were all urgent with entreaties in favour of Louis, and believing in his integrity, Napoleon at length showed himself disposed to grant conditions which, while they placed all the real power in his own hands, would permit Louis to retain the nominal sovereignty, at least during the war.

A certain amount of reconciliation arising from this last turn of the negotiation, it became a little less indirect between the two brothers, and they met. Napoleon received Louis at the Tuileries, explained his plans to him, and repeated that his chief wish, because it was his chief necessity, was to obtain peace with England; that on this peace depended both the glory of his own family and the greatness of France; that in his efforts to obtain it, no ally could be more serviceable to him than Holland, and that he was determined, therefore, to obtain from it, either by the exercise of his own power, or by the hands of his brother, all the assistance which its resources could afford; and that this motive, and not the desire to increase an empire which was already too large, had sometimes induced him to entertain the subject of its annexation. Enlarging upon this theme, with his accustomed force, and even with great good faith, for he was at this moment far more intent upon vanquishing England than aggrandising himself; he said, in one of his interviews with Louis, "I attach so much importance to a maritime peace, and so little to Holland, that if the English would open a negotiation, and come to a candid understanding with me, I should neither wish to annex your kingdom, nor to encumber you with distasteful conditions; I would leave Holland tranquil, independent, and intact." Then, as though hurried away by his subject, he would add, "these English perpetually force me to aggrandize myself! Had it not been for them, I should have annexed neither Naples, Spain, nor Portugal to my empire. I have wished to extend my coasts that I might increase my resources. If they continue in their present course, I shall have to annex to

my empire, Holland, the Hanse towns, Pomerania, and perhaps even Dantzig. It were well that they should know this, and you should endeavour to make them know it. Employ the opportunity which is offered by the connection of the merchants at Amsterdam with English houses, of informing England that nothing is more imminent than the annexation of Holland, which will be to her a source of the greatest injury, and that by treating for peace alone could she hope to preserve your independence, and ward off this serious danger from herself." After having conceived the idea of this discourse, Napoleon formed the project of sending immediately M. Roell to Amsterdam, to summon together the ministers, to associate with them some of the members of the Dutch legislative body, to induce them to deliberate upon the state of affairs, and to despatch in their name a safe man to London, to inform the British cabinet of what was taking place, and to implore it to spare Europe the misfortune of seeing the annexation of Holland to the French empire.

Louis, dazzled by his brother's project, was anxious to put it into execution, without loss of time. It was impossible to conceal the present state of the negotiation from the Duke of Otranto, who was determined not to be left out of it, and he was accordingly informed of everything. His mind forthwith became inflamed with the idea that he, also, would contribute to the bringing about a state of peace, by proceeding according to his own fashion, and putting some little force, if it were necessary, even upon Napoleon himself. Proud of the step he had recently taken in arming the national guards, at the time of the Walcheren expedition, and flattered by the encomiums which declared him an audacious genius, whose personal importance might bear comparison with that of Napoleon himself, he thought that it would be a little increased should the attainment of a general peace, which the whole world longed for, be attributed in a great degree to his exertions.

M. Fouché had, for some time, had M. Ouvrard under his charge, had permitted him to leave Vincennes to arrange his affairs, and had been so weak as to listen to his observations on all subjects; nor did he listen only to M. Ouvrard, but also to certain royalist writers, who in submitting plans to him, offered to devote themselves to the great man, raised up by Providence to effect a change on the face of the universe. It is necessary, said they, to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the marriage with Marie Louise to conclude a peace which shall embrace both sea and land, both the old world and the new; which shall pacify all

nations, dynasties, and parties, and enable its fortunate contrivers to have given satisfaction to all interests, even to those of the Bourbons.

To arrive at this advantageous position of affairs, it was necessary to divide the Penisular, to leave the largest portion to Joseph, and to surrender the remainder to Ferdinand VII., who must marry a Bonapartist princess. The independance of the Spanish colonies which they had already asserted for themselves, was to be confirmed, but confirmed under a monarchical form, for they were to receive as their King (can it be believed ?) Louis XVIII., who was regarded by the Royalists as the legitimate heir to the crown of France, and who would be very happy, it was supposed, to emerge from his retreat, to ascend the throne of the new world!

Such were the projects of the financiers and idle writers to whom M. Fouché listened; and which would be too puerile to be recited had they not been the source of very serious consequences.

Full of these ideas and impatient to contribute to the arrangement of a peace, M. Fouché had already sent a secret agent to London to sound the British cabinet, and had done this without Napoleon's knowledge. As soon as he had heard of the new project, he had hastened to mix himself up with it, and had sought for some one whom he might use as an agent in the secret negotiation which he was determined to open. M. de Labouchère, the head of the first banking house in Holland, partner and son-in-law of M. Baring, who was on his part head of the chief banking house in England, happened to be in Paris on business affairs. M. Ouvrard, who had sold him piastres at the time of his great speculations with Spain, and had by his means realized some millions in America, had introduced him to the Duke of Otranto, who had received him with the respect due to a banker who was rich, talented, and honest. The commencement of negotiations with England had scarcely been spoken of, than M. Fouché thought of M. de Labouchère, and proposed him as the agent. M. de Labouchère was accordingly chosen as the person exactly suited for this office, which required a person who was without any official character which would attract notice, and who yet had sufficient importance to command a ready reception and attentive hearing.

M. Roell and M. de Labouchère, then, were dispatched to Amsterdam, and in the meantime all resolutions with respect to Holland were suspended. Louis was anxious to take advantage of this interval to return to his kingdom; but Napoleon, who was unwilling to let him depart until a full

understanding had been come to upon the affairs of Holland, detained him at Paris, until some information should have been received from M. de Labouchère.

There was some difficulty in deciding upon the manner in which this negotiation should be conducted, and in the name of what authority the agent should present himself in London. After mature reflection it had been decided that the Dutch ministers and the members of the legislative body, could not be assembled together without publicity being given to the whole affair, and that there would be some inconvenience in representing the chief members of the Dutch government, as speaking of the political annihilation of their country as inevitable, and almost as a natural consequence, if England did not hasten to prevent it by making some sacrifices. It had, therefore, been judged more expedient to send M. de Labouchère, not in the name of King Louis, who could not enter into direct correspondence with England, but in the name of two or three of the principal ministers, such as MM. Roell, Vanderheim, and Mollerns. It was impossible that such a man as M. de Labouchère should not meet with attention when he declared that Napoleon's recent marriage had changed his views, and that such a peace might easily be obtained from him as would put a final stop to those invasions which were no less to be lamented for the sake of Europe, than they were injurious to England herself; and, whilst he was not to specify any particular conditions, he was authorized to declare, that should England show a disposition to make some sacrifices, France would not hesitate to make such on her side as would satisfy the honour and dignity of each country.

Everything having been finally arranged, M. de Labouchère embarked finally at Bruille, soon arrived at Yarmouth, and lost no time in proceeding to London. We have said that he was the partner and son-in-law of Mr. Baring; we should add that Mr. Baring was one of the most influential members of the East India Company, and a great friend of the Marquis of Wellesley, formerly Governor-General of India, and brother of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who commanded the English armies in Spain. M. de Labouchère had, therefore, but to present himself, to be both heard and believed. The success of his mission depended upon the offers which he was authorized to make; and on the position in which the British cabinet might be at the time. And this position was for the moment one of great difficulty.

After the resignation of Lords Grenville and Grey, who had continued the alliance formed between Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt, a resignation which had been caused by the

Catholic question, the exaggerators of the policy of Mr. Pitt had succeeded under the premiership of the Duke of Portland, and during their possession of the government received numerous blows. First of all Lord Castlereagh and M. Canning, the first firm, diligent, and able, but deficient in eloquence, the second on the other hand as superior in powers of oratory as the first was in the conduct of affairs, had given vent to the jealousy which each felt for the other in insults, which led to their retiring from the cabinet to fight a duel. They did not re-enter it. Lord Chatham had fallen in consequence of the Walcheren expedition, and the Duke of Portland was dead. Two persons possessed influence in the cabinet; Mr. Percival and the Marquis of Wellesley. The former a clever barrister endowed with some eloquence, inflexible firmness of character, and imbued with the blind prejudices of the Tory party. The latter, on the contrary, who replaced Mr. Canning at the foreign office, together with a most enlightened mind, possessed a perfect freedom from prejudices, and the rare talent of expressing himself with elegance and simplicity. He had less influence with the Tory party than Mr. Percival, because he had less passion, but he was held in high consideration, which was every day increased by his brother's growing fame.

The position of the English ministry was not, although it possessed the majority in the houses of parliament, very firm. It had experienced an alternation of success and the reverse. Although the victory of Talavera was a doubtful victory, and had been followed by a retreat on Estremadura, it had resulted in two advantages to the English, the first being that it caused the French army to hold aloof from Portugal, and the second that it enabled them to maintain theirs in the Peninsula in the face of the whole power of Napoleon. It had been, on the other hand, a great reverse for them when they failed before Antwerp with forty thousand men, and lost fifteen thousand by death or incurable sickness. Thus the position of the ministry was as undecided as was the opinion of the country on its policy. The opposition, having at its head two eminent persons, Lord Grenville and Lord Grey, declared that the war was carried on against all reason; that every year of its continuance had but given increased stature to the colossus which it was intended to overthrow; that it had caused the loss, if not of Portugal, certainly of Spain and Naples; and that by its prolongation all the northern coasts would be lost up to the mouths of the Oder; that the Peninsular war, in particular, was extremely dangerous, since that if Napoleon should throw

himself upon the English army with a hundred thousand men, not an English soldier would return; that the only force capable of being used in defence would thus be destroyed; that every day England lost some ally; that she had recently lost Sweden, and was threatened with speedily losing America; that the finances were loaded with frightful burdens; that the paper money and the exchange every day suffered fresh depreciation; and that, in short, to persist in such a policy was ruinous. Such was the substance of the daily remonstrances of Lords Grenville and Grey, and it must be acknowledged that there were sufficient reasons wherefore all those who could not foresee the mistakes into which Napoleon would shortly be hurried, should be desirous of peace. Nevertheless, save the millions which it cost to maintain so long a struggle, and the number of men who perished in Lord Wellington's army, which was not after all very considerable, and was made up by volunteers, the British population felt few of the consequences of war, and had, in a manner, become used to it. It had not as yet suffered much in its commerce; for if it had lost the continental markets, it had found others in the Spanish colonies. It was only threatened with serious damage when Napoleon determined to shut out completely from the continent colonial produce. But even in that direction it maintained in spite of his endeavours an immense activity. Its manufactures had received an enormous development; it ceased to feel any anxiety for its troops, whom it found able to keep their ground so well in the Peninsular; and finally, with the exception of some complaints which were sometimes levied rather against certain peculiarities of the income tax, than against the tax itself, it tacitly approved of the policy of the government, without however blaming the opposition for demanding peace. The slightest cause, therefore, was sufficient to incline it to the one side or the other.

Amongst the ministers Mr. Percival was notorious for his desire to prosecute the war with all the blind fury of a Tory. The Marquis of Wellesley, on the other hand, who was both an enlightened and a moderate man, and carried no obstinacy of temperament into the cabinet, was not unmindful that whilst the continuance of the war might procure large additions to the glory of his family, it would also surround both it and England with many dangers. He was therefore inclined to peace, should a serious offer of it be made, and acceptable terms proposed in respect of Spain. But to agitate the public mind by insignificant conferences, to turn aside popular opinion from its present peaceful current into a directly opposite direction, without being certain that there

would be any advantageous result from the change, to turn its warlike attitude into a peaceful one, without any certainty that peace would be really obtained, seemed to him to be a serious imprudence, which he, for his part, would not be guilty of. He had already behaved in a manner conformable to these ideas towards the agent sent by M. Fouché, and had given him an answer as evasive as the mission with which he was charged. An old officer in the army of Condé, and having some relations in England, the agent of the Duke of Otranto, had been presented by Lord Yarmouth, with whom he was acquainted. The Marquis of Wellesley received him politely, and replied to his message, that England had not determined upon prosecuting an eternal war, and would listen to overtures of peace, when brought by ostensible agents, properly accredited, and charged with propositions reconcileable with the honour of each nation.

Mr. Baring having announced the arrival of M. de Labouchère, and that he was the bearer of important communications, the Marquis of Wellesley hastened to receive him, showed him the greatest respect, and listened to him with profound attention. But after having heard him, he displayed extreme reserve, confining himself to general pacific declarations, and repeating that if France were really desirous of peace, England was quite willing to grant it. But he expressed the great doubts he entertained with respect to the real sentiments of the French cabinet, and gave as the source of these doubts, the doubtful character of the present mission, which was secret in its form, and charged with vague proposals, which left every thing in a state of uncertainty. He did not conceal that he had already received an overture of the like nature, borne, it was true, by a person of much humbler pretensions than M. de Labouchère, but exactly similar in its main points, since that also declared a pacific disposition without producing any proof, however slight, of the existence of such disposition. No clandestine mission, he said, no doubtful propositions, nothing which did not give a well grounded hope of attaining a peace, which would be honourable to England, would be listened to. As regarded Holland and the danger it was in of annexation to the French empire, the Marquis of Wellesley seemed little concerned. Whilst Napoleon found Holland too English, the British minister found it too French, and seemed to think that between its actual state and its annexation to France, there would be very little difference. As for the commercial inconveniences with which it menaced England, he seemed neither to have a clear idea of them, nor to foresee their extent, and repeated that every imaginable act of tyranny

had been long expected along the whole European coast, and that Great Britain was already resigned to it.

These declarations, which were as vague as the overtures with which M. de Labouchère was charged, were accompanied with the greatest testimonies of affection towards himself, and assurances that if any person should present himself in London as the bearer of ostensible powers, and of acceptable propositions, he would certainly be received and permitted to open negotiations.

The Marquis of Wellesley, so reserved with M. de Labouchère, was less so with Mr. Baring, and told him almost the plain truth. He and his colleagues, he said, had not determined upon prosecuting an eternal war, they cared little for re-establishing the Bourbons upon the throne of Louis XVI., and were ready to treat with Napoleon, but they distrusted his sincerity, and suspecting an intention on his part of exciting public opinion in England by a feigned negotiation for peace, had decided upon not aiding him in his designs. Influenced by these motives, they would only enter upon a negotiation which was both official and sincere. Resolved, as they were, neither to abandon Spain to Joseph, nor Sicily to Murat, nor to yield up Malta, they hoped that any envoy sent to negotiate would be furnished with such powers as would give a hope of agreement on these essential points.

Mr. Baring, who was a clever man, repeated these observations to M. de Labouchère, told him that England was resigned to the war, and even habituated to it; that she had not yet suffered sufficiently from it to feel inclined to yield; that while she had been very anxious with respect to the fate of the army, she was now re-assured by finding that this army maintained its footing in the midst of the Peninsular; that such a reverse as was little likely to occur was necessary to induce her to decide on peace; that it would never for a moment entertain the idea of surrendering Spain to a prince of the house of Bonaparte, and that no illusion must be indulged in on this point. Speaking with perfect freedom, and discussing all the various possible combinations, Mr. Baring represented as possible, but by no means certain of acceptance, and as solely emanating from himself, an arrangement which, while it left Malta to England, would give Naples to Murat, Sicily to the Bourbons of Naples, and Spain to Ferdinand, with the exception of the abandonment to France for the expenses of the war of the province as far as the Ebro.

Very certain that he should make no further progress in the objects of his mission by a prolonged stay in London,

M. de Labouchère departed for Holland, and reserving his communications respecting the result of his mission for King Louis in Paris, he maintained an impenetrable reserve on the subject towards the rest of the world. It was now evident, after these attempts at negotiation, that Spain was the real obstacle to peace; and that, having already obscured Napoleon's glory, having exhausted both his armies and his finances, she would continue to be in every subsequent negotiation for peace an obstacle perfectly insurmountable, unless a decisive triumph over the English could be obtained upon her soil.

Unhappily, Napoleon had become as habituated to the war in Spain as the English to the maritime war which she maintained against the universe. He resigned himself to it as to one of those serious maladies which one is able to endure by virtue of a strong constitution, from which one suffers in certain moments, which one forgets in others, and accompanied by which one lives on, endeavouring to deceive oneself respecting its serious nature. From the moment when he received the answer brought by M. de Labouchère, he ceased to expect that the resolves of Great Britain would be shaken by a threat of annexing Holland to France, and he resolved at once to put an end to the disputes between himself and his brother. Being unwilling, however, to give up entirely the indirect negotiation opened by M. de Labouchère, he dictated a note, of which the following was the import:—If England, it said, was habituated to the war and suffered little from it, France was also habituated to it and suffered little less. Victorious, rich and prosperous, France was condemned to pay dear for sugar and coffee, but she was not compelled to go without them. She was, in fact, indemnified by the new sugars which chemistry had discovered for her. A period of temporary suffering would be succeeded by one of unheard-of prosperity. Naples, Spain, and the Levant had brought her cotton sufficient to supply her manufactories, and if the sea were closed against her vessels, the whole continent offered an immense market for her silks, her cloths, her muslins, and dyed fabrics. She would be able, therefore, to maintain herself for a long period in the position which she held. As for Spain, the war had lasted two years and a half, because Napoleon, having had to march yet once more to Vienna, had been unable to devote to it sufficient attention. But he was now no longer occupied with Austria, and was preparing for the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the English, a cruel surprise. He was not distressed by an interruption to maritime commerce, which gave a vast development to French manufactures, nor by the

continuance of a war which, by drawing the English to the continent, furnished him with the occasions he so ardently desired, of matching army against army. And if he desired peace it was because, having made a marriage which tended to reconcile him with the old Europe, he was inclined to terminate the struggle which had been carried on between the ancient order of things and the new. With respect to the kingdoms which he had created, it was not to be supposed that he would sacrifice one. He would never dethrone his brothers Joseph, Murat, Louis, Jérôme. But the fate of Portugal and Sicily was still undecided; and these two countries, together with Hanover, the Hanse Towns, and the Spanish colonies, afforded materials for liberal compensations. But besides all this, if it were found difficult to come to an understanding upon these points, it would be at least possible to give, at once, a more humane character to the war. The English had issued 'orders in council,' to which Napoleon had replied by the decrees of Berlin and Milan, and the sea had thus been converted into a theatre of warfare. England had a greater interest than France in putting an end to this state of things, for a war between her and America was very likely to result from it. If she agreed with this opinion, she had only to repeal her lines of blockade, and France on her side would repeal hers; Holland and the Hanse Towns should remain independent and free; the seas would once more be open to neutrals, the war would lose its bitter character, and it was possible that this first return to moderation might be followed by a complete reconciliation between the two nations whose conflict divided, agitated, and tormented the whole world.

Such were the subjects of consideration which M. de Labouchère was instructed to submit to Mr. Baring, that they might eventually by any means, that should be found most suitable, be brought to the notice of the Marquis of Wellesley. For this purpose M. de Labouchère was authorised either to correspond with, or, if he thought it necessary, to make another journey to England.

Napoleon was anxious that the questions respecting Holland should have an immediate solution, that the complete closure of the coasts of the north sea might be immediately enforced; he still persisted in regarding the annexation of Holland to France, as the surest means of obtaining that result, but perceiving his brother's distress, and yielding to the entreaties of his mother and sisters, he was disposed to give up a part of his demands. He had already, from affection for the Queen Hortense and for the Empress Josephine, bestowed the fair duchy of Berg, which

had become vacant by the advance of Murat to the throne of Naples. Louis far from regarding this as a proof of affection, had persuaded himself, on the contrary, that it was the result of a desire to offend him, by depriving him of the education of his son, who, having become the sovereign, under age, of a principality dependent upon the empire, passed to the guardianship of the head of the imperial family, who was, of course, Napoleon. In spite, however, of these foolish self-deceptions, touched by his brother's state of anguish, he consented to entertain some other arrangement than that of annexation; some arrangement which, by a change of frontier line, and entrusting to French authority the guard of the Dutch coasts, would produce some of the important results which he had in view.

France having possessed, up to this time, Belgium without Holland, the frontier line had quitted the banks of the Rhine below the Wesel, passed the Meuse between Grave and Venloo, left southern Brabant on the outside, and rejoined the Scheldt below Antwerp, giving to Holland, consequently, not only the Waal, but the Meuse and the eastern Scheldt. Napoleon wished, in leaving Holland in his brother's possession, to rectify this frontier, to make the Waal the line of separation, and to adopt the Dutch Diep and the Krammer for the extreme limit, which arrangement would transfer to the sovereignty of France, Zealand, the isles of Tholen and Schowen, southern Brabant, a part of Guelders, the isle of Bommel, the important places, Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Gertruidenberg, Bois-le-Duc, Gorcum, and Nimèguen, that is to say, a fifth part of the population of Holland, and positions more important still than the four hundred thousand persons thus made subjects of the empire.

Besides this change of the frontier line, Napoleon desired that, until the conclusion of the maritime war, the Dutch commerce should be carried on under licences granted by himself, that all the Dutch ports should be guarded by an army of eighteen thousand men, of whom six thousand should be French, and twelve thousand Dutch, commanded by a French general, that all questions with regard to prizes should be tried in Paris, that a squadron of nine ships of the line, and six frigates should be under sail off Texel, by the first of July of the current year (1810), that all American cargoes carried into Holland, should be given up to the French treasury, that the imprudent measures which had been taken with regard to the noblesse, should be immediately retracted, that there should be no more marshals, and that the native troops under arms should never number less than twenty-five thousand men Amongst these conditions, which

were at least as hard to bear as the loss of a throne, there were many which affected more particularly Napoleon's unhappy brother, who was now paying the penalty of having played the king for a few years; the chief of these was the loss of the territory on the left of the Waal, which would to the greatest extent distress Dutch patriotism, and thoroughly impoverish the finances which were already so involved; a second was the transfer of the jurisdiction with respect to prizes, to the French courts, which involved in a manner the total destruction of authority in Holland; and a third was the subjection of the Dutch army to a French general, which was at the same time to take away all sovereignty from Louis, and to subject him to a cruel humiliation. Louis entreated for less hard conditions, and falling back, in his despair, upon his dreams of resisting his brother's authority, sent off advices to the ministers Krayenhoff and Mallerus to fortify Amsterdam, and those parts of Holland which were most capable of being put in a state of defence. He renewed, also, his order that admission into the Dutch fortifications should be refused to the French troops.

But in the meantime the ancient corps of Massena, commanded by Marshal Oudinot, had descended the Rhine and invaded Brabant under pretence of protecting the country against the English. General Maison having presented himself before the gates of Berg-op-Zoom had found them closed, and having insisted on their being opened to him, had caused the governor to show him the king's letter, which enjoined him to refuse admittance to the French troops. Fearing to overstep his duty if he came to a collision, General Maison paused under the cannon of the place, awaiting further orders. In the meantime information came from Amsterdam that its fortification was being actively proceeded with.

When information of these facts reached Napoleon, he was filled with indignation. He sent successively the Duke of Otranto and the Duke de Feltre to his brother to demand that all the gates of Holland should be opened to his forces, and to threaten that if they were not he would force them. He laid to the account of Louis and his ministers all the bloodshed that would ensue, and even demanded that the ministers who had given these orders should be delivered up to him.

The Dukes of Otranto and of Feltre (in the latter of whom Louis had great confidence), painted in such vivid colours Napoleon's anger, that the unhappy king in a fit of terror yielded every point, gave orders that the French

troops should be received into the fortified places, and consented to the dismissal of the two ministers who were accused of having advised the measures of resistance. "Sire," he wrote to his brother, "I send off this night a courier bearing the dismissal of the ministers Mollerus and Krayenhoff, who are alone to blame for the matters of which your majesty has complained. If you desire the dismissal of any other, I am ready to obey." Overwhelmed with suffering and chagrin, Louis also addressed the following note to his brother, which gives us a fair impression of the state of affairs at this period. "There has been no empire of the west hitherto," he wrote, "but it is most probable that there very soon will be. And then your Majesty will be very certain that I shall be no longer able to make mistakes, or to be disaffected." (Louis alluded to the state of well defined vassalage, which would be the result of this state of things, and render obedience easy to each inferior.) "Consider that I have been thrown, without experience, into a difficult country; permit me, now that I am on the point of losing both your friendship and your support, to entreat you to forget the past. I promise to observe faithfully all conditions you may impose on me."

The submission of Louis was complete, and there would no longer be any difficulty in the arrangement of the affairs of Holland. All the conditions insisted on by Napoleon were included in a treaty, by which Napoleon on his side engaged to maintain the integrity of the kingdom of Holland, or at least so much of it as remained. King Louis was only excused the reduction of the national debt to a third. To conceal them from the Dutch, the arrangements relating to the command of the Dutch army by a French general, to the seizure of American merchandize, to the abolition of certain dignities, and the dismissal of certain ministers, were included in secret articles. Amongst these secret conditions, one, which was not a little singular, was that Louis should have no ambassadors either at Vienna or at St. Petersburg. Napoleon, suspicious of the relations which his brothers might enter into in these capitals, which he knew to be thoroughly hostile to him, had imposed the same condition on Murat, under the pretext of economy.

When these sacrifices were consented to, Napoleon wrote to Louis a letter, which perfectly showed what were his real views.

"To the King of Holland,

"Paris, 13th March, 1810.

"Every political reason urges me to annex Holland to France; but seeing how much this would distress you, I now for the first time turn aside from my true policy to oblige

you. At the same time, be well assured that you must make a complete change in your mode of government, and that the first cause of complaint I have against you, will make me do that which I have now hesitated to do. My causes of complaint against you have reference to two subjects; the continuance of commercial relations between Holland and England; and speeches and edicts contrary to what I have a right to expect from you. It is necessary for the future, that your whole course of conduct should tend to impress Holland with a friendly feeling towards France, and not to be of a nature to excite its enmity and foment a natural hatred in its population. So far from taking away Brabant, I would have augmented Holland by the addition of several millions of people, if you had pursued that course which it was reasonable to expect from my brother and a French prince. But the past was irrevocable. Do not think that I am to be deceived; I read all the documents myself, and you will probably give me credit for knowing the force of ideas and phrases. You have written to me respecting the isle of Java. This subject must remain as yet in abeyance, for considering the powerful maritime resources of the English at the present time, it is necessary before we engage in new enterprises, to augment our naval forces. I calculate upon your being able to aid me almost immediately, and upon your maritime armaments acting in concurrence with mine."

When this agreement, the conditions of which we have shown, was settled, there was a sort of reconciliation between the two brothers. Napoleon loved Louis, to whom he had acted as guardian in his youth, and was loved by him when his spirit was free from the clouds of melancholy which so frequently oppressed it. They passed in each other's company all the period of the marriage fêtes, and in April, Louis departed to explain to his subjects the terms of the arrangement which had been come to, and to make them understand that he had been placed between the alternatives of submitting to the sacrifices which had been demanded of him, or of acceding to the total loss of the national independence. He had chosen well both for them and for himself, for as long as Holland preserved the vital principle of its political existence, it would be grounds for hoping that the day would come when all its losses would be recompensed; especially, as the greater part of the stipulated conditions, with the exception of those which referred to the change of frontier, would cease to be in force upon the attainment of peace. With regard to the loss of territory, Louis had entreated Napoleon to make it up by a grant of German territory, and he had

intimated that he would do so, should Holland render herself deserving of it by her conduct. That the appearance of reconciliation might be the more complete, Napoleon desired that the Queen Hortense should conduct her eldest son, the Grand Duke de Berg, into Holland, and pass some time with her husband there. Her presence, although but temporary, would help to persuade the public that all difficulties had been surmounted, and the delicate state of her health would be sufficient reason for her almost immediate departure.

Louis, therefore, left Paris for the Hague, whilst Napoleon hastened to give those orders which were called for by the new arrangements. He appointed to Marshal Oudinot to occupy southern Brabant and Zealand, as far as the Waal, to take definitive possession of these provinces, and to seize upon the spot all the English merchandize and colonial manufactures he could lay hands on. As Holland had been the great depôt, and the frontier provinces which had been acquired by the late conditions, had been the road by which they had entered France, there was a great probability that they would be found in considerable quantities.

Napoleon next ordered Marshal Oudinot to pass the Waal, and with three regiments of infantry, and two of cavalry, to advance into the northern part of Holland left to Louis; whilst General Molitor, concentrating his division towards l'Ost-Frise, would be ready to enter from the east, if events required it. General Oudinot was to establish his head quarters at Utrecht, to be joined by a number of custom house officers, and to occupy the navigable channels. He was desired to demand the surrender of the American cargoes, and to convey them by the inland channels to Antwerp, where was to be established the depôt and market for the seized merchandize. Besides the effect which Napoleon hoped to produce by these measures on commercial credit in England, and thus again on public opinion, he also hoped to obtain by means of them a large addition to the extraordinary treasury, and thus unite financial advantages with political ones.

In the midst of these various occupations, Napoleon found himself at the end of April (1810), the most favourable period for military operations in Spain, and that at which it was necessary that he should set out, if he intended to direct in person that decisive campaign, which he had determined should take place this year in the Peninsula. But in spite of his desire to set out, a desire so earnest, indeed, that he had already sent beyond the Pyrenees the greater part of his guard, a multitude of reasons still detained him in the bosom of his empire. Married on the 2nd of April, it was scarcely

fit that he should so soon leave his young bride to go to lead armies. The continental blockade, from which he expected such great results, were it only rigorously enforced, was only likely to be so by the influence of his own personal care. The disputes with his brother Louis, although temporarily set at rest, demanded a constant vigilance and unrelaxed firmness on his part, that the waters of Holland might not be suddenly opened to British commerce. The commercial system, much complicated by the grant of licences, required the publication of new regulations, which took up much of Napoleon's time, for he entrusted this business to no one, believing as he did, that he should eventually vanquish Great Britain as much by means of commerce as by his troops. And finally, although he had little hope of any successful result from the negotiation opened by M. de Labouchère, he was unwilling to close it entirely by his own absence from Paris. A commissioner had indeed arrived at Morlaix, to arrange the exchange of prisoners, who was charged with instructions which revealed a considerable change in the dispositions of the British cabinet. It was easy to believe that the last overtures had had some effect in bringing about this change.

There were many reasons to induce Napoleon to remain in Paris, besides his desire that any one should conduct the war in the Peninsula rather than himself; and this, not because he feared the assassination which the reports of the police showed he was in danger of there, but because he could not see in Spain, as he had in Prussia, Poland and Austria, any opportunity of putting an end to the war by one brilliant manœuvre, by one great battle; and did see that the campaigns there must consist of innumerable little conflicts, of sieges rather than battles, and form a methodical war, which could be as well directed from a distance as on the spot. The English alone were in a position to offer occasions which would demand important operations; but there was one amongst the marshals of the empire who, uniting with a rare energy the highest talents of a general, and having been covered with additional glory in the recent campaign, appeared to be exactly suited for the conduct of this war; and this was Marshal Massena. Napoleon fixed upon him as the man whom he would match against the English. The campaign opened by the siege of the fortified places which lay on the boundary line which separated Spain and Portugal, and many months were likely to pass before the commencement of offensive operations. Napoleon would at any time be able to throw himself upon the point at which he might

think his presence necessary. He forced the old warrior, who was suffering both from fatigue and illness, but was not ungrateful for the rewards which had been showered upon him, to depart for Portugal, to direct the operations against the English army; gave him the best staff that could be got together, placed under his orders the wise Regnièr, the brave Junot, the intrepid Ney; appointed to the command of his cavalry the best officer of this arm of the service who was then living, General Montbrun, besides brilliant lieutenants; promised him eighty thousand men, and dismissed him, when still suffering from his former exertions, overwhelmed with caresses, and followed him with the most sanguine hopes. Who could imagine, indeed, that the most brilliant of our generals, Napoleon alone excepted, at the head of a superb army, would not be able to overwhelm a handful of English, who were as inferior to our soldiers in numbers as they were in every military quality, except bravery? We shall presently see how destiny had decided.

After having made these arrangements Napoleon proposed to make a journey to Belgium, taking advantage of the unusually fine spring weather, to show his young wife to the populations which were impatient to see her, to influence favourably the Belgians, whom it was important to attach to the French empire, to make a personal inspection of the scene of the last English expedition, to order those works which would render a second expedition of the same kind impossible, to inspect the fleet at the Scheldt, to take a little nearer view of his brother's conduct in the new stage of his career, and to advance to meet rather than to withdraw from the negotiation with England.

The negotiation with England took, at this period, a most extraordinary direction, and one which we could scarcely believe possible, did not incontestable documents exist to prove it.

Napoleon had shown much reserve in regard to the degree in which M. de Labouchère was authorised to continue the negotiation opened with Great Britain. He had pointed out that France was still able to carry on the war with the endurance of very little suffering on her part, had distinctly signified the particulars in which France would never yield, and given some intimation as to those in respect to which she was disposed to make sacrifices. In the state of public feeling at that time in England these hints furnished but slight materials with which to prolong the negotiation, much less to bring it to a successful issue. M. Fouché thought thus, and had the good sense to wish for peace; but whilst he had the good sense to wish for peace, he was foolish

enough to desire that it might be procured by means of his own exertions, and if not in spite of Napoleon, at any rate independently of him, flattering himself with the idea of presenting it to the Emperor in almost a complete state, and dazzling him with the glory of so great an achievement. This was a kind of undertaking which would have been unwise under any government, and was most unwise under that of one so absolute and vigilant as Napoleon; and is inexplicable on the part of so clever a man as M. Fouché, except by that passion for interfering with everything which increased upon him with his age and his importance, and, we may say in his excuse, with the increasing manifestation of the perils of the empire. M. Fouché was urged on in this course by those persons with whom he was surrounded, and whom we have mentioned as promulgators of such projects as, that a portion of the Peninsular should be restored to the Bourbons of Spain, that the Spanish colonies should be resigned to the Bourbons of France, &c. . . . to which projects some others were added, such as, for example, that in case Napoleon should be unwilling to deprive his brother Joseph of his kingdom, Ferdinand should be presented with the Spanish colonies, and the Bourbons of France receive a recompense, which was a sufficiently strange one, consisting of nothing less than North America, the United States themselves! Let us observe the source of this notorious idea;—the United States by their law of embargo had embroiled themselves at the same time with both France and England; they were republicans, ungrateful to France and odious to England, whom Louis XVI. had erred in enfranchising, and whom Napoleon, curer of all the evils caused by the revolution, would replace under monarchical and European authority. England could not but be rejoiced at seeing the United States confined to their territories, checked in their enterprise, and punished for their revolt.

M. Fouché had too much good sense to believe in such chimeras, but pressed by M. Ouvrard, whom he had the folly to initiate in so grave an affair, he consented to his departure for Amsterdam, for the purpose of seeing M. de Labouchère, and directing the correspondence of the latter with London, in such a manner as to continue the negotiation, and not in such a manner as to break it off. M. Fouché was persuaded that by moderation and patience, and the war in Spain offering no better results, they would succeed in bringing Napoleon to sacrifice Joseph's kingdom, of which he was greatly disenchanted, perhaps the kingdom of his brother Louis, with which he was still less enchanted, and that by care England might be brought to a point at which

reconciliation with them would be possible, or peace become negotiable; but this, according to his opinion, was without Napoleon's interference.

M. Ouvrard set out in consequence, full not only of the ideas of M. Fouché, but, what was much worse, of his own, quite delighted to be mixed up with so great an affair, and flattering himself that he should recover by a signal service the long lost favour of Napoleon. Scarcely arrived at Amsterdam, he spoke in the name of M. Fouché, from whom he held several letters, was considered by M. Labouchère as the direct and accredited representative of this minister, and in consequence as the representative of Napoleon himself. Thence M. Labouchère found himself encouraged, by that which he heard and that which he read, to send to London new communications of a nature much more likely to satisfy British politics than those theretofore sent. M. Ouvrard in effect had told him that in respect to Sicily, Spain, the Spanish colonies, Portugal, and Holland, Napoleon would not be peremptory in his wishes, and that he must not depict him as such in London; that he wished sincerely for peace; that his inclination was misunderstood in England; that besides there was at that moment a point in common between him and the British cabinet, the desire of punishing the Americans for their conduct. M. Ouvrard touched on all these subjects in a manner more or less precise, and wrote several notes, pressing M. de Labouchère incessantly to transmit them to London. M. Fouché, having the imprudence to second this extravagant negotiation, had recourse to a strange device, such as the police can imagine, to give credit to M. de Labouchère with the British government. An unknown person who called himself Baron de Kolli, and appeared to belong to the English police, had presented himself at Valencay to contrive some method for the escape of Prince Ferdinand. They had arrested him, and thought that they had made an important capture, that would greatly annoy the British cabinet, whose intrigues would be publicly disclosed. M. Fouché authorized M. de Labouchère to write to the Marquis of Wellesley that, if he desired it, this person should be sent back to him. This would be at once a proof of good faith towards the British cabinet, and a way of greatly accrediting M. de Labouchère.

The communications with England were then both rare and difficult, not only on account of the bad state of the roads, but also on account of the war. It required fourteen or fifteen days to send a letter from Amsterdam to London, and receive a reply to it, so that this singular correspondence might still last a very considerable time without any definite

solution being arrived at. In the meantime M. Ouvrard in writing to M. Fouché represented the negotiation to him as making a progress which it did not make, and M. Fouché, in his turn deceiving M. Ouvrard, represented to him that Napoleon was instructed and satisfied with these parleys, which were absolutely false, for M. Fouché, in deferring as long as he could an unpleasant avowal, waited for the matter being sufficiently advanced to be avowed to Napoleon.

During this time the Emperor left Paris with a brilliant court, composed of the Empress, the King and Queen of Westphalia, the Queen of Naples, of Prince Eugène, of the Grand Duke of Wurtzbourg, the uncle of Maria Louise, of the Prince of Schwarzenberg, the Ambassador of the Austrian Court, of M. de Metternich, the first Minister of that court, and of the greater part of the French ministers. Napoleon intended to visit Antwerp, Flushing, Zealand, and Brabant, all provinces newly ceded to the empire, then to return by Picardy, and through Normandy to Paris.

The populace, tired of the monotony of their life, are always eager to run after princes whoever they may be, and often applaud them on the eve of a catastrophe. When Napoleon appeared anywhere the feeling of curiosity, and also of admiration sufficed to collect a crowd, and in the moment when he had just fulfilled his great destiny by his marriage with an Archduchess, the eagerness and enthusiasm were likely to be great. Wherever, indeed, he appeared, the transports were lively and unanimous. Besides, his presence always announced the commencement of numerous works, and in him they applauded not only the great man, but the benefactor. Leaving Compiegne on the 27th of April, he arrived the same day at St. Quentin. Besides the re-establishment of the manufacture of shafts, this town was indebted to him for the great works of the canal of Saint-Quentin, continued and finished since the consulate. The subterranean passage which united the waters of the Seine to those of the Scheldt, was illuminated, and Napoleon passed through it with his court, in elegantly decorated barges, and, so to speak, in open day. He granted, during the passage, to M. Gayant, the engineer who superintended these beautiful works, a pension of considerable amount, with a grade in the legion of honour, and then set out for Cambray and the Chateau of Laeken. He was not to visit Brussels until his return.

On the 30th of April, he embarked on the great canal which runs from Brussels, until it joins the Rupel, and by the

Ruppel the Scheldt itself. All the boats of the great fleet of the Scheldt, decked with a thousand colours, and worked by the ships crews, came to fetch him, and transported him along the submissive waters of Belgium with the quickness of the wind. Decrès, the Minister of Marine, and Admiral Missiessy, who had shown so much coolness during the Walcheren expedition, commanded the imperial flotilla. They arrived soon in view of the Antwerp squadron, created by Napoleon, and recently removed from the reach of the English torch. All the vessels, frigates, sloops and guns lined the way; Marie Louise passed under the harmless fire of a thousand cannon, which conveyed to her agitated senses the testimony of the power of her husband. The Imperial Court made its entry into Antwerp in the midst of a Belgian population, assembled to meet it, and which had forgotten its feeling of hostility in the presence of so great a spectacle. Napoleon had a great deal to do at Antwerp, and stayed there several days. The continental peace enabled him to devote himself to his projects for the navy of the empire, and of the allied states; he had this year about forty vessels to dispose of, nine for the Texel, promised for the 1st of July; ten actually under sail at Antwerp, two at Cherbourg, three at Lorient, seventeen at Toulon, one at Venice; in all forty-two. He calculated to have seventy-four in 1811, 100 or 110 in 1812, capable, when the necessary quantity of frigates and sloops should have been added, to embark in case of need, 150,000 men for any destination.

In order to reach this number it was necessary to add nine more at Antwerp in the space of one year. To do this, it was indispensable to augment the basins, and to bring wood and workmen to this chosen port.

Napoleon gave the proper orders, and had a vessel of eighty guns launched in his presence, which entered majestically into the Scheldt under the eyes of the Empress, and in the midst of the benedictions of the clergy of Malines, invited to this naval fête. Napoleon had near to him Prince Eugène, to whom he desired to show all that he did in the canals of Flanders, that he might excite him to the like in the canals of the Adriatic. "When one has land one can have sea," he exclaimed, "provided one wishes it, and one takes the necessary time." Time! exactly that which is procured by wisdom only, and of which Napoleon would soon deprive himself.

His brother Louis came to see him, and, although less agitated, always seemed extremely melancholy,—melancholy with his own sadness, and with the sadness of his people,

whom so many afflictions had struck at once. Napoleon endeavoured to inspirit him by showing him all that he had done at Antwerp, and all that he still proposed to do there, again urgently ordered him to have his fleet ready for the Texel for the 1st of July, unfolded to him his vast maritime projects, and announced to him that his troops were about to be brought on the coast, and that in a short time he should have at the mouth of the Scheldt, at Brest and at Toulon, vast expeditions ready to carry entire armies, that Massena would march on Lisbon with eighty thousand men, that in two months the English would be sharply pressed at all points, and that the war, of which they seemed to have made a habit, would soon be rendered insupportable to them, above all, if by rigorous observance of the blockade, a severe blow were struck at their mercantile interests.

With reference to this subject Napoleon conversed with his brother Louis on the negotiation of Labouchère. By a singular accident he had just encountered M. Ouvrard on his way, returning in all haste from Amsterdam to Paris, in consequence of the strange communications going on between Holland and England. Napoleon, with his ordinary promptitude of mind, had foreseen that M. Ouvrard, enjoying the favour of the Duke of Otranto, and connected in business with M. de Labouchère, had come to mix himself in that which did not concern him, to endeavour to detect some secret of the negotiation, perhaps to give counsels which were not required, and perhaps also to establish some speculation on the probabilities of peace. Full of a singular presentiment he caused M. de Labouchère to be forbidden to hold any intercourse with M. Ouvrard, demanded from him all the letters exchanged between Amsterdam and Holland, and added an order that all such letters should be sent to him during his journey wherever he might be. Louis set out again for Amsterdam without having wished to assist at any fête, above all at a moment when Napoleon was about to enter into the territory recently taken away from Holland. Napoleon, after having employed five days in directing the necessary works, and especially the new defences which were to render Antwerp impregnable, ordered the fleet to descend on Flushing, and to give the necessary time he went to visit the new territories acquired between the Meuse and the Waal, as also the several places of Bergop-Zoom, Breda, Bois-le-Duc, and Gertruidenberg. At Breda he received, with the civil and military authorities, the Protestant and Catholic clergy. In these newly-acquired territories of the empire the Catholics found themselves enfranchised from the Protestant domination, and yet

they were far from seeming satisfied. Whilst the chief Protestant minister came in his robe of state, the vicar apostolic, on the contrary, presented himself in a plain black dress, as if he feared, on such an occasion, to put on a holiday costume. Napoleon, by the simple attitude of the bystanders, had divined all their sentiments, and, the bad habit of not being able to contain himself each day increasing, he gave himself up to a transport of anger, in part sincere, and in part the result of calculation. Feigning at first not to see the vicar apostolic, he heard with benevolence the Protestant minister, who, speaking with much simplicity and modesty, addressed him in a few words of resignation, the only words proper in the mouths of citizens who were just torn from their ancient country, to be attached to a new country which, though great, was foreign. "Sire," said the representative of the Protestant clergy, "in us you see the ministers of a Christian community, whose custom is to worship in all that happens the hand of Providence, and to render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." "You are right," instantly replied Napoleon, "and you will find that you do well in so doing, for I wish to protect all kinds of worship. But why, sir, are you dressed in the costume of your ministry?" "Sire, that is the order." "It is then the custom of the country," replied Napoleon. Then turning towards the Catholic clergy he said: "And you, sirs, why are you not here in your sacerdotal habits? Are you solicitors, notaries, or physicians? And you, sir," addressing himself to the representative of the Roman church, "what is your title?" "Sire, vicar apostolic." "Who nominated you?" "The Pope." "He has not the right. I alone, in my empire, nominate the bishops charged with the administration of the church. Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's. The Pope is not Cæsar, I am Cæsar. God has not given to the Pope the sceptre of the sword, but to me. You Catholics, for a long time placed under the dominion of the Protestants, have been enfranchised by my brother, who has placed all kinds of worship upon an equal footing. You are about to be indebted to me for a still more complete equality, and you commence by showing a want of respect for me! You complain of being oppressed by the Protestants! by your conduct it would seem that you have merited it, and that it is necessary to place the weight of a strong authority upon you. Be sure that this authority will not be wanting. I have here a present proof that you do not desire to obey the civil authority, and that you refuse to pray for the sovereign. I have already caused two refractory priests to be arrested, and they will remain in prison. Imitate the Protestants, who, in

remaining steadfast to their faith, are citizens submissive to the law, and faithful subjects. Ah! you do not wish to pray for me!" continued Napoleon, with an accent of increasing anger. "Is it because a Roman priest has excommunicated me? But who gave him the right to do so? Who below can unbind subjects from their oath of obedience to a sovereign instituted by law? No one, you should know it, if you know your religion. Are you ignorant that it was your culpable pretensions which drove Luther and Calvin to separate from Rome, a part of the Catholic world? If it had been necessary, and if I had not found in the religion of Bossuet the means of assuring the independence of the civil power, I also should have enfranchised France from the power of Rome, and forty millions of men would have followed me. I did not wish it because I thought that the true principles of the Catholic faith were reconcilable with the civil authority. But give up all thought of putting me in a convent, and shaving my head, as Louis the Debonnaire, and submit yourselves, for I am Cæsar! Otherwise I shall banish you from my empire, and disperse you like the Jews over the surface of the earth." In pronouncing these last words the voice of Napoleon was raised and his eye flashed. The unfortunate priests who had provoked this burst were trembling. "You are," he added, "of the diocese of Malines; go and present yourselves to your bishop, obey the concordat, and I shall then see what I shall have to ordain for you."

This scene, calculated for effect, produced a great one. The words of Napoleon, taken down at the moment, and repeated by the permission of the police in the greater part of the newspapers of the country, produced a great effect.

Encompassing all things in his activity, Napoleon passed rapidly to other objects. He visited Berg-op-Zoom, Breda, Gertruidenberg, and Bois-le-Duc, and everywhere took wise resolutions, dictated by his profound knowledge of war and of administration. On seeing these countries so fertile in flax and hemp, he decreed that a prize of a million francs should be given to the inventor of a machine for spinning flax. He found also in these provinces manufactories which produced common cloth at a very low price, and well adapted for troops, and decided to use it to a considerable extent for that purpose.

Arrived on the banks of the Waal, which presents so strong a frontier and so excellent a means of communication in the interior, he felt all the ardours of his ambition for France rekindled, and conceived a regulation which should

insure to French boatmen the exclusive navigation of the Rhine. He decided that every boat not being French which entered the Rhine should, at Nimeguen if it came from Holland, and at Mayence if it came from Germany by the Maine, deliver its cargo to French boats, which alone could navigate this great river. Napoleon thus treated the river waters as the English treated the waters of the ocean.

Anxious to have timber proper for ship building for Antwerp, he ordered that all wood of this kind brought along the Rhine, should be obliged to pass into Belgium instead of going into Holland, whither it had been usually drawn by the great wealth of the inhabitants. He drew up at the same time several regulations to induce unoccupied workmen to come from Brest, where they built but little from want of wood, for employment at Antwerp.

After having visited the frontier places, and been conveyed successively to the islands of Tholen, of Schouwen, of North and South Beveland, in short of Walcheren, he decided, on account of the terrible fevers of these countries, that those posts only which were indispensable, should be maintained, taking care to choose them well and to provide them with every defensible force of which they were capable. At Flushing he ordered immense works to shelter the garrison from the fire of vessels, and to overwhelm with destructive projectiles any hostile squadron which should endeavour to pass the great channel. At the sight of the ruins of Flushing he showed himself more just towards the unfortunate General Mounet, who had recently fallen in defending the place, and gave the most requisite orders to prevent the past being renewed again in the future. According to an observation often made that men of a ripe age and acclimated are less susceptible of fever than young men newly arrived, he decreed an organization, by virtue of which the defence of these islands should be reserved for the veteran and colonial battalions. He desired that a numerous flotilla of gunboats might always be joined to the fleet, and that the basins of Flushing should be prepared to receive twenty vessels of the line. Whilst he directed these things his court gave and received fêtes, and occupied itself with the frivolous part of the journey, of which he reserved for himself the useful part.

His stay in these parts was prolonged until the 12th of May; he re-ascended the Scheldt, and this time only passed through Antwerp, visited Brussels to show his wife, again descended to Ghent and to Bruges to conclude the necessary works on the left of the Scheldt, and from thence west to

Ostend, where an English army in disembarking might have marched straight upon Antwerp. Napoleon here decided on works which could give sufficient strength to the place, and then set off for Dunkirk, where he ordered several necessary repairs, chastised the idleness of several engineer officers in fault, visited the camp at Boulogne, the abandoned theatre of his first projects, and held several reviews there, to cause uneasiness to the English; gave two days to Lille, and at last proceeded to Havre, where he occupied himself attentively with the defence of this considerable port. On the evening of the 1st of June, he returned to St. Cloud, satisfied with what he had done and ordered, with the reception everywhere given to the Empress, and the hopes which the nation seemed to place in the young sovereign. However, notwithstanding the numerous satisfactory subjects which this journey had procured for him, he returned with a profound irritation of which the Duke of Otranto was the principal object. King Louis, as Napoleon had ordered him, had demanded from M. de Labouchère all the papers relating to the communications with England, who, firmly believing that in continuing, at the instigation of M. Ouvrard, the overtures commenced, he acted according to the orders of the Duke of Otranto, and, in consequence, of the Emperor himself, had delivered over without dissimulation all that he had written to London, and all the replies which he had received. Napoleon, reading during the journey these papers, transmitted to him by his brother, learned for certain that the negotiation had been continued unknown to him, and on a basis which was far from being agreeable to his purposes. These papers did not disclose all that had passed, for the correspondence of M. Ouvrard with M. Fouché was wanting, but what was sufficient to prove to Napoleon, that they had negotiated without his orders, and after other indications than his. He surmised, without being quite certain, that M. Fouché had taken a principal part in these singular intrigues, and he wished to enlighten himself on the point immediately. On the morning after his arrival, that is on 2nd of June, he called the ministers to St. Cloud, M. Fouché was present. Without any preamble, Napoleon asked for an account of the going to and fro of M. Ouvrard in Holland, of the continued parleys with England, as it appeared without the sphere of the government. He asked him besides, one after another, if he knew anything of this strange mystery, if he had sent or not, M. Ouvrard to Amsterdam, if he was an accomplice or not of his inexcusable manœuvres. M. Fouché, who had reserved himself to speak at a late period to the Emperor of what he had

dared to attempt, surprised by his sudden revelation, which he did not expect, and pressed irrefutably by these embarrassing questions, stammered some excuses for M. Ouvrard, saying that he was an intrigant who meddled in every thing, and whose proceedings should not be attended to. Napoleon was not to be satisfied with these reasons. "These are not," he said, "insignificant intrigues, which should be despised; to permit oneself to negotiate with an enemy's country unknown to one's own sovereign, and on the conditions of which that sovereign is ignorant, and will not perhaps admit, is an unheard of treason. It is a treason which the weakest of governments ought not to tolerate." Napoleon added that he looked upon that which was just passed as so serious that he desired that M. Ouvrard should be immediately arrested. M. Fouché, fearing that his arrest would lead to a discovery of the whole affair, in vain attempted to appease Napoleon's anger, but the result of his efforts was only to increase Napoleon's suspicions, and attract them towards himself. Napoleon, who was fully resolved that M. Ouvrard should be arrested, had avoided entrusting the execution of his will to M. Fouché, lest he should find some means of evading it, and had chosen for this duty Savary, who had become Duke de Rovigo, and was entirely in his confidence. Within two or three hours M. Ouvrard was cleverly arrested, and all his papers seized. At his first examination it was discovered that the negotiation had been carried farther than had been suspected, and that M. Fouché had taken as large a part as any one in the singular intrigue which had been discovered.

Napoleon had been very dissatisfied with the restless spirit of this minister, who already on various occasions had officiously taken the initiative, or exceeded the bounds of his instructions, as for example in the matter of the divorce, in the excessive extension of the national guard, and especially in this negotiation with England. Napoleon had not failed to remark his rash spirit of enterprise, and that ambition of his to make himself of importance, which was very likely to prove in the course of time exceedingly dangerous. He perceived in Fouché's eagerness to conclude a peace in spite of himself, an indirect censure on his policy, and a wish to acquire credit at his own expense. We may add, moreover, that he had begun to conceive a vague feeling of discontent against all his old servants, for they all, especially the most distinguished amongst them, appeared, each in his own manner, to express disapproval of his actions. M. de Talleyrand gave his reproofs the form of sarcasm, the wise

Cambacérès blamed him by his silence, and M. Fouché by the exertions he had made to bring about peace. He had in reply made Talleyrand feel the weight of his temper, and maintained a rigid reserve towards Cambacérès, which chiefly injured himself, as it deprived him of precious counsels. With regard to M. Fouché he was resolved to give full scope to his anger.

The letters found in the possession of M. Ouvrard showed very plainly what part had been taken by the Duke of Otranto in the second Labouchère negotiation. The following day, the 3rd of June, fell on a Sunday; and all the chief dignitaries had gone to hear mass at Saint Cloud, and to assist at the Emperor's levee. After the celebration of mass Napoleon had the dignitaries and his ministers, with the exception of M. Fouché, summoned to his presence, and addressed them thus: "What would you think of a minister who, without the cognizance of his sovereign, should open negotiations with foreign states, conduct them on principles arranged only by himself, and thus compromise the whole policy of the state? What punishment is awarded by our laws for such a fault?" As he uttered these words Napoleon scrutinized narrowly each of those who surrounded him, as though he would ask of them such an answer as would enable him the more easily to pour his full vengeance on the head of the Duke of Otranto, for he felt in the midst of all his power that to punish him severely was no light thing. The complaisant courtiers easily read the meaning of his glances, and exclaimed that such a crime would be of the deepest dye. M. de Talleyrand, who was not this time the object of the imperial wrath, smiled carelessly; and the arch-chancellor, who guessed that M. Fouché was alluded to, and resolved to persist in declaring himself the friend even of his enemies, answered that there could be no doubt that the fault was a grave one and deserved a severe punishment, unless it were committed only through an excess of zeal. Napoleon hereupon exclaimed that an excess of zeal which should lead a man to act in the way he had described, would be as strange as dangerous, and he proceeded to repeat with vehemence all that he knew of M. Fouché; concluding by announcing his irrevocable determination to deprive him of his office, and requesting the advice of those present with respect to the choice of a fit person to succeed him.

This was a source of great embarrassment to all. It was difficult to make a choice, for to the post of minister of police belonged an immense importance, which was the consequence of the arbitrary powers belonging to it, and which M. Fouché had known how to increase and to identify with himself. Each,

moreover, feared to make any choice which might be repugnant to Napoleon's own secret determination, and to contribute, even indirectly, to the deprivation of a minister who was dreaded even in disgrace. All were eager to declare that serious deliberation was necessary before fixing on the man who would be a worthy successor to M. Fouché. But M. de Talleyrand, after having looked about him for some time in silence, and with an ironical expression flitting over his impassable countenance, at length said, turning to his neighbour, in a voice sufficiently loud to be heard by all around: "M. Fouché has certainly committed a great fault, and I will name the one man who alone ought to be his successor,—it is M. Fouché himself!" Vexed that this assembly of great persons should have not only failed in giving him any advice worth having, but should have been the means of exposing him to a stroke of Talleyrand's raillery, Napoleon abruptly retired, taking with him the arch-chancellor, and saying to him, "Much advantage have I gained from consulting the gentlemen! You see what useful advice they have given me! But my choice is made, and the Duke de Rovigo will be my minister of police." Napoleon had had occasion to prove the skill and boldness of the Duke de Rovigo, had remarked his devotedness to himself, and felt very confident that he would not imitate M. Fouché's example of taking to himself the credit of every act of grace, and attributing to the Emperor all those of a contrary character. The appointment of the Duke de Rovigo to this post would, moreover, be a source of general consternation, and this was by no means contrary to Napoleon's inclination. It was a choice, however, which filled the arch-chancellor with uneasiness, for whilst doing full justice to the merits of the Duke de Rovigo, he felt that an ill effect would result from a military air being given to the police, and hinted that public opinion, being somewhat estranged, was scarcely likely to be conciliated by the appearance of a minister of police in military uniform. To this Napoleon replied; "so much the better! The Duke of Rovigo is resolute and cunning; and as he will be feared, may afford to be gentler than another!" There was no answering this; and it may be observed of the Duke de Rovigo that he was intelligent, crafty, and unscrupulous, and yet free from malice, and perfectly capable of speaking the truth to his master's face. But the truth, unfortunately, in whatever guise it may reach a sovereign's ears, if he be not inclined to receive it, is but an empty sound, and begs for admission at a gate which will not be opened to its entreaties.

The course of affairs thus led to the removal in less than three years, of the two most important ministers of state, the

Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Police, M. de Talleyrand and M. Fouché. With respect to the ministry of foreign affairs, although filled with modesty, prudence and discretion, by M. de Cadore, it had seemed to be vacant since it had passed from the hands of M. de Talleyrand. Of polished manners and a pleasing exterior, M. de Bassano, a man who was devoted to the Emperor, and desired to serve him well, but too apt in a spirit of complaisance to give up his own opinions for those of the Emperor, aspired to the ministry of foreign affairs, and as a means of rendering his attainment of this post the easier, would have wished to place in the ministry of police a friend of his own. This friend was M. de Sémonville, a man at once cynical, daring, and supple, fraught with all the unscrupulous doctrines of a minister of police, but not possessed of the necessary judgment, tact, and vigilance. M. de Bassano had contributed to the fall of M. Fouché, by giving currency to more than one damaging report, and had paved the way for the elevation of M. de Sémonville, by extolling above measure some inferior services rendered by him in the course of the negotiations respecting the Austrian marriage. But if it were possible for complaisant mediocrity to gain access to Napoleon, as is the case with all great men, there was but little chance of his being imposed on by small artifices, especially when the matter in question was no less than in the choice of a minister of police. Indeed, whilst M. de Bassano had sent for M. de Sémonville to Saint Cloud, that he might be ready at the favourable moment, urgent and repeated messages were sent to the Duke de Rovigo to present himself in the Emperor's cabinet. The anti-chambers were filled with the curious, and those who had gone to Saint Cloud in the hope of assisting at some great change in the high ministerial appointments. The Duke de Rovigo arrived at length, and was much surprised at the announcement which Napoleon made to him, without any preface. "You are Minister of Police, take the oath, and begin your work!" The new minister murmured some modest objections to his fitness, to which Napoleon paid no attention, took the oath, and passed through the imperial apartments, which echoed with the news that the Duke of Rovigo was made minister of police, and the Duke of Otranto in disgrace. The effect of this news was disadvantageous; for M. Fouché, who after having performed great services by means of his knowledge of men, and by his considerate manner of treating party spirit, both appeasing and diverting it, had undoubtedly detracted from the merit due to these services, by his own officiousness, was nevertheless regretted by the public, as one of the men who had been

Napoleon's counsellors in his most prosperous years. He was regretted as Talleyrand and Josephine were regretted; with a regret which regarded them as witnesses of, and actors in a time which had been glorious, and which, it was feared, would not be equalled in prosperity by the future.

Napoleon did not, however, intend to disgrace M. Fouché, without giving him some compensation; and he made him governor of the Roman states, where his tact and experience in revolutions would find ample and suitable employment. Previously to this, he sent two letters to the ex-minister; one of them public and full of gratifying testimonies of esteem; the other private and more severe. We quote the second, because of the two it is the one which is the most conformable to the truth.

"Saint Cloud, June 3rd, 1810.

"Monsieur le duc d'Otrante, I have received your letter of the 2nd of June. I am fully aware of all the services which you have rendered me, and I have perfect confidence in your attachment to my person, and your zeal for my service. I should, however, be wanting in what is due to myself, did I any longer leave you in possession of the portfolio. The office of minister of police is one which demands that perfect confidence should be reposed in him who holds it, such a confidence as I can no longer place in you, since, in the most important matters you have compromised my tranquillity, and that of the state; conduct which is not excused in my eyes by the legitimacy of the motives which led to it.

"A negotiation has been opened with England, conferences have taken place with Lord Wellesley. This minister has known that he was treating with you, when he ought to have believed that it was with me; from this results a total confusion in all my political relations, and if I should endure it, a stain would be upon my character which I am determined not to endure.

"Your peculiar opinions regarding the duties of the Minister of Police are not consistent with the good of the state; and although I have full confidence in your attachment and fidelity, I am forced to a perpetual surveillance which fatigues me, and which I can no longer bear. This surveillance is rendered necessary by the number of things which you have done of your own head without knowing whether they agreed with my wishes or views, or were consistent with my general course of policy.

"I wish to inform you by my own hand of the reasons which induce me to deprive you of the portfolio of police. I have no hope of your changing your mode of acting, since during several years, the most decided and reiterated evidences of

my dissatisfaction have not altered it, and because you have been determined not to understand that it is possible to do much harm whilst attempting to do much good.

"Apart from this, my confidence in your talents and fidelity is complete, and I desire to find some occasion of employing them in my service."

M. Fouché on quitting his post had taken care to burn all the papers relating to it, and felt a malicious pleasure in withholding from his successor's hands all the innumerable threads composing the finely spun web of the system of police. The Duke of Rovigo, therefore, suddenly appointed to the head of this department whilst completely ignorant of its details, and, moreover, without means of communicating with the secret agents whom M. Fouché declined to point out to him, was at first surprised and then terrified at his new position. But he speedily became reassured and saw clearly where all had at first appeared confused and intricate. One by one crept up to him those mysterious secret agents, which are so necessary to a minister of police, and whose use is measured not by their own disposition but by that of the minister who employs them; a sort of timid and famished animals such as are all those which habitually live in the shade, flying at the least alarm, but quickly driven forth again by the pangs of hunger towards the hand which offers them food. These persons soon made the Duke of Rovigo acquainted with those secret plots, generally rather puerile than dangerous, which it was necessary to watch without appearing to make them of too much importance; and it was not long before the new minister found himself well able to conduct the affairs of his office, although he never acquired the authority of M. Fouché, to whose piercing eyes had been almost attributed omniscience.

Of all the secret proceedings which it was now the office of the Duke of Rovigo to trace out, Napoleon felt the most interest in the singular negotiation which had been pursued in his own despite. He wished to know the several parts which had been taken in it by M. Fouché, M. Ouvrard, and M. de Labouchère. M. Ouvrard frequently underwent examination and maintained a rigorous silence; M. de Labouchère was summoned to Paris, and ordered to bring with him the papers relating to the matter which he still had in his possession. By means of these and by interrogating M. de Labouchère the real facts of the case were speedily discovered to be as we have described. M. de Labouchère was considered to have behaved with discretion and sincerity, and to have only intermeddled with the negotiation in accordance with what he believed to be the wishes of the government.

M. Ouvrard and M. Fouché were found to have revived a negotiation which had been half abandoned, and to have completely disregarded the instructions of the Emperor in showing a disposition to sacrifice that which he was resolved not, on any consideration, to resign. But the chief source of annoyance to Napoleon was the idea that he might be suspected in England of duplicity, and of being willing to traffic with the kingdoms given to his brothers, especially that of Spain. An additional circumstance which came to light caused him particular alarm, and made him resolve to convert the almost nominal disgrace of M. Fouché into one both public and severe. It was discovered that independently of the communications which had been carried on by M. de Labouchère, and which were but the revival and protraction of an authorized negotiation, there had been others which had no such foundation, and which had been solely the idea of M. Fouché himself. M. Fouché had in November, as we have said, selected an agent named Fagan, formerly an officer in an Irish regiment, well connected in England, and a friend of Lord Yarmouth, who had introduced him to the Marquis of Wellesley. There was reason to suppose that written communications had passed in the course of this affair, and Napoleon sent to M. Fouché, demanding that he should deliver up all such as were in his possession, and threatening the severest penalties in case he should hesitate to obey.

The agent had brought from London only a few unimportant papers, and these M. Fouché had burned, partly because they were of little interest, and partly because prudence counselled the destruction of the least traces of so rash an undertaking. When a message to this effect reached him, Napoleon surrendered himself to the most violent paroxysms of rage, for he feared that this obstinacy of M. Fouché concealed some important secret; he deprived him of the governorship with which he had just invested him, and exiled him to Aix in Provence.

The alarming suspicions, however, which had arisen, were soon set at rest. The agent who was the object of so much inquietude appeared, frankly answered all the questions that were put to him, said that he had seen the Marquis of Wellesley, and had from him the only written document that he had received; and that this was a note containing about six lines, and simply repeating the ordinary declaration of the British ministers, that they were ready to take part in a sincere formal negotiation, which should comprise all the allies of England, and especially Spain.

The result of the inquiry into this strange affair seemed,

in fact, merely to show that M. Fouché had been guilty of an act of great temerity, and that the Emperor might possibly be considered in England more accommodating than he really was. Napoleon soon saw the matter in its true light and grew calm, but he still left M. Fouché in disgrace and exile. Fearing, however, to be accused of lightly sacrificing his old servants, he had an account of the whole affair drawn up and communicated to those ministers and great persons who had been witnesses of the bursts of passion to which it had excited him. "It is right that they should see," he said, "that I do not permit myself to be causelessly and arbitrarily severe towards my old servants."

This attempt at negotiation showed very clearly that without the sacrifice of Spain, which Napoleon was determined not to sacrifice, peace was impossible; and that it only remained to prosecute the war with vigour, and to enforce with the utmost possible rigour the continental blockade. In the latter measure the assistance of Holland was indispensable, and therefore became the object of increased attention.

Had King Louis had a judicious and clear-sighted understanding, he would have acted a manly part in the position in which he found himself, and since he had determined to resign, for the sake of preserving the safety of Holland, a portion of his territory, he would have endeavoured to instil submission into the hearts of his subjects. The most sensible of them, in truth, needed no persuasion; they were well aware that resistance was unavailing whilst they were under the hand of Napoleon, who, after all, was not an enemy, but a rather exacting ally, who taxed them severely for the common good. But King Louis had, unfortunately, a cankered heart. Softened for a moment by the expostulations of the members of his family, on his return to Amsterdam all his usual bitterness of soul returned, aggravated by the sacrifices which he had been compelled to make. On entering his capital he seemed to read on every face reproaches for his having resigned the fairest provinces of the kingdom, and he hastened to show himself the most distressed of all. The Queen who followed him displayed a countenance as full of gloomy meaning as his. This was not the way to please at Paris, nor to lead to that resignation at Amsterdam which could alone prevent some terrible outbreak. But, unhappily, the actions of the King were even more imprudent than either his looks or his language.

He commenced by writing the most affectionate letters to the two ministers whom he had shown himself so ready to sacrifice at Paris; by giving titles of nobility to those who were now to lose their rank as marshals, a method of com-

pensation which was very convenient perhaps, but quite at variance with the policy which he had promised to pursue; by degrading the Burgomaster Vander Poll, who had opposed the putting Amsterdam into a state of defence. To these acts he added one which was more serious still. Having taken a dislike to the French ambassador, M. de Larochefoucauld, whom he regarded as being a spy upon his conduct, he was anxious to take advantage of his absence to receive the Corps Diplomatique, and only have to receive M. Sérurier, a simple chargé d'affaires. M. Sérurier was a prudent and reserved man, who only concerned himself with the punctual performance of the duties laid upon him by his court. There was no reason why he should not be treated, at least, with politeness. The King passed before him without either word or look, and overwhelmed with civilities the Russian envoy beside him. This scene became the source of much remark and anxiety in Amsterdam, and was reported in Paris by the French agent, who could not maintain silence on subjects which excited general attention.

The difficulties which had their foundation in the personal character of the King were accompanied by others which were the result of circumstances. The last treaty exacted severe sacrifices from the Dutch. In the first place all those American cargoes which had entered the Dutch ports under the flag of the United States, and had been seized at the instance of the French government, had to be given up. Now these cargoes were either the property of Dutch houses, or of English houses which had commercial connections with Dutch merchants; and all these houses opposed the execution of this measure, those of the one class alleging that these cargoes were composed of Dutch merchandize conveyed under the American flag from the colonies of Holland; and those of the other contending that they consisted of true American merchandize brought over in American vessels. King Louis attempted to deliver up in the place of these cargoes those which had been seized by our cruisers, and belonged to them But the delivery of these cargoes was one of the articles of the treaty, on the exact performance of which Napoleon most strenuously insisted, either because he would thus strike a blow at the principal branch of the contraband trade, or because he was anxious to enrich the treasury extraordinary at the contrabandists' expense. This question, therefore, became the subject of the most animated and bitter communications.

The establishment of a French custom-house service along the coasts of Holland, presented another great difficulty. There had come from Boulogne, Dunkirk, Antwerp, Cleves,

Cologne, and Mayence, legions of French custom-house officers, who did not speak Dutch, were accustomed to a most rigorous surveillance, and brought to the exercise of their functions a sort of military honour, which rendered them almost proof against corruption. The Dutch were thus compelled to endure on their coasts and in their ports the presence of foreign functionaries, and to submit to their minute investigations; a state of things well nigh unbearable by a people who were almost exclusively mercantile, and who had always been accustomed to the utmost commercial freedom. And had it been necessary to endure this restraint only on the exterior frontier, the annoyance, though still great, would have been less severely felt. But the configuration of Holland rendered its presence necessary at its very centre; for besides being traversed by a multitude of rivers and canals, it is penetrated by an arm of the sea called the Zuyderzee, which affords the most convenient possible means of communication between all parts of the country. Had this Zuyderzee had but one outlet, that might have been watched and the interior navigation of the country been left unimpeded; but as there were many in various positions, it had been found necessary to subject the interior of the country to an intolerable surveillance; and in addition to this commissions were established composed of French custom-house and military officers, to pass summary judgment on all offences and offenders against the laws of blockade. Louis had not reckoned on this infringement on his sovereign rights, and he ordered the liberation of all the individuals arrested under the authority of these tribunals.

But far beyond all these difficulties in gravity was that which arose from the military occupation, and which increased as the French advanced posts drew nearer to Amsterdam. Marshal Oudinot, who commanded the combined forces which were to guard the avenues of Holland, had his head quarters at Utrecht. He had established military posts from Utrecht to the mouth of the Meuse, and, ascending the coasts of North Holland, from the mouths of the Meuse to the extremity of the Hague. But it was necessary to rise still higher, if the Zuyderzee and Amsterdam were to be closed against the contrabandists. But this, either swayed by his own wishes or the secret partisans of a revolt, Louis was determined not to suffer; for whilst they were only at Utrecht or the Hague it was still possible, by opening the sluices and cutting off North Holland, to dispute with Napoleon Batavian independence, as two centuries since it had been disputed with Louis XIV. But to preserve the

ability to effect this it was necessary to prevent the ascent of the French troops beyond Leyden.

Besides this reason, King Louis was especially anxious to prevent the appearance of foreign troops in his capital, since their presence would have reduced him to the rank only of a Royal Prefect. He urgently insisted, therefore, with Marshal Oudinot that the French troops should not ascend higher than Leyden, declaring that it was contrary as well to his honour as his dignity to permit troops which, although friendly, were nevertheless foreign, to be quartered in the city of his royal residence. And in fact, an advanced guard having presented itself before Harlem, it was denied admission, and the Imperial eagle was forced to retire.

In addition to these greater or less infringements of the treaty, was the neglect of one of its articles, on the performance of which Napoleon laid particular stress, namely, that which related to the armament of the flotilla of the Texel. Some vessels had been assembled under Admiral Winter, but they had scarcely a quarter of the proper number of men; and this condition of the treaty which was the most easy to comply with, the most fitted to appease Napoleon's anger, and the fulfilment of which must have been advantageous even in the event of resistance being determined on, was left unsatisfied from want of financial resources. All accounts from the Texel concurred in stating that the armaments which had been announced were illusory.

All these numerous disputes became known, in the common course of things, to the public, receiving a heightened colour from those who wished Holland to throw itself into the arms of England, and being deplored by those sensible persons who foresaw their inevitable consequences, and regarded by the suffering masses as so many proofs of an insupportable tyranny to which it was intended to subject them. And Louis, as much excited as the humblest of the crowds of the labouring classes who collected every day on the empty and desolate quays of Amsterdam, so far from attempting to appease the public emotion, excited it on the contrary both by word and gesture.

Matters had at last arrived at that pitch that the least thing was capable of causing an explosion; and one Sunday, one of the servants of the French embassy walking in his livery through some public place, was recognized, first hooted, then mobbed, and finally only rescued with great difficulty from the hands of the excited populace.

At any other period such an incident would have been but of slight importance; but occurring when it did it was sure to bring matters to a crisis. The facts we have just related,

having been reported without any exaggeration to Napoleon by Marshal Oudinot and M. Sérurier, had filled him with rage. That his chargé d'affaires should have been insulted, his eagles forced to retire from before Harlem, and the livery of his ambassador outraged, seemed to him to be an accumulation of unbearable affronts, especially since the essential conditions of the treaty were either left unperformed or executed only in part. He had his passport sent to M. Verhuel, who was the Dutch ambassador at Paris, and although he held him in high consideration, ordered him to quit France without delay. He prohibited M. de Larochefoucauld from returning to his post, and M. Sérurier from re-appearing at the Court of Louis. He demanded that those who had been guilty of the outrage against the livery of the French embassy, should be instantly given up to him; desired that the burgomaster of Amsterdam should be reinstated in his affairs; that the gates not only of Harlem, but also of Amsterdam itself, should be re-opened to the French troops, who were to enter with drums beating and colours displayed; that the American cargoes should be given up without exception; that the French custom-house officers should be everywhere received; and that an explanation should be given with respect to the armament of the fleet promised for the first of July. He concluded by declaring that if one of those demands remained unexecuted, he would speedily put an end to what he called the ridiculous comedy, and take possession of Holland, as he had taken possession of Tuscany and the Roman States; he enforced his threats by actions. The troops of the division Molitor, which were at Embden, were commanded to enter Holland by the north, and those which were in Brabant were directed to enter it by the south, with a view to the reinforcement of Marshal Oudinot.

The news of these startling proceedings fell, blow after blow, upon Amsterdam, and the alarm occasioned was increased by the declarations of Admiral Verhuel, who had quitted Paris in accordance with the injunctions he had received, and who perfectly well understood what were the intentions of Napoleon. He urged upon those who were at the head of affairs, the absolute necessity of coming to some determination, of either adopting a course of resistance which would most probably end in disaster, or of making that absolute submission which could alone avert the peril. King Louis had recourse to a great consultation, to which he summoned not only the ministers in office, but also ex-ministers, and the principal officers both of the navy and the army. With the exception of some madmen, and those who were devoted to

the interests of England, all those present were of the same opinion. Much as they detested the yoke of France, they considered that that of England, which was the only alternative offered, would have been still less endurable. Moreover, that whilst the greater portion of the Dutch territory would have to be resigned in a contest with Napoleon after having suffered frightful ravages, the least portion could only be preserved from his hands by drowning it, and by giving up to the English the timber yards, arsenals and fleets. No one who retained the least portion of common sense or patriotism, could pronounce in favour of a measure so rash. All the sensible persons present at the consultation expressed both by word and look their opinion of the utter uselessness of any attempts at resistance, and King Louis found himself deserted by those, even, on whose devoted support he had most confidently reckoned. Besides, although some exalted families might have a strong leaning towards England both from interest and sentiment, and the populace might attribute to us the wretchedness they endured, and the bourgeoisie be alienated from us by their commercial sufferings, the latter began to perceive the perils which surrounded Holland, and which threatened to cast her desolate and ruined at the feet of the English aristocracy, and raised their voices against the imprudent conduct of the government. In the midst of this state of affairs, Louis, who had pledged himself not to suffer the presence of the French in Amsterdam, finding himself deserted by those of his subjects whose passions he had too warmly abetted, knew not what course to take, and fell into a state of the utmost mental distraction.

In this position of perplexity it occurred to him, as it already frequently had, to offer entire submission to his brother's will, and to avoid a contest which it would be impossible to maintain. He summoned to his presence M. Sérurier, the French chargé d'affaires, to whom he had a few days previously shown so great a slight, received him very civilly, asked his advice, promising to follow it most faithfully, offered to have the individuals who had insulted the livery of the French embassy prosecuted, to reinstate the burgomaster of Amsterdam, to deliver up the American cargoes, to submit to the French custom-house officers, and to hasten the armament of the fleet; naming as the only condition in return for those acts of submission, that the French troops should not enter his capital; this, he said, would be a humiliation he could not endure. This unhappy prince had in fact so often declared that he would not permit the presence of foreign troops in the city of his royal residence, that he believed their actual presence there could not but

overwhelm him with shame. We must add, moreover, that from the midst of his profound and incurable distrust, had sprung up an idea that Napoleon had resolved to depose him, and that immediately on the arrival of the French troops in Amsterdam, he would be dethroned, without even having in his power the honourable, though sad alternative of abdicating. He was very eager, therefore, to delay their advance upon that city.

But the orders of Napoleon had been so positive, that neither Marshal Oudinot nor M. Sérurier dared to defer a measure which they had been peremptorily desired to carry out. M. Sérurier entreated the King not to be alarmed at the presence of the French soldiers, who were his fellow countrymen, who had raised him to his throne, who always regarded him with the respect due to the brother of their Emperor, and who were, moreover, ordered to conduct themselves towards him as was fit towards a royal ally. But he could not modify the Marshal's instructions, and was obliged to permit the advance of the French troops, whilst he hastened to send word to Paris of what was taking place in Amsterdam.

Situated between the Dutch who were averse to a resistance which could only prove ruinous to their country on the one hand, and the French troops who continued to advance upon Amsterdam on the other, and seeing no other way of preserving some show of dignity, the King resolved voluntarily to resign his throne. He called together his ministers and informed them in secresy that he was about to abdicate in favour of his son, and to confide the regency to the Queen; since one who was a woman, a mother, dear to Napoleon, and willing to do all that he desired, would by her very feebleness disarm his anger, and be able to submit to him without degradation. His ministers listened to him in silence, and expressed some regret at losing a King so devoted to the welfare of Holland, but they did not insist on this point very strongly, for they were well aware that, at the pass to which things had now come, the reign of an infant under the regency of a woman, offered the only combination which could prolong for a time the existence of Dutch independence. Upon the King's earnest request, they promised to keep his intentions secret, until he should have time to abdicate, and to retire in freedom whither he might choose. This precaution, inspired by his habitual distrust, was superfluous, for neither M. Sérurier nor Marshal Oudinot could have prevented him from abdicating, or had any intention of infringing his personal liberty.

Forty-eight hours only were devoted to the preparations

for this abdication. The French chargé d'affaires and general-in-chief had no intimation of it. It was arranged that the King should depart unattended and in a disguise, through which recognition would be impossible; that the act of abdication should be then immediately carried to the legislative body; that the ministers, as a council of regency, should assume the functions of government in the name of the young King, until the return of the Queen, who had only remained a few days in Holland, and that this princess should be invited to Amsterdam to take upon herself the regency and the education of the heir to the throne. The necessary documents were signed on the 2nd of July, 1810, and immediately after having signed them King Louis throwing himself into a carriage set out, leaving his most confidential ministers in ignorance as to his intended place of retreat. On the morning of the 3rd of July the city of Amsterdam, to its surprise and disquietude, and the French army and embassy to its profound astonishment, learned the extreme step which had been taken by the Emperor's brother.

The ministers first went to pay their compliments to the infant who was now a King and then proceeded to make the legislative body acquainted with the events which had taken place. During the course of the afternoon the French army, which had already arrived at the gates of Amsterdam, was received by the old Burgomaster Vander Poll, who had been reinstated in his office, and by the Dutch military authorities. The reception was almost amicable. The populace made no show of resistance. The great bulk of the inhabitants, while regretting Louis, considered that it was now necessary to place all their reliance on Napoleon, and to seek in a reunion with the vastest empire in the universe a recompense for the loss of independence and the sufferings which must fall on them, from the rigorous application of the continental system. The resolutions which should be taken at Paris with respect to these affairs were awaited with a species of breathless expectation.

M. Sérurier had instantly dispatched an attaché of the embassy to inform Napoleon of the King's strange abdication; but on the very day of the arrival of this messenger in Paris, the 6th of July, a report was presented to Napoleon, which had been drawn up with the view to the explanation of the reasons which called for the annexation of Holland to the Empire. His resolution, therefore, had been come to before his brother's abdication. Nevertheless, determined as he was, Napoleon had perceived in the very moment of converting intention into action, the full gravity of the measure he was

about to take. In fact, immediately after the treaty with Vienna and his marriage with Marie-Louise, he had directed all his thoughts towards the attainment of peace, and had manœuvred his forces with a view to the evacuation of Germany, and to quieting the anxieties of the continental powers. But how would all Europe be alarmed by his seizure within the space of three months, of Brabant, Zealand, and the whole of Holland, thus adding two millions of souls to his empire, and extending its frontiers from the Scheldt to the Waal, from the Waal to Ems. This incessant spirit of acquisition, which had been made the ground of so much reproach against France, would once more manifest itself in the most alarming guise. And how would England, who held in her hands the power of granting that last and most desirable peace, namely, a maritime peace;—how would she endure, in addition to the annexation to France of Antwerp and Flushing, the annexation also of Helwoet-Sluys, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and the Helder? Napoleon perceived all these difficulties; but delighted at the idea of adding to France such territories, such bays and ports, and of closing, moreover, many a broad avenue against British commerce, and considering that the annexation was excused by the position in which he was placed by his brother's abdication, he declared Holland to be annexed to the empire of France. Receiving the information on which he founded it on the evening of the 6th, the arrangement of the conditions of this annexation occupied but two days, and on the 9th July, 1810, it was decreed.

The motive publicly assigned for this annexation was, that Holland being without a king, and it being necessary to prevent its falling into the hands of the English, Napoleon had found himself compelled to bring it under the vigilant and vigorous administration of the empire; and further, that Holland thus annexed would give important naval assistance to the common cause, and add largely to the extent of coast closed against British commerce. But the reason which was chiefly urged with the Dutch themselves was, that placed between a sea closed against them by the English and a continent closed against them by the French, they must speedily have perished, or at least have been utterly crushed under the weight of an enormous debt; but that being, on the other hand annexed to the most powerful empire in the world, they would have the continent open to them during the war, and during peace both sea and land; that under this latter condition of circumstances their commerce would become more vigorous than it had ever been at the period of their most brilliant prosperity; that their maritime power, at present

almost annihilated, when incorporated with that of France, would bring back the glorious days of Tromp and Ruyter, and dispute with Great Britain the dominion of the seas; that they themselves, placed on an equality with the inhabitants of France, would be amply recompensed by the acquisition of a new and powerful country for the country they had lost.

With a surprising audacity of language, Napoleon decreed that *Holland was annexed to France!* and decided, moreover, that Amsterdam should be the third city of the empire; Rome having been, four months previously, declared the second. He arranged that Holland was for the future to send six members to the senate of the empire, six deputies to the council of state, twenty-five to the legislative body, and two members to the Cour de Cassation. A tempting bait was thus offered to every kind of ambition; he confirmed the naval and military officers in their various ranks, incorporated the royal guard of Holland with the French imperial guard, and ordered that the Dutch regiments of the line should have rank in the French army, in order with the regiments already existing, and in accordance with their numbers. What could be more flattering to the Dutch troops than such an affiliation as this?

The kingdom was divided into nine departments, namely, the departments of the mouths of the Scheldt, of the mouths of the Rhine, of the Zuyderzee, of the mouths of the Meuse, of Upper Yssel, of the mouths of the Yssel, of Friesland, of western Ems and of eastern Ems. The existing system of taxes was to be maintained until the 1st Jan., 1811, when the French imposts, much less burdensome than the Dutch, were to be established throughout the nine departments.

It was in its finances, together with its commerce, that Holland had most seriously felt the consequences of its isolated position. It was now evidently necessary to take some steps with respect to its debt. In a budget of about 155 millions of expenses set against 110 millions of revenue, the interest of the debt alone was set down at 80 millions. It was impossible that such a state of things should continue, and this was made sufficiently apparent by the fact that the interest of the debt had not been paid either in 1809 nor in 1808. The treasury bills were discounted at a considerable loss; and this deficiency had been both the cause of the annihilation of the Dutch navy, and that three thousand of its seamen had emigrated to England for the sake of obtaining a subsistence.

Napoleon, considering that these first moments of agitation in Holland were the most convenient season for the infliction of a painful operation, and comparing its present situation

with that of France after the revolution, made it one of the clauses of the act of annexation, that the national debt should be reduced to a third part. But he ordered the immediate payment of the dividends in arrear of the years 1809 and 1808, which to many of the small fundholders was an immense consolation. Napoleon hoped, by cutting off the amounts paid to certain princes, enemies of France, such as the princes of Hesse and Orange, to make twenty millions suffice for the payment of the interest of the debt after its reduction to a third; by the suppression of many portions of it which the annexation had rendered useless, to make fourteen millions suffice for the expenses of the civil service; and that thus, twenty millions being devoted to the army and twenty-six millions to the navy, the annual expenses should only amount to eighty millions. The Dutch had always had a predilection for maritime pursuits, and Napoleon hoped by affording them the means of indulging it, and giving orders for the immediate commencement of operations in the dock-yards, to rouse their drooping spirits and inspire them with a favourable idea of the annexation.

The commercial affairs of Holland next claimed his attention. The removal of the line of French custom-house officers between France and Holland would of course have been an immense commercial advantage; but as it had already taken possession of the ground, Napoleon decided that it should remain until the 1st January, 1811, at which period was to take place the complete fusion of the interests of the two countries. An immediate impulse would, nevertheless, be given to Dutch commerce, as well as a great gratification to French consumers, by permitting the influx into France of the immense stores of sugars, coffees, cottons and indigoes, which had been amassed at Amsterdam and Rotterdam; and the dispersion of these stores, whilst affording much relief to the commercial classes of Holland, would also make the duties of the custom-house service far lighter. But as the price of colonial produce in Holland, on account of the facility with which it was brought in, never reached a quarter of that which prevailed in France, the grant of full liberty of importation to the Dutch merchants, would have been to them an enormous advantage, which they could never have expected, and on the other hand a serious blow to the French merchants, who had founded their arrangements on a very much higher scale of prices. To avoid this, Napoleon imposed a tax of fifty per cent. upon all colonial produce imported from Holland into France, and this, whilst it left a large margin of profit to the Dutch merchants, placed those of France on a much more equal footing with them, and saw

also the means of pouring large sums into the imperial treasury.

Such were in general the measures which accompanied the decree of the 9th July. There were some others whose purpose it was to soften still more the disfavour with which the Dutch might regard the annexation of their kingdom. In order that Amsterdam might not be immediately deprived of a court, he arranged that there, as at Turin, Florence, and Rome, some high personage should reside, whose duty it would be to exercise the imperial authority, and represent it with considerable state. As there was at the moment no prince of his family ready for the post, or capable of managing the financial and administrative details of the annexed kingdom, and as, moreover, none such could decently replace King Louis, Napoleon determined to appoint to it the arch-treasurer Lebrun, a man of a gentle, conciliating spirit, very skilful in matters of finance, and who knew how to bring the truth before his master's eye under the guise of good-natured and amiable pleasantry. Napoleon could not have chosen a representative more suited to the Dutch character. The arch-treasurer himself was anxious to decline an office of such great difficulty; but Napoleon without listening to his remonstrances hastened his departure, bestowing upon him an ample revenue and extensive powers. He associated with him M. Daru to take possession of the public properties, the arsenals, and magazines; M. d'Hauterive to take charge of the archives relating to foreign affairs; M. de Las-Cases to take necessary measures with respect to the maritime projects; and the talented engineer, M. de Ponthon, to inspect the roadsteads, gulfs, and ports from Flushing to Embden. He hoped within the space of fifteen days to have received all their reports, and to have given the necessary orders as well for the rigorous enforcement of the continental blockade as for the defence of the new territory annexed to the empire, and the revival of the Dutch marine. And finally he sent General Lauriston, his aide-de-camp, to take possession of and bring to Paris the Prince Royal, who was to receive the title of Grand Duke de Berg in exchange for his crown.

General Lauriston lost no time in proceeding to Amsterdam, arrived there on the 13th July, and obtained possession of the prince, who had been treated with most respectful care, but had not been regarded as a king. The arch-treasurer Lebrun arrived on the 14th, and was well received. The royal guard, the national guard, and the civil authorities, assembled to meet him at the city gates. The royal guard, gratified at becoming a portion of the imperial guard,

raised some cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* The populace maintained a calm silence. The various functionaries, anxious to keep their appointments, saluted the new master, as new masters are generally saluted in all times, in all countries. The next day they took the oaths, and it was one of the new Dutch ministers who reminded Prince Lebrun, who was always a little forgetful, that he had neglected to order a form of prayer to be read in the churches for the Emperor. The arch-treasurer told this story himself to the Emperor, remarking with a little malice, that he was not the most zealous of his subjects in Holland.

The Dutch are calm and reserved, and of a character which has a good deal of keenness and prudence mingled with its integrity. As a people they were not desirous of quarreling with the man who had become their master as he had become the master of so many other countries, and perceived, moreover, that they would derive some considerable advantages from the annexation of their country to the empire. The isolated and troubled existence which had been theirs during the reign of King Louis, more Dutch than the Dutch themselves, of course could not continue. So situated between France and England, that it appeared inevitable that they must be subject to either the one or the other, they resigned themselves to their annexation to France, in the hope that when peace should be established they would become the commercial agents of the vastest empire in the world. This was the substance of all the opinions expressed by sensible men on the subject. The change might pain their hearts, but it did not disturb their minds. The fund-holders, were, it is true, distressed at the loss of two-thirds of their dividends; but in general the affairs of these little capitalists gained little attention, for they were neither sufficiently rich nor sufficiently numerous to attract it. The inhabitants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, habituated to the possession of command and influence, had been favourably inclined by the immediate opening of the dockyards. Admiral Winter, who was generally beloved by the seamen, had endeavoured, as far as possible, to inspire them with confidence in the intentions of Napoleon, and an expectation of the speedy revival of the Dutch navy. All classes, therefore, found some reason for being pleased with the change. But it remained to be seen how they would bear the presence of foreign troops, the conscription, impressment, the prolonged closure of the seas, and, in short, all the annoyances resulting from subjection to a foreign government, which would send its orders from a distance, and express them in a language which was not the national one.

Napoleon had scarcely received the first reports of his agents when he determined on his projects with respect to the Dutch navy. He decided on the formation of three fleets, one to be built at Antwerp, another at Rotterdam, and a third at Amsterdam. He ordered that the construction of vessels should be immediately commenced both at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, and that all the vessels yet capable of service should be repaired. He had seamen levied, and although a considerable number were in the English service, he yet hoped by the offer of good pay to obtain a sufficient number to man the fleets. There was an abundance of ship building material in Holland; and funds were as plentiful as material, since the tax of fifty per cent. upon colonial produce, and the sale of American cargoes, filled the coffers of the Dutch departments.

The annexation, therefore, succeeded better than could have been expected, and the continental blockade was enforced as far as the mouths of the Ems. As for King Louis, who had in a manner fled after his abdication, it was discovered that he had arrived at the Baths of Tœplitz. Napoleon instructed his diplomatic agents to treat him with the utmost respect, to attribute all that had passed to his bad state of health, and to place at his disposal such funds as he might require. Thus, for the moment, all the difficulties attending the annexation seemed to vanish; but Napoleon, after his marriage, had experienced extreme anxiety to set at rest the uneasy suspicions of the various governments, to evacuate Germany, and to turn aside from all other enterprises to carry on against the English a vigorous war, both commercial and military; and yet he had already, with a view to enforcing the continental blockade and increasing his maritime power, extended his territory from the Scheldt to the Waal, from the Waal to the Meuse, from the Meuse to the Helder, from the Helder to the Ems. Where was he to pause in this career? and how could he justify to the European powers these dangerous aggressions?

Napoleon, in fact, in his eagerness to attain the two great objects of his desire, had almost forgotten his intention of reassuring Europe; and scarcely deigned to submit to the various governments a few insignificant reasons in explanation of this vast addition to his empire. He instructed M. de Coulaincourt to let fall at the Court of Russia the observation that Holland had scarcely changed masters in consequence of its annexation to the empire, since that it had always in reality belonged to France whilst it was under the government of King Louis; that his brother's abdication, in consequence of the state of his health, had left the Emperor

no alternative but to take possession of it; that it was a country of such a nature that its resources could be employed to the injury of England alone; that its incorporation with the empire of France was the only means of rendering the continental blockade really effectual, of increasing the naval forces of the allies, and obtaining that peace which all the world desired.

The observations which Napoleon addressed to Austria on this subject were even briefer, and he scarcely mentioned it to the other governments. Those cabinets which received such communications on the annexation as he chose to favour them with, made no reply, for they had in fact nothing to say. They saw, pondered on what they saw in silence, and awaited the as yet unforeseen opportunity of expressing the very strong opinions they had on the subject. We may notice also, that Austria, very sensitive on the subject of Trieste, was exceedingly indifferent with respect to Amsterdam, and that Russia did not consider the Helder sufficiently near to Riga to induce her to display any great zeal in behalf of Holland.

It was at this period that M. de Metternich finally quitted Paris to place himself at the head of the Austrian cabinet; as will be remembered, he came to France with a secret mission to the Emperor, after his marriage with Maria-Louise. Under pretext of serving as a guide to the young princess through the first months of her residence in Paris, his real office had been to watch Napoleon, to endeavour to discover whether his marriage had laid at rest the spirit of conquest within him, or whether it had but delayed for a moment the execution of his designs upon Europe. M. de Metternich adopted the second of these suppositions.

Whilst awaiting the results of his encroaching policy, which he loved to dissemble, even in his own eyes, Napoleon directed his whole attention to the employment of his new territories as far as possible, in the enforcement of the continental blockade. In spite of the most rigorous surveillance, and the infliction of the most severe penalties upon contrabandists, a certain quantity of colonial produce and English manufactures still reached the continent; but as this contraband traffic was only carried on at a cost of forty or fifty per cent., the English merchants suffered considerable loss; the goods accumulated in their warehouses underwent a rapid depreciation in value; and the manufacturers on the continent who devoted their attention to the spinning and weaving of cotton, to the extraction of sugar from grapes or beet-root, potash from sea-salt, and dyes from various chemical combinations, found sufficient encouragement in the state of the

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markets to induce them to persevere. Thus the manufactories on the continent, especially those of France, were in a state of great activity; and a twofold advantage was attained,—expansion was given to new branches of French industry, and the elements of English commercial wealth were depreciated.

Nevertheless, that state of affairs was not altogether satisfactory, which compelled the people of Paris to pay a premium of fifty or sixty per cent. to the contraband traders of all nations, and to purchase at a dearer rate than any other persons, sugar, coffee, cotton, and indigo; these articles decreasing in price, in proportion to the increase of the distance from Paris; and the cause of this commercial phenomenon simply was, that the surveillance became less vigilant the farther it was removed from the centre of administration. The occupation of Holland, and the presence of Marshal Davoust with his troops on the shore of the North Sea, diminished this difference to a great extent, but it still existed.

The existence of this state of things was a source of the extremest annoyance to Napoleon, and what he saw taking place in Holland suddenly suggested to him the proper manner in which to treat it. Being willing that the Dutch should reap some benefit from the annexation of their country, he had permitted the importation into France of the colonial produce accumulated in their warehouses, on condition, however, of the payment of a duty of 50 per cent., that their long insubordination might not be followed by too great a commercial prosperity, and that the admission of their stores into France might not be too disadvantageous to those French merchants who had bought their goods at a much heavier price. This restricted liberty had gratified the Dutch, and brought a considerable sum to the treasury.

Napoleon, while glancing over the papers of the departments of customs which revealed these facts, was suddenly struck by an idea. He held two councils of commerce in the week, and in these he was perpetually importuned with the remonstrance, that the contrabandists forced his frontiers, whatever provisions he might make to the contrary, and levied an exorbitant premium which fell more severely on French consumers than on any others. "Ah! well!" he said, one day, "I have thought of a plan by which I shall be able to disappoint the calculations of the English and the contrabandists. I will permit the importation of colonial produce at a very exorbitant duty, say fifty per cent.; I shall thus preserve between the depôts of London and the markets

of the continent the obstacle which renders the price of colonial produce in London at least fifty per cent. lower than what it is in Paris, Hamburgh, and Amsterdam. Far from relaxing in the rigour of my surveillance, I will render it still stricter, permitting no importations but what shall have first paid this duty, in order that the English, whilst selling their colonial produce, as they do already, will be able to sell them no dearer since the conditions will remain the same, and the only alteration will be that they will pay the duty on the importation of their goods to my custom-house officers instead of to the contrabandists; and whilst maintaining the depreciation in the value of their stores, I shall keep up for the produce of our own manufactories the high prices by which they are encouraged. And besides this, as my treasury will receive those profits which are now obtained by the contrabandists, I shall thus compel the English to bear the expenses attending the re-establishment of my navy."

Napoleon found, after due enquiry, that 50 per cent. would in fact maintain in London that depreciation in value which ruined the English merchants, and upon the continent those high prices which gave vigour to the French manufactories; and that, moreover, the high prices which the war imposed upon all consumers on the continent, would by this plan be rendered equal for those of Paris, Amsterdam, Hamburgh, and Switzerland. Besides this, there was great hope that the new tariff would prove a fruitful source of supply to the impoverished treasury; and this last consideration had more weight with Napoleon than all the others.

Resolved to levy this duty upon all colonial produce, but being nevertheless, unwilling to infringe by the execution of his new plan the system of the continental blockade, Napoleon maintained in complete theoretical vigour the prohibition against holding any communication with the English, or receiving the produce either of their colonies or their manufactories; and repeated his determination respecting the seizure and confiscation of all such produce as could be proved to have its origin from English colonies or manufactories; but there was colonial produce which had other origin, and this was called *origines permises;* as, for example, that found in vessels which had been taken by our privateers or the privateers of our allies, that which formed the cargoes of licensed vessels, and that conveyed by vessels bonâ fide neutral. Napoleon decreed that the colonial produce imported by either of these means, should be allowed free sale on payment of fifty per cent. As, however, these sources could be by no means sufficient for provisioning the continent nor bring in very large receipts to the treasury, it was inti-

mated to the officers of customs that they were to allow to pass for genuine the *certificates of origin* which had been fabricated in London, or given by corrupt consuls, of whom unfortunately, there were by no means few; and as the payment of so heavy a duty before the sale of the goods would be a matter of great difficulty, it was arranged that it might be paid either in money, by bills, or in kind; in the latter case, half of the goods themselves being surrendered in liquidation of the duty.

This principle once established, all colonial produce would have to pay the duty wherever it might be found, and if it could not be proved to have paid it, would be declared contraband and seized; and Napoleon gave orders that in all places to which his power extended, sudden searches should be made for colonial produce, to enforce the payment of the duty on that which had been openly declared, and to confiscate that which was contraband. It is easy to perceive what must have been the result of such a measure, enforced throughout almost the whole continent at the same moment, and what consternation it must have caused amongst the numerous accomplices of British commerce. It was not only in Holland that there were found vast stores of colonial produce, which were the accumulations of contraband traffic, but also at Bremen, at Hamburgh, in Holstein, Pomerania, Prussia, Dantzig, in the great commercial towns of Germany, such as Leipzig, Frankfort, Augsburg, in Switzerland, throughout almost the whole of Italy, of Venice, at Genoa, at Leghorn, and Naples.

But whilst Napoleon was willing to permit the importation of the produce of the English colonies, on conditions as disadvantageous to British commerce, as they were advantageous to the French treasury, he was especially anxious to depreciate the value of all the productions of British manufactures; he determined to wage against them a war of extermination, and with this intention gave orders that wherever they might be discovered, and in whosever possession, they should be confiscated and publicly destroyed.

This system was established by a decree of the 5th of August, and scarcely had the decree been issued, when Napoleon despatched his couriers through all the states of the confederation of the Rhine, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia and Russia, forcing adoption of this system upon some of these states, and representing to the others the advantages of its adoption in glowing terms.

Napoleon hastened to put his system into execution, and to make seizures. But there was not much likelihood of its being fruitful in any great degree in the interior of the

kingdom, for the customs' officers had not left much colonial produce in that quarter, to be affected by it. The contraband depôts were most generally situated on the frontier; and in consequence of this, Napoleon had the audacity to declare that as every such depôt established within four days' journey from the frontiers of France, was manifestly intended as an injury to her, he should consider himself perfectly authorised in treating them as though they had been within the territory. He ordered, therefore, the generals who occupied the north of Spain, to institute searches in all suspected places; and commanded Prince Eugène to send unexpectedly six thousand Italians into the Canton du Tessin, to seize a depôt from which English colonial produce was furnished to the whole of Italy. As for that portion of Switzerland which bordered France, he was unwilling to employ French troops in its search, and confined himself to sending thither a French officer of customs to direct the Swiss troops in the proper method of conducting it. He directed the seizures to be made at Frankfort by the troops under Marshal Davoust. At Stuttgard, Baden, Munich, Dresden and Leipzig, the decree of the 5th of August was adopted and put into immediate execution. At Bremen, Hamburgh and Lubeck, Napoleon discovered and seized, without taking the least notice of the authorities, immense stores of the prohibited produce. He pursued the same course of action at the Prussian towns, Stettin and Custrin, and at the Polish town, Dantzig; all of which places, we may remember, contained French garrisons. Prussia, whose government had assented to the decree, was informed that all the merchandize seized upon her territory would be sold and accounted for in part discharge of her debt. Denmark, which, although faithfully preserving her position as a neutral, had admitted a considerable amount of contraband goods into Holstein, under the guise of sales of the contents of vessels taken by her privateers, gave her adherence to the decree; but Napoleon, not having any great confidence that it would be very strictly enforced in that country, and considering that Holstein, which was filled with the prohibited produce, had a frontier very difficult to watch, ingeniously determined to allow two months for the diffusion through Germany of its contraband stores, on condition of the payment of the very productive duty of 50 per cent. The depôts then became exhausted, and a very considerable amount of duty obtained.

Napoleon reiterated to Sweden his threatening and serious declaration, that he would break the peace so recently concluded, and re-occupy Swedish Pomerania, if new depôts of

prohibited merchandize were permitted to be formed at Stralsund. All the states in fact, required to submit to the decree of the 5th of August yielded to it, with the exception of Russia. This latter country, without opposing the decree, contented herself with intimating that, excellent as it might be for adoption by other states, there was no occasion for its adoption by her; and that, still faithful to her allegiance, and engaged in strenuous warfare with Great Britain, she would not fail, even for her own interests, to throw all possible obstacles in the way of British commerce. At the same time she expressed a little distrust at perceiving the extension of the French troops along the coasts of the north seas, even up to Dantzig. These remarks, however, were made in a tone of extreme moderation, and with all the discretion of a power which was in an attitude of expectation and not of hostility.

The French customs' officers made numerous seizures in the north of Spain, Italy, Leghorn, Geneva, and Venice, and especially in the Tessin. The Swiss, disturbed in their fraudulent traffic, raised some outcry, but Napoleon replied to them, that he could not permit a country which he had restored to tranquillity and independence, to become the accomplice of his enemies. The stores on which the duty was levied, or which were confiscated at Frankfort, Bremen, Hamburgh, Stettin and Dantzig, were also of considerable extent; and as a fifth part of the seizures was bestowed on the customs' officers and the soldiers by whom they were made, they performed this part of their duty with considerable zeal.

The treasury, independently of its money receipts which reached a very considerable sum, suddenly became proprietor of an immense amount of merchandize, which had accrued to it, partly from the payments in kind of the 50 per cent. duty, and partly from the confiscations of stores. That portion of this merchandize which was seized in Holland was sent to Antwerp, and that which was gathered in the north of Germany, to Magdeburg; and Napoleon intended that the artillery waggons returning to France, should convey it to Strasburg, Mayence, and Cologne. A sale by auction, at which assembled all the merchants of the empire, who were engaged in the colonial trade, was commenced at Antwerp, and carried on during many weeks, with the most profitable results. The same thing took place at Mayence, at Strasburg, at Milan, and Venice; and whilst colonial produce was being seized throughout almost the whole of the continent, and, becoming the property of the treasury, was sold by public auction, all English woven fabrics were publicly destroyed, wherever discovered. There was an immense amount of

these tissues in Germany, and their destruction by fire was a source of much consternation to the agents of contraband commerce.

The effect of these measures upon England was great, and was rendered still greater by an accidental circumstance. Contrary winds had detained for some time numbers of English vessels at the entrance of the Baltic, more than six or seven hundred assembled within sight of Denmark and Sweden, anchoring wherever they could under the protection of the British flag. On receiving information of the new vigorous measures they all, almost simultaneously, endeavoured to retrace their path, although Napoleon, in the hope of enticing them in, hnd relaxed the surveillance at the entry of the ports; some of them became prizes to our privateers, and the others added their cargoes to the mass of unsold merchandize, with which England was over burdened, and which made her experience poverty in the midst of abundance. Desirous of reducing British commerce to the last extremity, Napoleon prepared with the utmost secresy, at the mouths of the Elb and the Weser, a little naval expedition, which was to proceed rapidly to Heligoland and carry off the riches with which at this moment it was stored.

As insatiable in his desire for the success of French industry, as he was for that of its armies, and in administration as in war, neglecting no means by which it appeared probable that he could gain his ends, Napoleon set himself to contend with other rivals besides the English. The Swiss had displeased him, both because they were extensively engaged in the contraband trade, and because they were, next to the English, the most formidable rivals of our manufacturers. Their cotton fabrics were not so good as those of France, but they were produced much more cheaply, partly on account of the less dearness of labour amongst their mountains, and partly on account of the fraudulent methods by which they obtained the raw material in a cheaper market; and the cotton tissues of their manufacture they sold as English in Germany and Italy. Napoleon, therefore, forbade Prince Eugène to permit this sale in the latter country, writing to him, that Italy might well make some sacrifice in return for all that France had done for her; and that, moreover, if she behaved as Holland had done, she should receive the same treatment. In addition to this, as Italy exported a considerable quantity of raw silk, which reached England through the north of Germany, and was there woven for exportation to the Americans, Napoleon raised one third the export duty upon raw silks, when they were conveyed by Switzerland and the Tyrol, in order to direct them away from

England and throw them into France, by Chambéry and Nice. He hoped by these means to render Lyons the greatest silk market in the world, and to enable the Lyonese to add to their unrivalled skill in manufacture the power of having the best materials.

In his eagerness to subject every thing to his purpose, Napoleon extended his system of licenses, and applied it to every branch of commerce. Originally only a certain class of vessels had made their voyages under the protection of licenses; but from this time every ship which navigated the oceans, or the Mediterranean sea, was compelled, to avoid being liable to seizure by our privateers, to take out a license, in which was to be stated the place from which it set out, that to which it was bound, and the nature of its cargo. By virtue of these licenses, vessels were even permitted to visit England, notwithstanding the decrees of Berlin and Milan, provided they exported national products, such as grain, woven fabrics, Parisian objects of luxury, and wines, and brought back in exchange dockyard materials, American cottons, indigoes, cochineal, dye woods, rice, and tobacco. Sugar and coffee were, of course, prohibited articles. Thus the whole system of commerce was regulated by decrees, and in short almost brought to a dead-lock; and the results which Napoleon really obtained by these singularly violent but efficacious means, was the infliction of a heavy blow at British credit, by the depreciation of all that merchandize which was a pledge of the value of the British bank paper. It was impossible to say how far the effects of those important measures would extend if persevered in.

Whilst Napoleon was waging this ceaseless and ruinous war with England, he was preparing for her an additional peril, in the shape of a rupture with America. On the occasion of his seizing certain American vessels, on the ground that some French ships had been seized in America by virtue of the law of embargo, he had reiterated to the United States' government his readiness to repeal in favour of America, the decrees of Berlin and Milan, if she would compel England to respect her neutrality also; a declaration which he repeated in a decree of the 1st November, 1810.

Nothing was better planned than this policy, for the Americans treated as neutrals by France, could not but demand to be similarly treated by England, even to the extent of threatening war in case of her refusal to do so, and affairs seemed to be tending in this direction. We have seen how America, having equal cause of complaint against each of the belligerent parties, had prohibited her citizens from navigating the seas of Europe, and had forbidden

entrance into her ports to either the French or the English, unless driven into them by stress of weather. But as this law punished themselves for the faults of others, they substituted for it another, by which communication with France and England was alone interdicted, and by which it was also declared that this interdict would be withdrawn, in respect to that of the two powers which should put a stop to its violent conduct towards the neutral powers. England, anxious to gain the good will of the Americans, immediately revoked her orders in council in their favour, and dispensed, in their case, with the visit to the Thames, for the sake of paying toll; but she substituted for this navigation tax, the famous paper blockade, and declared that neutrals might freely visit every part of the world, save the ports of the French Empire, which were blockaded from Embden up to Spain, from Marseilles to Orbitello, from Trieste and Venice to Pesaro.

But the Americans observed, with much reason, with regard to this regulation, that to release them from visiting the Thames and the payment of toll was nothing, if they were to be prevented by a fictitious blockade from touching at vast countries which could never be blockaded in reality. In vain England replied that the revocation in their favour of the orders in council, was an immense concession, and that Napoleon was so far from intending to put into execution his fair promises, that he had recently intimated in secresy to the British cabinet intentions of a very different nature towards the United States. The Americans were not to be thus persuaded. Having received Napoleon's decrees which declared commercial relations fully re-established with the Americans on the first of November, provided they enforced due respect towards their flag, the President of the Union announced by a proclamation that, if England had not by the 2nd February, 1811, revoked all its measures, including the fictitious blockade, the commercial interdict would be withdrawn with respect to France, and maintained with the utmost rigour against England. From the interruption of commercial relations between England and America, to a state of war between these two countries was but a step, for it was tolerably certain that the English would prevent the American vessels from entering the French ports, and even capture them on their way, and that America could not fail to take measures for avenging the outrages thus offered against her honour and safety.

Such were the means employed by Napoleon during the year 1810 to ruin British commerce, whilst his generals were employed in the Peninsular, in driving the English armies into the sea; and these means which displayed at once the

extent of his genius, the profundity of his calculations, and the vehemence of his passions, were fitted for the attainment of the end he had in view, but they were also capable of leading to other far different results. It was necessary therefore, that a state of things so odious to all the world should not be prolonged, and that by the devotion of his whole resources to the prosecution of the war in Spain, he should inflict so heavy a blow upon Great Britain, as together with her commercial sufferings, should oblige her to agree to peace and to assent to the transformation of Europe. It was Spain, therefore, which was to decide, and which did decide, as we shall see, the destiny of Europe, for it was absolutely requisite to strike heavily and swiftly in this direction, if the patience of the whole world were not to be worn out by a state of things which, before becoming insupportable for England, was very likely to prove to be so for the constrained allies of France, for her sincerest friends, and even for herself.

BOOK XXXIX

TORRES VEDRAS.

VICISSITUDES of the Spanish war during the latter part of the year 1809—Retreat of the English after the battle of Talavera, and their long inaction in Estremadura—The assembly of the Cortes at the commencement of 1810 determined on—Events in Catalonia and Aragon—Skilful manœuvres of General St. Cyr in Catalonia for covering the Siege of Girone—Protracted and heroic defence of this place by the Spaniards—General St. Cyr disgraced and replaced by Marshal Augereau—Conduct of General Suchet in Aragon since the taking of Saragossa—Battles of Alcanitz, Maria, and Belchite—Definitive occupation of Aragon, and its good administration by General Suchet—Troublesome growth of bands of guérillas throughout the whole of Spain, and especially in the North—Unwilling to confine themselves to this species of warfare, the Spaniards desire to commence grand operations, in spite of the advice of the English, and march upon Madrid—The battle of Ocana, and dispersion of the last Spanish army—Consternation and disorder at Séville—Project of the Junta of retiring to Cadiz—Commencement of the year 1810—The French plans for this campaign—Employment of the numerous reinforcements sent by Napoleon—Situation of Joseph at Madrid—His Court—His systems, political and military, opposed to those of Napoleon—Joseph desires to take advantage of the victory of Ocana to invade Andalusia, expecting to find great resources in that province—Notwithstanding his determination to unite all his forces against the English, Napoleon consents to the Andalusian expedition, intending to send his troops from Andalusia to Portugal—March of Joseph upon the Sierra-Morena—Entry into Baylen, Cordova, Séville, Grenada, and Malaga—The error of not advancing immediately upon Cadiz enables the Junta and the Spanish troops to retire—Commencement of the siege of Cadiz—The 1st Corps appointed to the prosecution of this siege; the 5th sent to Estremadura, the 4th to Grenada—Unfortunate dispersion of the French troops—During the Andalusian expedition Napoleon converts the provinces of the Ebro into military governments, with the view of ultimately uniting them to the Empire—King Joseph falls into a state of despair, and sends two of his ministers to Paris to protest against the proposed annexation—After long delay the operations of the campaign of 1810 are at length commenced—Whilst General Suchet besieged the fortifications of Aragon, and Marshal Masséna besieged Cadiz and Badajoz, Marshal Masséna to take Ciudad Rodrigo, and Alméida, and to march immediately upon Lisbon at the head of 80 thousand men—Siege of Lerida—Marshal

Masséna having been appointed against his own wish to the command of the army of Portugal arrives at Salamanca in May 1810—Disordered state in which he finds the troops intended to carry on the campaign in Portugal—Bad disposition of his lieutenants—The army reduced at the commencement of the campaign from its proper strength of eighty-thousand men, to fifty-thousand—Efforts of Marshal Masséna to supply deficiencies—Siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Alméida in July 1810—After the taking of the two fortresses, Marshal Masséna prepares to invade Portugal by the valley of Mondego—Finds great difficulty in procuring means of transport for provisions and ammunition—Passage of the frontier on the 15th of September—The political and military views with regard to the Peninsular, of Sir Arthur Wellesley, now Lord Wellington—Choice of an impregnable position in front of Lisbon, as a means of resisting all the forces Napoleon could send into Spain—Lord Wellington prepares to retreat, first destroying all the resources of the country in front of the advancing French—Retreat of the English army upon Coimbre—Marshal Masséna pursues the English in the Valley of Mondego—Difficulties attending his march—The English pause upon the lines of Sierra d'Alcoba—Battle of Busaco—The French unable to force the position of Busaco, proceed to turn it—Precipitate retreat of the English upon Lisbon—Energetic pursuit on the part of the French—The English enter upon the lines of Torrès Védras—Description of these famous lines—Marshal Masséna, after having carefully reconnoitred, despairs of forcing them—He determines to blockade them, until the arrival of reinforcements—In the meanwhile, takes up a firm footing upon the Tagus, and prepares a bridge which may enable him to manœuvre upon both sides of the river, and to provision his army at the expense of the rich province of Alentejo—Mission of General Foy to Paris, to inform Napoleon of the events of the Campaign, and to ask him for instructions and for succour—State of the English army in the lines of Torrès Védras—Lord Wellington's disputes with the Portuguese government, and misunderstandings between him and the British Cabinet—State of Public feeling in England—Anxiety respecting the fate of the British Army, and disposition towards peace—Assumption of the regency by the Prince of Wales—His disposition towards the various parties in the British Houses of Parliament—The slightest incident capable of inclining the balance in favour of the opposition and bringing about peace—General Foy's journey across the Peninsula—His arrival in Paris and presentation to the Emperor.

BOOK XXXIX.

After the Battle of Talavera, and the loss of the bridge of Arzobispo, the English and the Spaniards had fallen back with precipitation, from the Tagus upon the Guadiana. Although its issue was indecisive, this battle, having drawn the French forces around Madrid, had had for them all the effects of a defeat, for it had forced them to retreat into the heart of the Peninsula, leaving behind them their wounded, their sick, and even part of their stores. The Spaniards fled into Andalusia behind the sierra Morena; Sir Arthur Wellesley took up a position in the environs of Badajoz. Then, complaining as was his wont, of the feeble co-operation of the Spaniards, and above all of their negligence in supplying the commissariat, as though they could provision his troops when they were unable to procure food for their own, surrounded by a rich country, with a safe retreat open to him towards Portugal, he resolved to make no more rash incursions into the Peninsula, estimating at its full value his late almost miraculous retreat. Attributing his inactivity to the intense heat, he advised the Spaniards to avoid great battles, and to enlist upon their side the lapse of time, always a great enemy to invasion.

There was much wisdom in these counsels, but they were easier to give than to follow, and expressed, moreover, in a manner little calculated to gain attention, or to be of much use to the Spaniards, whom a devoted loyalty had thrown into a revolution almost as violent as that into which a passion for liberty had hurried the French some twenty years before, and who laboured under the task, at the same moment, of governing themselves, and of repelling a formidable invasion. But whatever bitter reproaches Sir Arthur Wellesley might direct against them, they transferred to the Central Junta, which had replaced the regency of Aranjuez, and on which it was the custom to heap the blame of every misadventure.

If the English were discontented, if their wants could not be satisfied, if the heat of the weather or the policy of their

leaders held them inactive, if undisciplined troops led by monks were unable to hold their ground against the veteran bands of Napoleon, the cause was in every case attributed to the bad spirit and the incapacity of the Central Junta. The provincial juntas, likewise, overwhelmed it with reproaches, and that of Badajoz perpetually demanded the convocation of the Cortes, which was the new remedy expected to be a cure for every ill.

Nothing would have been easier than to yield to this wish, and the Central Junta, worn out with its distressing and perilous duties, would have gladly resigned its duties into the hands of the Cortes, had the desire for their assembly been unanimous, but it was not so. Although Spain had not commenced its revolution, as France in 1789, by an explosion of liberalism, but had commenced it on the contrary, by an explosion of loyalty, it had soon taken a very similar tone, and discussed the same questions which had been discussed in the constituent assembly. There was one party in the country which thought that the temporary absence of royalty afforded a good opportunity for the execution of necessary reforms, and that by the adoption of these reforms Napoleon would be deprived of the pretended object of his invasion, the regeneration of Spain. This party was not composed exclusively of the bourgeoisie, but numbered also amongst its ranks many members of the Spanish aristocracy, and those clear-headed men who are to be found in all ranks, and whom circumstances had now united in a party which the progress of events rendered powerful. But the holders of the opposite opinions were also of all ranks, and consisted of the less enlightened portion of the noblesse, of the clergy, the magistracy, the army, some part of the bourgeoisie, and of a certain number of enlightened men whom the French revolution had filled with terror. Whilst the one party, desiring a complete reform of the monarchy, demanded the assembly of the Cortes as the only possible means of effecting a social revolution, the other, which desired no revolution, demanded the immediate re-adoption of a Royal Regency, which consisted of five or six high personages chosen from amongst the generals, the superior clergy, and the ancient ministers of the monarchy. At the head of this last party were the Palafoxes, the defenders of Saragossa, the Duke de l'Infantado, General Gregorio de la Cuesta, a singular character, the Count de Montijo, a noble who lived amongst the people and delighted in arousing their passions, the Marquis de la Romana, who commanded the armies in the north of Spain, and the old minister Florida-Blanca. At the head of the opposite party were the celebrated M. de

Jovellanos, and many such men, as MM. de Tareno, Arguelès, and others, who were less known at this period than they afterwards came to be, and who were anxious to bestow upon their country a government worthy of a civilized nation.

After a long struggle between the two parties, an unexpected event brought matters to a crisis. A discovery was made of a kind of conspiracy formed by the heads of the party opposed to any kinds of reform, the object of which was to dissolve the Central Junta, to seize the reins of power, and to govern monarchically, and without reform. Desirous of obtaining the support of the English, the members of this conspiracy had made overtures to Henry Wellesley, the English Ambassador, and brother to Arthur Wellesley, the General of the British Army. The Ambassador, although England regarded with little favour either the Central Junta or a system of general reform, in a spirit of good faith gave information of the affair to the members of this Junta. The conspiracy was thus baffled; but the Central Junta perceiving how impossible it was that they should maintain their ground, were anxious to give place to really national representatives, and decreed that the Cortes should be convoked for the commencement of 1810, reserving to themselves the power of fixing the time, mode, and place of their meeting, according as the events of the war might render advisable. Feeling at the same time the necessity of some more concentrated authority, it established an executive commission of six members, which was to exercise all the functions of government, and retained only for itself the duties of legislation. Amongst the members of this commission was the Marquis de la Romana, a man of a restless spirit, and much given to boasting, but who had as yet accomplished nothing save his escape from Denmark with his division. He had been transferred from Old Castille in Andalusia for the purpose of reorganizing the troops in this part of the Peninsula.

The Spanish armies were divided at this period, into the army of the left, which disputed with the French Generals Old Castille, the kingdom of Léon, the Asturias, and Gallicia; the army of the centre, comprising the troops which guarded Estramadura, La Mancha, and Andalusia; and the army of the right, composed of the troops which, under Generals Reding and Blake, had attempted during the whole of the year 1809 to snatch Catalonia from General Saint-Cyr, and Aragon from General Suchet.

The plan formed by the new executive commission, was to collect a vast army, and to endeavour to snatch Madrid from King Joseph, who had at his immediate command eighty thou-

sand of the first troops in the world. In vain Sir Arthur Wellesley, advised them to risk no great battles with the well-trained French troops; the new heads of the government paid little heed to his counsel, and energetically proceeded with the assembly of their vast army. They brought together the troops which, under Gregorio de la Cuesta, had been vanquished at Talavera, and those composed the armies of Estremadura and La Mancha; to these was added a detachment of Valenciens. They hoped to form an army of 50 or 60 thousand men, provided with an excellent cavalry, and the best artillery in Spain. The proud Gregorio de la Cuesta was to be at the head of this army; but the Junta regarded him with little favour, and upon his sending in his resignation, which he was constantly in the habit of doing, in the manner of a threat, he was taken at his word, and General Egria was appointed as his successor. It was proposed, as soon as the weather should have become cooler, to act on the offensive against the troops which Joseph had assembled around Madrid, and that in the meantime the armies of the left and right should press upon the rear of the French, to force them to retreat northwards.

In the meantime events of considerable importance were occurring in Catalonia and Aragon on the one side, and in Old Castille on the other. In Catalonia General Saint-Cyr had carried on a contest during the year 1809 with the Catalans and the troops of General Reding, which he had ended by driving back into Tarragonia. He had then fallen back upon Barcelona, to re-organize and provision his army, and to relieve it of the prisoners made in the four battles which he had gained in Catalonia. He had conducted those prisoners to the frontier and then commenced the siege of Girone, which Napoleon had assigned to him as an easy task, which would be the crowning achievement of his glorious services. General Verdier was charged with the conduct of the actual attack, and General Saint-Cyr reserved to himself the duty of covering the besiegers. It was not at that time sufficiently well understood, even after the taking of Saragossa, that sieges in Spain were great military operations, more difficult to conduct than battles. But terrible and famous examples were soon to teach us the lesson.

General Saint-Cyr leaving with General Verdier all the forces he could spare, and taking with him only twelve thousand men skilfully took possession of the fertile plain of Vich, by which means he secured an ample supply of provisions both for his own troops and those of General Verdier, and held a position in which he would be able to check the

advance of the forces which would, in all probability, be sent to the aid of Girone.

The heavy artillery, after having been long expected, having at length arrived, General Verdier commenced operations. The city of Girone, situated on the bank of the Ter, at the foot of fortified heights, encompassed with regular works, filled with a fanatical population, the very women of which took an active part under the title of the company of Sainte-Barbe, defended by a garrison of seven thousand men, and an heroic governor, Don Alvarez de Castro, had declared that its resistance should render it immortal, and we shall see how well it kept its word. The long interval of time moreover, which was occupied in preparing for the attack, and which had been protracted by the difficulty of transport, had afforded ample opportunity for making every preparation for defence.

General Sanson, an able officer, who had the conduct of the engineering operations, having decided that it would be necessary to commence by taking the heights, the trenches were opened in front of the Fort de Montjouich, and after some time a breach was effected; but as, unfortunately, some days were allowed to elapse between the moment of its becoming practicable and the assault, the enemy were enabled to prepare an energetic resistance and repulse our troops; an event which filled the whole city with intense exultation.

The point of attack against the Fort de Montjouich appearing to have been ill chosen, the works were opened in another direction; a course of proceeding little calculated to increase the ardour of the French troops, or to diminish the fanatic zeal of the inhabitants. At length, another breach was declared practicable, and the Spaniards perceiving that they could no longer hold Fort Montjouich against us, evacuated it during the night. And thus we gained possession of this fortification after the lapse of a period equal to what had sufficed for the greatest sieges.

Weary of the delay occasioned by these preliminary operations, our soldiers determined to attack the town itself, and descending to the banks of the Ter, took up a position under the plunging fire of the heights which yet remained in the enemy's position. Operations were directed against the enceinte of the town, and a practicable breach having been effected, it was directed to carry it by assault. Don Alvarez de Castro, at the head of the garrison, and supported by the whole population, male and female, had sworn to die rather than surrender, and if the French cannon overthrew their walls, to keep out the enemy with others built of their dead bodies. Our soldiers rushed to the assault with vigour,

were repulsed, and again advanced with fury under the fire from the town itself, and from the heights, and amidst the clanging of bells, and the wild cries of the inhabitants. Many times our troops obtained the summit of the wall to find there an impenetrable mass of infuriated men. Priests, women, and children, threw themselves into the breach, and mingled with the combatants; and it was at length found necessary to retire before the noble delirium of Spanish patriotism, and to convert the siege into a blockade; a means of attack which was most likely to be attended with success, as fever and famine had already seized upon the heroic defenders of Girone, and the governor himself was dying.

To prevent any kind of relief from reaching the garrison now afforded the only chance of success, and became the care of General Saint-Cyr; for although he had been deprived of his command and succeeded by Marshal Augereau, the Marshal after having eagerly sought the appointment showed less eagerness in fulfilling its duties, and it was therefore necessary that General Saint-Cyr should remain, at a most critical moment, at the head of an army the command of which he was to resign within a few days.

At the same time General Blake, knowing that Girone was in danger of being compelled to surrender by famine, collected the remnants of the armies of Catalonia and Aragon, and advanced to its relief with a thousand beasts of burden. General Saint-Cyr hastened to take up a position in front of the point in the line of blockade which was the weakest and most liable to attack. For three days the hostile forces remained opposite to each other in the midst of a thick mist, which entirely concealed them from each others view. At length one of the French divisions engaged in the siege allowed itself to be surprised, and the Spanish General threw into Girone, besides the convoy of provisions, a reinforcement of four thousand men; this latter succour being rather disadvantageous than otherwise, for it was not men but food that was required.

The unhappy Alvarez de Castro, whose resources had been little increased by this operation, sent an earnest request to General Blake for new succours; and the latter again approached the city by remote routes with an immense convoy. But General Saint-Cyr, entrusting this time the necessary measures to no one but himself, having placed his troops in ambush, permitted the enemy's troops with the convoy to arrive at the very gates of the city, and then suddenly taking them in flank and rear, obtained possession of many thousand beasts of burden and some thousands of prisoners. The wretched inhabitants of the besieged city, thus deprived of

the succour of which they had such urgent need, decimated by fever and famine, and deprived of the services of their commandant who was at the point of death, found themselves compelled to surrender, which they did on the 11th of December, after an ever memorable siege of six months.

Such were the events which took place in Catalonia during the latter part of the year 1809. The events in Aragon had also been important. After the surrender of Saragossa, the 5th corps, under Marshal Mortier, had advanced upon the Tagus, and the 3rd, exhausted by the terrible siege of Saragossa, had remained in Aragon. Fortunately, this corps received a wise, talented, and firm leader in the person of General Suchet. His corps was composed of three old regiments of infantry, of four new, of three regiments of Polish infantry, of the 13th Cuirassiers (the only regiment of this arm in Spain), of some light cavalry and excellent artillery. He devoted the utmost attention to his troops, and endeavoured to inspire them with a feeling of duty and of resignation to a war which the siege of Saragossa had rendered hateful to them. After having allowed them a certain period of repose, he led them in front of the enemy. General Blake, who commanded the army of the right, had formed the project of taking advantage of the departure of the 5th corps, to throw himself upon Aragon, and retake Saragossa; General Suchet was unwilling to await his attack, and proceeded towards Alcanitz to meet him; but the French General soon perceived that fatigue, disgust, and an insufficient organization had affected his troops more vitally than he had at first supposed, and he was compelled to lead them back. Fortunately General Blake neglected to seize the favourable opportunity, and gave him time to concentrate his forces at Saragossa, to recruit the regiments with fresh troops drawn from Navarre, and thoroughly to reorganize and refresh them; and there General Suchet, his soldiers being inspired with an entirely new spirit, awaited at Maria, in an advantageous position, the arrival of General Blake. The Spaniards exhausted their ardour in a furious attack upon his position, and being attacked in their turn, were routed with considerable loss; pursued by the French forces to Belchite, they once more ventured to give battle, and were again beaten, leaving in the hands of the victors the whole of their artillery, and many thousand prisoners.

Completely master of Saragossa and the fertile plains of Aragon, General Suchet devoted his attention to tranquillising the country, freeing it from the guerilla bands, and obtaining from its resources the necessary subsistence for his

troops in the manner least burdensome to the inhabitants, and to immense preparations for the siege of the hostile fortifications. Knowing from experience that the subsistence of an army, although undoubtedly a heavy burden to a country, need not be a ruinous one, if instead of being seized by a rough military grasp it be provided for by the hand of an intelligent and just administration, he called together the former members of the provisional government, and declared to them his anxiety to cause the maintenance of his army to fall as lightly as possible upon the inhabitants, and asked them to assist him in carrying out these views. The man's whole air and manner convinced those whom he addressed both of his ability and of his sincerity, and they resolved to comply with his requests to the utmost of their power. Saragossa considered that it had done its part towards maintaining the independence of Spain by its heroic defence, and now, its more passionate and implacable spirits having either perished or been scattered, the remainder of its inhabitants was anxious for repose. This disposition accorded well with the intentions of General Suchet, and within the space of a month Saragossa appeared to have arisen from its ashes.

The French General re-established the old imposts, the accustomed authorities, and ordering that all the revenues should be paid in to the treasury of the province, gave up a large portion of them to the service of the province itself, reserving the surplus only for the necessary expenses of his army, and reiterating his promise, which he scrupulously observed, to respect both the persons and property of the inhabitants. In the meantime he made every preparation necessary to the siege of the important places of Lerida and Mequinenza, which it was necessary to take before the army of Catalonia could advance upon Tortosa and Tarragonia.

The guerilla bands were the only obstacle to the complete pacification of Aragon. Whilst the Central Junta of Spain employed itself in the formation of regular armies which were always vanquished, there arose spontaneously irregular troops, which without either officers or commissariat, led only by instinct, and acting according to the circumstances of the moment, supplied themselves with everything they required, whilst they rendered their enemies destitute; were always present at the precise moment when least expected, dispersed if the hostile troops were in force, and re-appeared as soon as they were scattered in picquets or escorts of stores; never attempted to vanquish their foes in mass, but cut them off man by man, showing no more humanity than was to be expected of the Spanish people, or of any people perfidiously invaded, and sparing neither the wounded nor the sick; and

this was a system of attack which could not fail, if persevered in, to overcome the most valiant armies, for a constant part of the operations of an army consists in the appointment of detachments to the duty of foraging, escorting stores, and conveying the sick, the wounded, and recruits; and an army from which these detachments are incessantly cut off, must languish, wither and die, as a tree deprived of its branches.

These guerilla bands which had always been troublesome, had increased immensely since the dispersion of the Spanish regular troops, and it was difficult to say whether the Peninsular were more effectually defended by the English army or these bands, which snatched from the French the fruits of their victories, and rendered their defeats disastrous.

Sometimes it was an officer whom the dispersion of the Spanish armies had left without employment, sometimes a restless monk, a pastor who desired to defend his village, or a farmer anxious for the safety of his fields, a student who was glad to exchange his books for a new kind of life, or a shepherd weary of his flocks, who, inspired either by patriotism or religion, the spirit of adventure, or that of self aggrandisement, collecting here and there a few peasants, a few fugitives from the vanquished armies, or prisoners escaped from the hands of the French, either by themselves or in the train of some leader already renowned, established their quarters in some district, where they obtained either from the sympathy or terror of the inhabitants all that they needed, transported themselves hither and thither as the movements of the enemy or their own plans rendered advisable, and so harassed the invaders, that the victorious troops of the latter became as wretched, wearied and destitute, as those whom they had vanquished. Whilst the interior of Aragon had been subdued by the arms and the policy of General Suchet, all its borders were overrun with hardy and numerous bands of guerillas. One body under the command of an officer named Renovalès, was established in an almost inaccessible convent, in the valley on the south of the Pyrenees; another, under Mina, a young student nineteen years of age, completely intercepted the road from Pampeluna to Saragossa; in the south of the province, an old officer named Villacampa, with a troop composed of soldiers and peasants, commanded the environs of Calatayud; in the mountains of Montalvan, at the celebrated convent of Notre Dame del Aguila, was Colonel Raymon-Gayan, at the head of about three thousand men; and the famous l'Empecinado, at the head of two thousand five hundred insurgents, infested the road between Saragossa and Madrid.

Against these guerilla bands, General Suchet at length prepared to take active measures; Mina was pursued and taken, and sent as a prisoner to Paris; Renovalès was deprived of his convent stronghold, and the bands of Villacampa and Raymon-Gayan, were vanquished and dispersed. By these successful operations the Valencian and Madrid routes were rendered free, and good expectation was obtained, that when once the fortifications of Lerida and Mequinenza were taken, and after them, those of Tortosa and Tarragonia, the province of Aragon, and even that of Catalonia, would be reduced to peace.

But these happy results, which were as much due to the administrative ability of General Suchet, as to his military skill, were far from being equalled in Biscaye, the two Castilles, and the kingdom of Léon. In vain the French Generals pursued the guerilla bands in these countries, which were especially given to this irregular mode of warfare, and peculiarly adapted by local circumstances for its pursuit. Besides this, the sufferings which the inhabitants had to endure from the exactions of the guerilla bands, and the supplies which they had to provide for the French troops, frequently drove them to revolt. Generals who were unendowed with the wisdom of General Suchet, cared not how they obtained what was necessary for their troops, and frequently seized it in a manner which rendered utterly destitute the already ruined inhabitants; and if, unhappily, they chanced to have been hardened by twenty years of warfare, to have been exasperated by suffering, and irritated by crimes committed against our troops, they shot unfortunate wretches who were guilty of no fault; or who, at the most, had attempted to preserve bread for their children; shot them in revenge for the assassinations committed by the guerillas. And these latter on the other hand frequently seized soldiers of our detachments and hung them on the trees, often side by side, with Spaniards who had been accused of favouring the French. Thus there prevailed throughout these unhappy provinces a feeling of despair; and the excesses of our soldiers and the crimes of the Spaniards themselves, were equally laid to our charge.

In certain districts the guerilla bands were innumerable. El Pastor in Guiposcoa, Campilla in Santander, Porlier in the Asturias, Longa between Aragon and Castille, Merino in the neighbourhood of Burgos, Capuchino and the curé Tapia, in the plains of Castille, El Amar, at la Rioja, Duran in the mountains of Soria, Don Camillo Gomez, in the environs of Avila, Don Julian Sanchez (a brave warrior whom the death of his parents and his sister had driven from his fields, and

almost goaded to madness), in the environs of Salamanca, and a host of others too numerous to mention, crept amongst the mountains and scoured the plains. Sometimes uniting in masses to engage in important expeditions; sometimes dispersing to avoid our pursuit, and frequently when pressed too closely by the French troops, embarking in English vessels to descend on other coasts. They were guilty of horrible crimes and enormous ravages. They murdered our sick and wounded, stopped despatches, the delivery of which was often of the utmost importance, kept all our agents in a state of perpetual terror, completely crippled the exertions of our commissariat, and impeded the reinforcement of our armies by compelling battalions and squadrons to remain in the north, and exhaust themselves in fruitless movements, before they had been able to join the regiments they were intended to recruit.

These detachments consisting of raw recruits, and commanded by officers wanting both in experience and talent, no sooner arrived at Pampeluna, Tolosa, Vittoria, Burgos, and Valladolid, than they were sent to chase the indefatigable guerillas, and being unaccustomed to fatigue, and individually inferior to the bandits they pursued, found in this kind of warfare a fatal apprenticeship to their trade of war. The greater number of them, after a week or two, went to perish in the ill provided hospitals, and of the reinforcements intended for the armies in the field, scarcely a fourth part reached their destination. The destruction of the horses was as rapid as that of the troops themselves, and it was of ordinary occurrence that a troop of three hundred cavalry should lose within the space of a few days two-thirds of their horses. Almost at the first moment of arrival at these first stations of the army of Spain, both soldiers and officers breathed in with the infected air, a feeling of deep discouragement, and regarded themselves as destined to a useless and inglorious death; and this feeling was not a little increased by the conviction that they would never come under the eyes of Napoleon himself.

The Generals commanding at the various stations, being left entirely to their own imaginations, proposed various methods, some of them odious and some ridiculous, for the destruction of the guerilla bands, such as cutting down the woods within a certain distance of the roads, and burning or decimating those villages, of which any of the inhabitants had become guerillas. The most sensible of them, General Kellerman, not knowing to what measures to have recourse, addressed the following reflections to Major General Berthier.

"The force which I command is manifestly inadequate,

and independently of the hostile troops, against which it is necessary to make head, is scarcely large enough to protect itself against the swarms of brigands, and the strong organized bands which infest the country, and which by their activity, but more especially by means of the sympathy of the inhabitants, elude all pursuits.

"Permit me then Prince, frankly to express to you my opinion,—that the Spanish war is no ordinary affair, and that whilst we need fear no disastrous reverses, this nation will destroy the French army in detail. It is in vain that the heads of the Hydra are cut off on one side, they arise again on another, and if there be not some change in the sentiments of the inhabitants, it will be long before this vast Peninsula is brought to submission, and in the meanwhile, it will absorb both the population and the wealth of France. Its object is to conquer us by the aid of time and perseverance; its submission can only be obtained by the absolute destruction of its strength, and annihilation of a moiety of its population. The present disposition of the inhabitants is such, that we can gain over no party amongst them to our side. All the moderation and justice we show towards them are of no avail in diminishing their rancour against us, and would fail to obtain for any governor or commander the aid of ten men in a moment of peril.

"Reinforcements are necessary; the Emperor is perhaps tired of sending them; but we must either at once conclude this war, or shut ourselves up in one half of Spain, in order to make the conquest of the other. In the meantime the resources of the country fail, agriculture is neglected, the coin is withdrawn from circulation; it is impossible to provide for the pay or maintenance of the troops, for the requirements of the hospitals, or, in short, for any of the innumerable things necessary to an army, which is in want of every thing: wretchedness and privations increase the number of sick, and continually enfeeble the army; and in addition to this, bands of the enemy swarming in every direction, every day pounce upon little detached parties of our men, who, with the utmost imprudence, and in spite of the most positive and reiterated prohibitions, continually expose themselves to this danger.

"When I fall into such reflections as these, I am lost, and only recover myself to exclaim, there is need of the head and arm of Hercules! His strength and skill alone can terminate this contest, if indeed it ever shall be terminated."

The meaning of this was, that the presence of Napoleon himself was necessary to the termination of the war; but although the picture of the state of affairs as drawn by

General Kellerman was by no means an exaggerated one, the difficulties opposed to us were not equally great in all the provinces. It was still possible that success might, in the course of time, be the result of perseverance; but its attainment would require all the resources of France, and all the genius of Napoleon.

The northern provinces were, as we have said, those which the nature of the country and the exasperation of the inhabitants rendered the most difficult to subdue. Besides the guerilla bands, there was, in this part of Spain, a regular army to be overcome, that of the Duke del Parque, called the army of the left, being that which was formerly commanded by the Marquis de la Romana. This army was composed of the united troops of Galicia, the Asturias and Léon, which Marshal Soult had neglected, to plunge into Portugal, which Marshal Ney had repulsed but not destroyed, and to which he had been compelled to resign Old Castile, when ordered to join the other Marshals in the rear of the British army. Marshal Ney, after the battle of Talavera, had gone to Paris to discuss with Napoleon all those matters which had been subjects of dispute between himself and Marshal Soult. His corps, (which was the sixth) reduced by the effects of fatigue and the diseases prevalent in Autumn, to nine thousand effective soldiers, was, about the end of October 1809, in the presence of the army of the Duke del Parque, which numbered almost thirty thousand men. This General, in accordance with the reiterated instigations of the Junta to assume the offensive, advanced as far as Tamamès, by the route of Ciudad Rodrigo, to Salamanca, with the object of concurring in some degree with the ambitious views of the government of Seville. Profiting by the example of the English, he prudently and skilfully took up a position upon a group of rocks which were very difficult of access, and of sufficient height to be easily defended against the most valiant troops, unless led to the attack with the utmost caution.

General Marchand, full of the audacious spirit of his chief, and accustomed to despise the Spanish troops, advanced upon Tamamès upon the 18th of October, and did not hesitate to attack the enemy's position. Some pieces of cannon posted in advance of the heights occupied by the Spaniards and covered by cavalry, were speedily taken and the cavalry dispersed; but after this first easy success the heights themselves still remained to be taken. Two regiments, the 6th leger, and the 69th of the line, advanced to the attack, and were withdrawn after having suffered considerable loss. Our whole line followed this retrograde movement, and the intre-

pid 6th corps for the first time paused in the front of the Spaniards; and so furious was the enemy's fire that we were compelled to resign the cannon which had been taken, all the horses which drew it having been slain.

This was an insignificant check, but one which was well calculated to inspirit the Spaniards, and to confirm them in their project of assuming the offensive. Nothing could be more to our advantage than their attacking us in great masses, for our troops were being cut off in detail, and in general actions alone we achieved success. The central government residing at Seville, already strongly disposed, notwithstanding the advice of Sir Arthur Wellesley to the contrary, to direct the forward movement of the army of the centre, did not hesitate, after the affair at Tamamès, to give orders for marching upon Madrid. The Central Junta finding even General Eguia too timid, had replaced him by Don Juan de Areizaga, a young officer who had distinguished himself in the affair of Alcanitz against the troops of General Suchet. This new chief, who attributed to their officers the defeats suffered by the Spanish troops, and to a certain extent substituted for them others who were younger and more inured to the perils of actual warfare, inspired such confidence that the heads of the government already began to discuss the measures which ought to be taken when Madrid should have been reached.

Don Juan de Areizaga having collected upon the sierra Morena the troops of Estremadura, those of La Mancha, and a detachment of Valenciens, traversed La Mancha in the course of November, and reached the banks of the Tagus above Aranjuez, in the neighbourhood of Tarancon. His army consisting of more than fifty thousand foot soldiers, somewhat more disciplined than the generality of Spanish soldiers, of fourscore well-served pieces of cannon, and of seven or eight thousand good cavalry, was inspired with the confidence usual with the Spaniards; and, on the other hand, the news of its approach was received with joy at Madrid, where preparations were made to give them a proper reception.

Marshal Soult who had become Major General of the Spanish army, since the departure of Marshal Jourdan, had at first some difficulty in discovering the intentions of the Spanish General; but having a great part of his troops behind the high Tagus, towards Aranjuez, he was in a position to offer a front to the enemy from whichever direction he might come, and was not compelled to make any decided movement. He had under his command the 2nd, 5th, 4th, and 1st corps, and could muster 60,000 excellent troops, which were twice

as many as were sufficient to vanquish all the regular armies in Spain. Unable to divine the plans of an enemy who had scarcely formed any, Marshal Soult made such arrangements as might best suit all probable contingencies; he sent the 2nd corps (general Hendelet) from Aropesa to Talavera, with orders to watch the Estramadura route, by which the English would come, if at all. He brought back the 5th, (Marshal Mortier) from Talavera to Toledo, and concentrated the 4th, (General Sébastiani) between Aranjuez and Ocana.

About the 15th of November, the enemy having entirely quitted the route of Séville for that of Valencia, and appearing to direct his movements against our left, Marshal Soult, attentively watching the enemy's movements, brought back the 4th (General Sébastiani) from the left to the right, and ordered it to cross the Tagus near to Aranjuez, by the bridge of la Reyna. He drew off the 5th (Marshal Mortier) from Toledo upon Aranjuez. He placed the 4th and 5th corps under the supreme command of Marshal Mortier, and directed that they should debouch upon Ocana. He ordered Marshal Victor, at the head of the 1st corps, to pass the Tagus between Villareja and Fuenteduena, upon the left of the corps of Sébastiani and Mortier; a movement which was a little contrary to rule, and was calculated to render Marshal Victor's corps almost useless, but which could be, however, a source of little peril in the presence of an enemy, whom any one of our corps might have encountered singly without danger. Marshal Soult himself set out from Madrid with King Joseph, the King's Spanish guard, and the remainder of the division Dessoles.

In the afternoon of the 18th General Sébastiani approached the Tagus with the Dragoons of Milhaud, and crossed the river by the bridge of la Reyna with his cavalry, leaving behind him his infantry, which was still on its march. On arriving at the edge of the plateau la Mancha, General Sébastiani perceived the Spanish cavalry which covered the main body of the army of Areizaga on its march from Santa-Cruz upon Ocana. This troop consisted of about 4000 well-mounted and well-equipped horsemen, and as those of General Sébastiani numbered only about eight or nine hundred, he found himself in a somewhat embarrassing position; but Marshal Mortier had, fortunately, just arrived at Aranjuez, and sent him the 10th Chasseurs, together with the Polish Lancers, which raised the troop at his disposal to the number of 1500. With these troops the imposing mass of the enemy was dispersed by a brilliant feat of arms, which gave good hopes of our success in the battle which would

evidently take place on the morrow. The body of the Spanish army was already in sight, and Marshal Mortier made his arrangements for the approaching conflict. The French army consisted of about twenty-four thousand men, a number very insufficient to oppose the 50,000 or 55,000 of the army under General Areizaga. Marshal Soult and King Jerome arrived at the moment when Marshal Mortier had completed his arrangements for the battle, and had only to confirm them.

At eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 19th of November, General Leval attacked the enemy's right with the German and Polish regiments, these troops being soon somewhat broken by an overwhelming fire from the enemy's musketry and artillery, and General Leval seriously wounded, General Girard, forming in column the 34th, 40th, and 64th regiments of infantry, whilst he opposed the 88th to the Spanish cavalry which threatened his left, passed between the Polish and German regiments, and attacked the Spaniards with the utmost resolution. The enemy began to give way, and to fall back upon Ocana. Our troops continued their attack, and signs of disorder were soon visible in the Spanish army. In the meanwhile our cavalry attacking that of the enemy which covered the baggage in the direction of the road from Santa-Cruz to Ocana, dispersed it, and then dashed into the midst of the broken and flying masses of the enemy's infantry. Within the space of a few moments some four or five thousand fell under the sabres or bayonets of our soldiers. Forty-six pieces of cannon, thirty-two flags, and fifteen thousand prisoners remained in our possession, besides an immense quantity of baggage, and two or three thousand horses. The triumph needed only to have been obtained over the English to be complete.

This event naturally caused excessive dismay at Seville, and excited anew the outcry against the Central Junta. The project of replacing it by a Royal Regency was reproduced on this occasion with more earnestness than ever. The Marquis de la Romana, however, who had formerly desired to deprive the Central Junta of its authority, having now obtained possession of the chief part of its executive power, hastened to check its most daring adversaries, and placed in arrest the Count de Montijo, and Francisco Palafox. But as repeated news of misfortune continued to arrive in rapid succession, the Junta, perceiving no secure asylum but at the bottom of the Peninsular, behind the lagunes which cover Cadiz, decided to re-assemble in the isle of Léon at the commencement of 1810, in order to prepare the convocation and assembly of the Cortès for the 1st March.

Thus the campaign of 1809 may be said to have terminated with advantage and glory to our arms; and there was fair reason to hope the near approach of a termination to this long and cruel war.

But, as commonly happens, embarrassments and chagrin were not the lot of the vanquished alone; for they prevailed at Madrid, in the very court of the victorious King. Joseph in Spain had as many subjects of dispute with his powerful brother, as Louis in Holland. We have already seen that he believed himself capable of arriving much sooner at an understanding with the Spaniards by means of his powers of persuasion, than his brother ever would by the exhibition of all his terrors; that, in common with all those whom Napoleon had made kings, he espoused the cause of his new subjects, against the French armies charged with the duty of compelling their submission to him, and that Napoleon was transported with passion when he found that Joseph showed greater favour to the Spaniards than to the French troops, who shed their blood to make him a king, a disgraceful and indecent animosity arose in consequence, between the two courts; and as the English obtained from the guerillas more than one letter taken from the French couriers, they did not fail to parade in their journals these sad divisions in the Imperial family.

Joseph had naturally desired to establish a court at Madrid, as his brothers had established courts at Amsterdam, Cassel, and Naples. Some complaisant but second rate French officials, military and civil, and some Spanish adherents of the new king, composed this court, to which Joseph gave his entire confidence, and on which alone he bestowed any favours. Its members in return admired his superior understanding, his amiability, and exquisite tact, and were prone to reiterate that Napoleon was surrounded by flatterers, who exaggerated his merits at the expense of his brothers, that his undeniable military talent was sadly deteriorated by a want of prudence and moderation; and some of these flatterers of Madrid, who were such good judges of the flatterers of Paris, had had the imprudence, during the campaign of Wagram, to calculate the chances which threatened the life of Napoleon, and whilst expressing a due sense of the misfortune which a loss of so much talent and glory would be, asserted that his death would not be so great a calamity for the empire as was generally supposed; for that, in that event, the attainment of peace would be as easy as it was now difficult, and both France and Europe would obtain that repose they so much needed. These assertions, which contained a considerable amount of truth, were imprudently

made in the presence of generals who repeated them to Napoleon, because they hated the Spanish Court, in the presence of the French Ambassador, who reported them because it was his duty to do so, and in the presence of a police, which gave information of them in accordance with their instructions. The consequent irritation in Paris may be easily conceived.

Joseph would have gladly rewarded his flatterers, but his whole revenue sufficed only for a third part of the absolutely necessary expenses of his household, his guard, and the salaries of the functionaries who received his orders. But one resource was open to him, and that consisted in the raising money on the national domains. With the money thus obtained Joseph had made some presents to his favourites; he had, moreover, bestowed on them some titles of nobility, some decorations, and some commands in his guard. In justification of these acts, Joseph declared that it was necessary that a king should have something to give, that he should be able to reward those Frenchmen who had attached themselves to his fortunes, and to recompense the Spaniards who had alienated themselves from their countrymen to devote their services to himself.

Nor were these Joseph's only weaknesses, for, being very coldly received by the French troops, who regarded him neither as a friend nor a general, and more coldly still by his subjects in Madrid, who could not look on him as their legitimate sovereign, he passed the greater part of his time in retirement, in the society of his complaisant friends, and of a beautiful and intellectual person who was one of the few Spanish ladies who dared to present themselves at his court.

Napoleon, who could never pardon those errors of his brothers, which he was ready enough to forgive in his own case, and who was irritated by a number of malevolent reports, manifested even a greater degree of anger against the Court of Madrid than he had shown towards that of Amsterdam, for in addition to all those reasons of his displeasure, to which we have alluded, was the ceaseless and poignant chagrin which he experienced on account of the Spanish war. He declared repeatedly, that Joseph had no idea of how to conduct a war, that he had neither genius nor character, and that without the presence of three or four hundred thousand French soldiers, he would not remain eight days upon his throne; that his gentleness was out of place, and that there was greater need for him to render himself feared, and to cherish the French troops, than to conciliate the Spaniards; that this mode of governing was no doubt very distasteful to one of so gentle a character as Joseph, but that Napoleon had not forced him

to become King of Spain, and that after having accepted the crown, it behoved him to wear it in a becoming manner; that his financial embarrassments were the result of his own incapacity, and the incapacity of his ministers; that Spain had already cost the Imperial treasury two or three hundred million, and that France could not be ruined for her sake; that Spain contained immense resources, and that were he, Napoleon, able to go there, he would easily procure from them subsistence for his armies, and an ample surplus for the expences of the civil service; that he was about to send a reinforcement of 120,000 men to put an end to this wearisome war, that he would provide them equipment, but that Spain must bear the cost of their subsistence; that his brother's guard was an useless, and even a dangerous establishment, which absorbed money which was required for other purposes, and which would desert on the first occasion; that it was absolutely necessary that Joseph should cease to rule Spain, or continue to do so in accordance with the views and wishes of Napoleon; and that if the government were not conducted agreeably to his will, he would simply convert into military governments the provinces occupied by the French armies, restoring them to the king on the conclusion of the war, withholding only, as a recompense to France for her exertions and expenses, the provinces comprised between the Pyrenees and the Ebro.

When these remarks of Napoleon were repeated to Joseph, he declared that he already had sufficient to complain of, that he endured a thousand annoyances from the French Generals, and that if the proposed military governments should be established, and it should become necessary to announce to the people the dismemberment of the monarchy, not three or four hundred thousand, but a million of men would be required to keep down the Spaniards;—and even a million would not suffice.

We may observe in this quarrel with Joseph a repetition of Napoleon's dispute with Louis, and how little Napoleon gained by employing his brothers as the instruments of his authority, since they invariably became the supporters of those interests which he sought to sacrifice to his inflexible designs.

At the present moment, however, as the despair of Joseph and the anger of Napoleon were tempered by the hopes in which each indulged that the next campaign would put an end to their anxieties and sacrifices, they devoted themselves wholly to efforts to render the approaching campaign as effectual as possible.

Joseph wished to commence this campaign by an expedi-

tion to Andalusia, and his ministers, lending a ready ear to those Spaniards of Seville who represented Andalusia as weary of the government of the Junta, and ready to surrender itself to the new king, declared that force need have little part in its conquest, and that Joseph's power of gaining hearts would be its only vanquisher; that to him alone would belong both the glory and the profit; that Grenada and Valencia would speedily follow the example of Seville, and Cadiz soon be as the other three; that he would thus have almost the whole of the south of Spain under his direct authority, and being then possessed of abundant financial resources would be independent of his brother, and become indeed King of Spain. Joseph, readily entering into these views, earnestly requested of Napoleon permission to make the conquest of Andalusia, and was supported in his request by Marshal Soult, who also believed that it would be very easy, and desired its accomplishment as a means of effacing the remembrance of Oporto.

Napoleon however, contrary to his usual habit in the case of military affairs, hesitated; he was well aware of the advantage of obtaining immediate possession of Andalusia, and of the probability that its example might lead to a submission of the whole southern portion of the Peninsula. But his great military talent taught him, that the first necessity was the expulsion of the English, which would lead to a general peace; and the conclusion of a general peace would leave the passions of the Spaniards as a fire unsupplied with fuel, and destined to be speedily extinguished. In accordance with these views, he had made preparations for overwhelming Lord Wellington with an overwhelming mass of troops; but unhappily he permitted himself to be diverted from this wise project, and, considering the expedition to Andalusia as but a temporary employment for the excellent soldiers which he had around Madrid, consented that it should be undertaken.

In permitting this expedition, which Joseph was to carry out with 70,000 veteran soldiers, Napoleon had considered that at least 30,000 at the close of the campaign might be detached, and led towards Lisbon by the left bank of the Tagus, whilst Masséna marched by the right, at the head of the 60,000 troops of Ney and Junot, with the 15,000 of the guard, and the 10,000 cavalry of Montbrun, which, without taking into account the reserve of Drouet, would form an overwhelming force which the English would be unable to withstand; and which would probably render the campaign of 1810 the last of the Spanish war.

In accordance with these ideas, without losing sight of his

main object, which was the expulsion of the English, Napoleon permitted the expedition to Andalusia, regarding it but as a profitable employment of the troops concentrated around Madrid, until the great army of Portugal destined to march upon Lisbon, under the illustrious Masséna, should have been assembled in Castille.

But whilst consenting to the Andalusian campaign, Napoleon directed Joseph to observe certain precautions in its conduct. He commanded him to march with three corps, the 4th, under General Sébastiani, the 5th under Marshal Mortier, and the 1st under Marshal Victor, the division Dessoles remaining in reserve. He ordered the 2nd to remain upon the Tagus, *vis-a-vis* with Alcantara, in order to watch the English, whose plan of operations could not be discovered since their retrograde movement into Portugal. He also recommended Joseph to carry with him a siege train, that the want of it might not stop him before Seville as Marshal Moncey had been stopped before Valencia.

These instructions having been given, Napoleon directed General Suchet to take Lerida and Mequinenza, whilst Joseph was employed in the conquest of Andalusia. General Suchet, aided in this undertaking by Marshal Augereau, would in turn be able to assist him in taking Tortosa and Tarragona, and then marching upon Valencia be in a position to complete the conquest of the south, already commenced by Joseph. In the meantime Marshal Ney in Old Castille would organize his corps, pursue the insurgents of Leon, assist General Bonnet in the Asturias, and prepare for besieging Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, with which the campaign of Portugal was commenced.

Joseph was extremely delighted at receiving permission to undertake the Andalusian expedition, chiefly because it gave him the opportunity of acting out of Napoleon's sight, and with the counsel of Marshal Soult, who served as his major general, and showed towards him the greatest deference; the Marshal himself being sufficiently pleased with an expedition into Andalusia, where in the absence of the English the issue of the battles was rather to be looked forward to with hope than fear.

Although the authority of Joseph over the corps which were not placed immediately under him was of a very undefined nature, Marshal Soult wrote in his name to General Suchet, directing him to abandon the idea of the siege of Lerida, and to march upon Valencia, in order to cover the left of the army of Andalusia. Addressing an order of the same kind to Marshal Ney, he recommended him to commence immediately the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, to draw the

English towards the north of Portugal, and to set free the right of this army of Andalusia, which was protected in every kind of way as though it encountered the greatest dangers.

These precautions having been taken, they advanced upon the sierra Morena with the intention of making the attack upon the 19th or 20th January, 1810. General de la Romana, who had been charged with the duty of re-organizing the Spanish army commanded by General Areizaga, which had been half destroyed and dispersed amongst the numerous recesses of the sierra Morena, had promised much and done nothing. Scarcely twenty-five thousand demoralized and destitute troops were ranged in three divisions in front of the three passes of Almaden, Despena-Perros, and Villa-Mourique. A division detached from Old Castille, under the Duke of Albuquerque, had crossed the Tagus in the neighbourhood of Alcantara, and marched to cover Seville.

The troops under General Areizaga defended but feebly the defiles of San-Estevan and Despena-Perros, and retired in all haste upon Jaen to cover Grenada. The others having fallen back from Almaden upon Cordova, had directed their retreat, not towards Seville, which the Spaniards expected to offer but a slight resistance, but towards Cadiz, where they hoped to find a secure asylum, behind the lagunes of the isle of Léon and under the cannon of the English ships. The French army followed to a certain extent in this twofold direction. The 4th corps, forming our left, under General Sébastiani, pursued towards Jaen the two divisions which retreated into the kingdom of Grenada, in order to drive them from this kingdom and the port of Malaga. The 5th corps, under Marshal Mortier, forming our centre, having reached the Guadalquivir, turned to the right, and rejoined the 1st corps which, under General Victor, had descended upon Cordova. From Cordova they turned towards Seville, pausing at Carmona, a little city not far from Seville. Joseph, who was not inclined to attempt the capture of towns by assault, wished to await at Carmona the effect of the secret relations which Messrs. O'Farill, d'Azanza, and Urquijo, were attempting to establish with the interior of Seville.

It would have been better, whilst awaiting this pacific result, to have left Seville on the right and to have hastened directly upon Cadiz, to intercept the troops, the material, and, above all, the members of the government who were on the point of flying. The possession of Cadiz would, in fact, have been of more importance than that of Seville, for the walls of the latter might at any time be battered down by the siege train, but it would not always be easy to pass the

lagunes which separate Cadiz from the firm land of Spain, and it was only by a surprise that we could hope to make the capture of this important town.

Joseph proposed to direct a detachment against Cadiz, and to march with the 1st corps only upon Seville. This plan was supported by many of the generals, but combatted by Marshal Soult, who objected to it that, the army being already weakened by the despatch of General Sébastiani to Grenada, it could not bear any further diminution, and that Cadiz would fall of itself into their hands on the capture of Seville; the Marshal's opinion diverted Joseph from the execution of his idea, and he marched directly upon Seville with the united corps of Marshals Mortier and Victor. The reserve under General Dessoles was left in the defiles of Despena-Perros, between the Val de Penas, Caroline, and Baylen.

The approach of the French caused the greatest excitement in Seville; the central Junta left to an executive commission the care of defending the city, and one by one withdrew to Cadiz; but many of them were maltreated by the populace which arose in insurrection, proclaiming the Junta of Seville the Junta of defence, and bringing forth from prison the Count de Montijo and Don Francisco Palafox, to dispute with the French possession of the capital of Andalusia.

Whilst the inhabitants were immersed in useless excitement, the French had advanced to the gates of Seville by the route of Carmona. On the 29th the corps of Marshal Victor appeared in sight of Seville; all the bells were tolled, the populace assembled in masses upon the ramparts and the roofs of the houses, shouted forth the most furious cries. Marshal Victor summoned the place to surrender, declaring that if the gates were not immediately opened, he would instantly commence the attack, and put to the sword all who resisted. These threats, in conjunction with the secret correspondence which had been carried on with the interior of the city, had the effect of bringing about conferences during which the chief personages, with the Marquis of Romana at their head, made their escape. The Provincial Junta then consented to deliver up the capital of Andalusia, and on the 1st February the gates were opened to Joseph's army, which entered with drums beating and colours flying.

The city was almost deserted; the upper classes had fled either to Cadiz or the provinces, or into Portugal; the monks had been equally eager to withdraw themselves from the power of the conqueror, and the mass of the people had scattered themselves in dismay over the surrounding country; but as the troops respected both persons and property, and

Joseph hastened to put into practice his system of conciliation, the greater portion of the inhabitants soon returned, tired of enduring cold and hunger in the open fields.

The truth of Marshal Soult's declaration that the conquest of Seville would undoubtedly be succeeded by the submission of Cadiz, now remained to be proved; and the various corps speedily commenced those movements which would put it to the proof.

The 5th corps marching upon Estremadura had dispersed on its way some detachments led by the Marquis de la Romana, and made some considerable captures of baggage and money belonging to the numerous fugitives who were flying to the shelter of the strong walls of Badajoz. On arriving at the gates of Badajoz the French General summoned it to surrender, and received an answer from the governor in the name of the Marquis de la Romana, that the fortress would make a resistance worthy of its natural strength and the determination of its defenders. Marshal Mortier, having no siege train, had then taken up a strong position on the Guadiana, and had placed himself in communication with the 2nd corps (General Reynier's) which had now advanced as far as Truxillo.

In the meantime General Sébastiani, at the head of the 4th corps, chasing before him the wreck of Areizaga's army, had successively entered Jaen and Grenada, and had then appeared before Malaga, where the infuriated populace declared their determination to make a furious resistance; but an advanced guard of cavalry and a few light infantry regiments had speedily quelled their ardour and reduced the place to submission. The 4th corps might reasonably expect that its establishment in the kingdom of Grenada would be equally easy.

Matters in relation to the capture of Cadiz, however, were far from wearing a similarly favourable aspect. The ministers of King Joseph had written to many members of the government and to several generals, who even at Seville had appeared disposed to surrender, utterly weary of this devastating war and the interminable civil dissensions. But these last, constrained as they now were by all that surrounded them, replied only in a most vague and unsatisfactory manner. As for the inhabitants of Cadiz, full of confidence in the natural strength of their town and in the support of the English troops which had been promised them, they surrendered themselves to unbridled fury, and met the French summons to surrender with outrageous bravadoes.

A local insurrectional Junta had been formed and made preparations for the defence; the Duke of Albuquerque with

his division, joined the numerous and important political refugees who were now in Cadiz, without giving up the great arsenal of the Caraque to the English, without even opening the interior roadstead to their fleet, the Junta of Cadiz had admitted them into the exterior roadstead and consented to to receive into the enceinte of the place 4,000 of the soldiers. Eighteen thousand Spanish troops were already either within the town, or in the isle of Léon.

In the meantime the political movement which had been interrupted at Seville by the arrival of the French, continued at Cadiz with the greatest violence. Its first result was naturally the dissolution of the central Junta, which, persuaded of the impossibility of its retaining its authority for any considerable time, hastened to resign, and amidst the universal applause of the inhabitants and the refugees, immediately convoked the Cortes and nominated a royal regency, to be invested with executive power. This regency was composed of five members, the bishop of Orense, a man of mediocre and fanatic spirit, General Castanas, a man of some skill and wisdom, Saavedra, a state counsellor, a renowned sailor, Don Antonio Escano, and a Spaniard of the American colonies, Don Miguel de Lardizabal, appointed to represent in the government the transatlantic provinces. After having performed these two acts, the Junta separated, receiving the greatest ill treatment from its enemies, who even examined the baggage of many of its members, to discover whether they had abstracted any of the public funds; a most unmerited outrage, as they had generally been accounted persons of strict honesty.

The new regency had scarcely been appointed, when it displayed a very manifest inclination to delay the convocation of the Cortes; but the people of Cadiz, and the refugees were alike anxious for their immediate assembly, and it was determined that they should be convoked in March.

Affairs were in this state when the first corps under Marshal Victor arrived before the canal of Santi-Petri, three or four days after the entry of the French into Seville Had he appeared before Cadiz with an imposing force when the government, the armies, and the most impetuous spirits were still at Seville, it is probable that he might have surprised and ensured its reduction; but now it was necessary to make preparations for a long and difficult siege.

Some time would be necessary for the collection of the various means of attack, and the consideration began to strike every one, now that it was spread over this immense tract of country, which extended from Murcia to Grenada, from Grenada to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Seville, and from

Seville to Badajoz, that our noble army, twice as large at least as was necessary for the invasion of the south of Spain, would have much difficulty in retaining possession of it. Marshal Victor, with twenty thousand men, had scarcely sufficient for the investment of the isle of Léon and for keeping in check its garrison, which was more numerous but happily less brave than the 1st corps; and if he had sufficient troops for the preparations for the siege, he certainly had not enough for its accomplishment. The 5th corps, under Marshal Mortier, obliged to furnish a garrison for Seville and a corps of observation before Badajoz, had great difficulty in performing this twofold task. General Sébastiani who, with the 4th corps, had to hold Malaga, to occupy Grenada, and to make head against the insurgents of Murcia, had not a soldier too much. Dessoles' division, posted amidst the gorges of the sierra Morena, in order to protect the line of communication, was thoroughly employed, for it had to guard, besides the defiles of the sierra Morena, Jaen, which commands the route of Grenada and the plains of la Mancha; and to provide a garrison for Madrid. Finally the 2nd corps, under General Reynier, posted upon the Tagus, between Almaraz, Truxilla, and Alcantara, could not prudently be withdrawn from this position, for it was there that the English had passed in the preceding year, on their march from Abrantés to Talavera. We see, therefore, that this numerous and noble army, the most valiant of all the armies of the empire, having no rival but the corps of Marshal Davoust in Hanover, and which numbered nearly 80,000 men, was already scattered over the provinces of Grenada, Andalusia, and Estramadura, that it was scarcely in force at any one point, and certainly not in a condition to afford any assistance to the army which was about to act against the English in Portugal. That the hope of being able to divert a detachment of it towards Lisbon, which had decided Napoleon to permit the Andalusian expedition, was consequently utterly dissipated, and was succeeded by the fear that it would prove insufficient even for the defence of Andalusia.

The new Regency entrusted the Marquis de la Romana with the command of the troops of Estremadura encamped around Badajoz, and having summoned General Blake from Catalonia, where he had been replaced by General O'Donnel, had placed him at the head of the army of the centre, the remnants of which had fled into the kingdom of Murcia; Blake rallied them, and in concert with the garrison of Cadiz, directed expeditions upon Grenada and Seville, and in every other direction in which he could afford support to the

guerillas of Ronda. We must add, that the twofold diversion which had been ordered to be made upon our wings, and which consisted in throwing Marshal Ney upon Ciudad Rodrigo, and General Suchet upon Valentia, had not succeeded.

The order which had been incautiously given to Marshal Ney to attack the important fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, without siege artillery, and in the neighbourhood of the English, who had withdrawn to the north of Portugal, had only resulted in a vain bravado. Marshal Ney had confined himself to throwing a few balls against the place from his field guns, and to sending to the governor a summons to surrender, which received just the kind of answer such an attempt deserved. The Marshal had then returned to Salamanca. General Suchet, believing that the order to march against Valentia had been concurred in by Napoleon, presented himself before that city, which, according to some accounts was well disposed to surrender, and thrown into it a few cannon balls; but the inhabitants showed a determination to resist which it was vain to expect to subdue without the aid of heavy artillery. General Suchet retired, therefore, in all haste, towards Aragon. This was the second French army, (counting that of Marshal Monery) which had presented itself before Valençia, and been compelled to withdraw without having forced the gates of that proud city; a fact which considerably increased the triumphant feelings of the inhabitants.

In the meantime the whole country from Murcia to Grenada, from Grenada to Cordova, and from Cordova to Seville, was in entire subjection to Joseph, who visited these cities in the character of their king, making what his courtiers called a triumphal progress, but which was not so regarded by persons of more discernment. It is true that the fickle and inconstant populace of these cities, much as they detested the French, applauded this king in a manner which afforded his flatterers an opportunity of declaring that he had obtained more by his personal grace and condescension than Napoleon by his terrible soldiers; and that were he only permitted to pursue his own plans he would speedily effect the subjugation of Spain,—but the persons who uttered these sentiments forgot that eighty thousand of these same terrible soldiers were at the present moment affording to Joseph the means of trying the effect of the charms of his manner upon the people of Andalusia. In the meantime both Joseph and Marshal Soult were satisfied.

But in the midst of these self congratulations on the subject of the Andalusian expedition, a thunderbolt was

launched from Paris, which turned all Joseph's exultation into bitter dismay. The Andalusian expedition had occupied the first months of 1810, and this was the very period of the most serious disputes between Holland and Napoleon, who had not quarrels only with King Louis, but also with King Jerome, on account of Hanover, and with respect to the execution of the financial conditions attached to the cession of that country. Tired of finding his brothers perpetually the cause of some obstacle in his path, and unable to perceive that they were in reality only the passive agents of the resistance of circumstances to those impossible achievements he was attempting; and receiving a multitude of reports respecting the tone and conduct adopted by Joseph, he took measures with respect to him which were very severe, and by no means of a nature calculated to facilitate the performance of the work which remained to be performed by him in Spain. In the first place he was displeased that General Suchet should have been called off from the siege of Lerida to carry his heavy artillery against Valentia, by which means the French army had been caused to make a second ineffectual appearance before the walls of that city, and he forbade General Suchet from obeying henceforward any authority but that of Paris. He expressed equal disapproval of the imprudent demonstration which Marshal Ney had been ordered to make against Ciudad Rodrigo.

Joseph's gift of money to his favourites, when resources were utterly wanting for the supply of even necessary expenses, angered him beyond expression. "Since money can be found," said Napoleon, "for gifts to the idle and the intriguing, means ought to be found for the support of the soldiers, who pour out their blood for King Joseph; and since their wants are not supplied, I must provide for them myself." Accordingly he converted Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre, and Biscay, which were the four provinces on the left of the Ebro, into military governments. He arranged that in those governments the generals commanding should exercise civil as well as military authority, that they should receive all the revenues on account of the army chest, and whilst treating the government at Madrid with apparent deference, should neither obey nor be accountable to it.

After having taken military possession of the territories on the left of the Ebro, Napoleon secretly communicated to the generals, his intention of annexing them to France, as some indemnity for the sacrifices she had made to secure the throne of Spain for his brother; and directed them, in case they should receive orders from Madrid, contrary to those they received from Paris, to declare that they had been prohibited

to obey any other government but that of France. This was a serious step, not only for Spain, but also for Europe. It seemed, in fact, that Napoleon, as insatiable in peace as in war, was resolved to rule by his decrees where he could not vanquish by his sword. He had annexed to the empire Tuscany, the Roman States, and Holland; he was at this very moment contemplating, although he maintained silence on the point, treating Valais and the Hanse towns in the same manner. To add to these acquisitions, the country between the Pyrenees and the Ebro was, in effect, to say to the world that nothing could escape his avidity.

The secrecy enjoined upon the generals relative to the annexation of the four provinces, was not long possible. The establishment of the military governments in these provinces, would have alone sufficed to reveal Napoleon's real intentions; but Napoleon did not confine himself to this measure, but took others which restricted Joseph's authority within the gates of Madrid. Besides the acts above mentioned, he distributed the troops in the field into three armies, one of the south, one of the centre, and one of Portugal. He placed Marshal Soult at the head of the army of the south, having renounced upon consideration, the intention of inquiring into his conduct at Oporto, and confided to him the 4th, 1st and 5th corps which occupied Grenada, Andalusia, and Estremadura. He composed the army of the centre of Dessoles' single division, added to it the depôts generally established at Madrid, and entrusted it to Joseph. The army of Portugal was formed of all the troops assembled in the north, to march upon Lisbon, under the orders of Marshal Masséna; the generals commanding these armies were to obey only the orders of the French minister, which meant of Napoleon himself, who had adopted the title of Commander-in-Chief of the armies of Spain, and had appointed Prince Berthier his major general. Joseph had, therefore, no command over the governor of the provinces of the Ebro; none over the generals of the three acting armies; his authority being confined to the army of the centre, which was the least numerous, and was appointed to the performance of but an insignificant task. His authority could scarcely have been more restricted or rendered more nominal, and this certainly was not the way to exalt him in the eyes of the Spaniards. The orders, moreover, relating to the finances were as severe as those relative to the military hierarchy. The revenues received in the provinces of the Ebro were allotted to the armies by which they were occupied. The acting armies were to obtain support from the countries in which they conducted their opera-

tions, and as it was possible that sufficient money would not be found for their pay, Napoleon agreed to send to Spain two millions a month for that purpose. Henceforth Joseph only had for revenue the taxes which he could obtain from Madrid itself, and the hatred which the Spaniards bore towards him, not on his own account but on account of the invasion of which he was the representative, began to change into a feeling of contempt, which was still more formidable.

Joseph received information of the above circumstances at Seville, and was overwhelmed by it. MM. O'Farill, Urquijo, d'Azanza, and d'Almenara, who had accompanied him to Seville, fell into the deepest despair. Struck by so heavy a blow Joseph had no longer any taste for remaining at Seville, where his presence was no longer likely to have that effect upon his new subjects which he had expected. He found himself, also, without authority in Andalusia, Marshal Soult having become general-in-chief of the army of the south, and determined to visit France, to come to some understanding with his brother, and to make him acquainted with the probable consequences of these his last measures. He took leave, therefore, of his ministers, leaving Marshal Soult absolute master of Andalusia; and thus eighty thousand of the best troops in Spain were paralysed to make, not Joseph, but Marshal Soult king of Andalusia.

Joseph passed rapidly and without ostentation through Andalusia, which he had lately traversed with so much triumph, and passing through the defiles of the sierra Morena, where was cantoned Dessoles' division, the only active force which remained to him, and then, leaving some infantry regiments in these defiles, and one or two regiments of dragoons to scour la Mancha, he concentrated around Madrid the few troops upon which he could rely.

He had no sooner entered his capital than he received the most extraordinary information from Seville. Marshal Soult considering himself not sufficiently strong in troops with the three corps which had been confided to him, and which comprised the best troops in Spain, pretended that all those in the arondissement of the south belonged to him, and consequently ordered the brigade which was between la Mancha and Andalusia to approach to receive his orders. General Laboussage, to whom these orders were addressed, replied that he was under the commands of the état major of Madrid, and could not, without its authorization, quit the post which he occupied. Marshal Soult repeated his orders, accompanying them with severe threats in case they should be disobeyed. Joseph, on the other hand, forbade General Laboussage to obey, and whilst in the midst of this quarrel

with Marshal Soult, experienced a new annoyance quite as painful as any of the others. The generals stationed in the kingdom of Léon and Old Castille, where the military governments were not as yet established, put into practice the principle laid down by Napoleon, that each army should be supported by the province which it occupied, and should levy contributions without employing the financial agents of Joseph, and without holding themselves accountable to his authority. These repeated blows rendered Joseph's humiliation complete, and he was ready to abdicate, even without compensation, the burdensome crown of Spain. By the advice, however, of his ministers and of some persons who enjoyed his confidence, and who were unwilling to lose the king to whom they had become attached, he directed his wife, who was in Paris, and two of his ministers, MM. d'Azanza and d'Hervas, who were about to proceed thither, to negotiate with his brother and to make him understand that the loss of the provinces of the Ebro exposed him to the hatred of the Spaniards, that the reduction of his authority brought on him their contempt, and that he would rather resign the Peninsula than retain it on such conditions.

Napoleon received the Spanish ministers without severity but with some disdain; spoke contemptuously of Joseph's system of policy; and displayed great inflexibility on the subject of the finances, declaring that if Joseph were not willing to obtain of Spain the necessary money for the troops, he must procure it himself by the hands of his generals, taking care, however, that whatever surplus remained beyond the necessary expenses of their armies should be paid over to Joseph's treasury. He was unable, he said, to change the distribution of the various military commands, for that he had need of two great armies, that of the South and that of Portugal, to act in concert for the expulsion of the English, and that by leaving between these the army of the centre, and entrusting it to Joseph, he had conceded all that was possible.

With respect to the provinces of the Ebro in which he had established military governments, Napoleon did not dissemble his project for annexing them to France as a means of indemnifying her for her expenses; Portugal, he added, which would one day be annexed to Spain, would be a noble compensation, but it was first necessary to conquer it, to drive out of it the English, and after having driven them out, to force them to make peace; the accomplishment of all which was difficult, and rendered desirable for the present the postponement of any determination, and complete silence on these topics. The Spanish ministers remained therefore at

Paris, with the intention of negotiating and seizing every opportunity of making some impression on Napoleon's inflexible will.

For the moment Napoleon permitted them to add some troops to the army of the centre. He decided that Marshal Soult in endeavouring to take Cadiz should try also to capture Badajoz on the frontier of Portugal; that Marshal Masséna on his side, whilst his armies completed their formation, should undertake the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, which were the protection of Portugal on the side of Castile, and that these supports once assured they should take the offensive during the course of the month of September by marching altogether upon Lisbon, Marshal Masséna on the right bank of the Tagus and Marshal Soult on the left. According to this new plan the whole of the summer would be devoted to the different sieges, and orders were given that it should so be employed, and with the greatest possible activity.

General Suchet had in effect since the month of April, undertaken the task which was assigned to him. Having promptly repaired the fault which they had caused him to commit, in drawing him upon Valencia, he sat down before Lerida to besiege that place. His corps made up to an effective force of thirty and some odd thousand men, by the arrival of recent reinforcements, could not furnish more than twenty-three or twenty-four thousand combatants. Of these he kept about 10,000 to guard Aragon, and with thirteen or fourteen thousand he had marched on Lerida, investing that place on the two sides of the Segre. These forces were just sufficient for attacking the place, but there was reason to fear that they would be insufficient, if it should prove necessary to cover the siege against the endeavours which would very likely be made from without. It was the duty of Marshal Augereau to cover the siege of Lerida and Mequinenza, whilst Marshal Suchet carried them on, and it was the duty of Marshal Suchet in his turn, to cover those of Tortosa and Tarragonia, whilst Marshal Augereau devoted his forces to that purpose.

Lerida is famous in history, and from the time of Cæsar to that of the Grand Condé has in every age played an important part; it is on the right of the Segre, a river which carries to the Ebro the waters of one half at least of the chain of the Pyrenees, and being situated at the foot of a rock, which is surmounted by a strong castle, it is protected in one direction by the waters of the river, and on all by the cannon of the castle. The rock on which this castle is built, is almost perpendicular on every side, save towards the south-west, on which side it is accessible by a gentle

ascent, which commences almost from the town itself, but this also rises abruptly towards its extremity, and is strongly fortified. It was necessary, therefore, to take the town under the fire of the castle, and after the town the castle itself; unless, indeed, a well arranged system of operations should obtain the simultaneous accomplishment of both these results.

At the moment when the trenches were about to be opened, an intercepted letter apprised General Suchet that the Spanish General, O'Donnel, was approaching with the troops of Catalonia and Aragon to raise the siege. On the 23rd it was known that he was only one march distant. He came from Catalonia by the left of the Sègre, whilst the town and the besieging army were on the right. General Suchet made his arrangements for holding his ground against both the enemies without and those within. On the 23rd April, at daybreak, General O'Donnel appeared at the extremity of the plain of Margalef, which extends on the left of the Sègre, and immediately commenced the action. After a brief contest victory declared itself for the French, and the Spaniards fled, leaving behind them almost six thousand prisoners, with many cannon, colours, and a large amount of baggage.

After this brilliant success General Suchet, wishing to know if the result of the battle which had deprived the garrison of all hope of succour had inclined them to surrender, sent them a summons to do so; but the governor proudly replied that the garrison had never relied upon any external aid for the success of its defence. It was necessary, therefore, to proceed with the siege.

The trenches were opened on the 29th April. The execution of the works was difficult, not on account of the hardness of the soil, but because the spring rains had caused the waters of the Sègre to overflow, and because great inconvenience was experienced from the artillery of the castle.

On the 6th and 7th of May all the batteries were constructed and armed, and the cannonade was commenced; but our artillery suffered so severely from the fire from the castle, most of the pieces being speedily dismounted, that the cannonade had to be suspended for the purpose of erecting new batteries and redisposing the direction of the old. These new works occupied until the 12th of May, when the fire was recommenced, and with complete success; our batteries silenced those of the town itself, whilst those of the castle had been rendered less dangerous by being approached nearer. At length a practicable breach was effected and an assault rendered feasible. It was arranged that this should take place on the 13th. Two columns were to advance

simultaneously to the assault, whilst a company of sappers and miners was to break down one of the gates, by which the army might be admitted. The General-in-Chief and Colonel Haxo remained in the trenches at the head of the reserves, ready to advance in whichever direction it might be desirable.

At the approach of evening four bombs having given the signal, the two columns poured from the trenches into the breaches and clambered up them, in spite of a terrible fire from the front and flank. Having arrived on the rampart they were for a moment thrown into confusion, but they soon rallied and entered the town, which they found defended by barricades, which were immediately taken. In the meantime the sappers and miners had succeeded, after a hand to hand conflict, in opening the gate situated near the bastion of the Madelaine, and thus giving admittance to the columns which waited behind them. Our troops thus penetrating into the town in all directions drove the garrison and the inhabitants, mingled together in confusion, towards the slopes which led to the castle. Filled with terror they threw themselves into the castle itself and even into the fosses. All through the night this mass of mingled men, women, and children was, by General Suchet's order, overwhelmed with missiles from every species of ordnance; a scene of tragedy being the result, which it was impossible to avoid, for the immediate conclusion of the siege depended on the state of despair to which this unhappy mass of persons might be reduced.

However great might be the determination of the garrison and their leader it was impossible to persevere under these circumstances, and on the 14th May, therefore, the governor Garcia Conde hoisted the white flag, and surrendered himself and the garrison prisoners of war. The result of this siege gave to us the most important fortification in Aragon, and producing an immense sensation in this part of Spain much diminished that confidence in their walls with which the inhabitants had been inspired by the siege of Girone.

Whilst these events were taking place in Aragon, Napoleon had at last compelled Marshal Masséna to quit Paris to proceed to Salamanca. Unable to place himself at the head of the armies of Spain, various motives induced him to bestow the chief command upon Marshal Masséna. Soult, having been twice tried against the English, had not, in Napoleon's opinion, shown sufficient vigor to justify his being opposed to them again. Marshal Ney possessed, on the contrary, that power of energetic action which was neces-

sary in a struggle against such enemies, but he had never commanded in chief, and it was necessary that the general to be matched against so skilful a tactician as Wellington, should unite with consummate generalship and great energy of character, that habit of command which enlarges the spirit, and renders it capable of bearing fitly all the anxieties attending a great responsibility. Marshal Masséna was the only man whose ready spirit, clear judgment, and ardent temperament rendered him fit for such a post. Marshal Masséna, with Ney and Junot for his lieutenants would be able to surmount all obstacles. But Marshal Masséna, whose clear sightedness was not confined to military affairs, perceived that a rapid advance was being made towards some great catastrophe. Having conducted all kinds of warfare in Calabria, Italy, Germany, and Poland, he augured no good from that which was so obstinately maintained in Spain, and he was by no means inclined to compromise his high renown upon a theatre whereon all the difficulties which Napoleon had excited against himself appeared to have assembled. He showed the greatest repugnance to undertaking the management of the campaign in Portugal, and when required by Napoleon to give his motives, alleged, that besides the difficulties which he foresaw in the conduct of the operations, and the want which he suspected there would be of proper means for carrying them out, his health was broken, and his energy most probably enfeebled in consequence; and that moreover, there would be some inconvenience in his assuming the command over those Marshals who considered themselves his equals, and were accustomed to obey none but Napoleon himself. Napoleon, with that persuasive manner which he knew how to assume with his old companinions in arms, had caressed the old soldier, reminding him of his renown, his proverbial energy; declared that he had never displayed more youthful vigour than in the last campaign, that the army re-echoed with his name, that neither Marshal Soult nor Marshal Ney considered themselves his equal, and that neither of them would refuse the obedience demanded by his superiority, his age, and the Imperial confidence with which he was invested; that if they were Marshals and Dukes, he was Prince of Masséna; and that there were, moreover, means of forcing unruly spirits to submission; that as far as his health was concerned, the climate of Portugal was exactly the one most likely to restore it; that he would be afforded time for repose by the lapse of three or four months which would intervene, being employed in siege operations, before the commencement of movements in the field; that as regarded the means

necessary to the conduct of the campaign, they would be furnished in abundance, 80,000 men being placed under his orders, together with an immense matériel; and that, being entrusted with the conduct of this campaign, it was probable that he would become both the most glorious and the most popular of the soldiers of France, by obtaining that maritime peace which was alone required, because it was the only one which had not as yet been obtained. These arguments, accompanied by a thousand caresses, had rendered Masséna unable to refuse the request of the most generous of masters; his far-seeing spirit, therefore, sadly yielded to the persuasions of gratitude and the habit of obedience, but not to self-deception.

Masséna having thus, whether he would or no, accepted the command of the army of Portugal, proceeded to Salamanca, his arrival being a source of terror to the insurgents, of confidence to the troops, and of displeasure to Junot and Ney. It happened, unfortunately, that his energy was unaccompanied by that dignity which, whether natural or assumed, imposes upon men, and which was one of those qualifications for command, the neglect of which in Napoleon was compensated for by the prestige of his prodigious genius, his dazzling glory, and unrivalled fortune. Masséna arrived at his head quarters in a manner and with an attendance little calculated to impress his already discontented lieutenants, and indiscreetly complaining of his fatigue. "Masséna is grown old," was the constant murmur around Marshal Ney at Salamanca, and around Junot at Zamora. Masséna was not left long in ignorance of this circumstance. "They consider me old, do they?" he exclaimed with anger; "I will soon make them understand that my will at least is not old, and that I know how to exact obedience from those who are placed under my orders." A third lieutenant, General Reynier, whose corps was to join the army of Portugal, conducted himself, at first at least, with more propriety than the other two, receiving his commander-in-chief with the respect which was to be expected from a modest and earnest officer.

But these difficulties were by no means the least serious of those which Masséna had to encounter. His army was not as yet either organized or supplied with the necessary matériel, and Napoleon refused to furnish the funds by means of which alone it could be obtained. He found, on arriving at Salamanca, that such matériel as had been sent from France since the peace with Austria had been seized on its way, as far as possible, by each corps, and consumed before the campaign had commenced. The weather, moreover, had been

as frightful in the Castilles as in Aragon; and in addition to all these difficulties, guerilla bands, more numerous and more audacious than ever, intercepted every convoy that was not guarded by a considerable force. The urgency of the necessities of the army had given birth to abuses which the generals, either indolently or purposely, connived at. The soldiers and sometimes the officers seized the peasants' cattle or corn, not to use for their own support, but to convert into money. They assisted also the contraband traffic in colonial merchandize by permitting mules burdened with this merchandize to pass by on the payment of a tribute; and they even went so far as to permit some of the Spanish prisoners to escape for bribes. Masséna was deeply distressed at this low state of discipline of his old companions in arms, whom he found changed in every thing save that martial daring which neither misfortune nor all Europe gathered under the walls of Paris could subdue.

Independently of this general state of the army, each corps had its own particular distress; and none of the corps were of that strength which Napoleon had hoped and promised they should be. Masséna was able, indeed, to assemble an army of 60,000 men, but the diseases attending the summer season, the sieges which were to be undertaken, and the garrisons which would have to be left in the conquered places, would certainly reduce it by fifteen or sixteen thousand men, and leave the army of Portugal numbering no more than 50,000 effective combatants. The aspect of things in general, the inferiority of the number of the troops, the want of matériel, the bad spirit manifested by the Generals, and the utter decay of discipline, filled Masséna with dismay, and he wrote to Napoleon letters which were as talented as they were sad. Nevertheless, old and worn out and hopeless as he was, he applied himself to the work in hand with more energetic zeal than he had ever displayed at any previous period of his life.

Aided by the members of his staff and by General Thiébault, Governor of Salamanca, he applied himself to the creation of that which did not exist, and the reparation of that which was destroyed. With a view to these objects he ordered to be brought into the chest of the central army the contributions which each corps had seized for its own use from the province which it occupied. He urged the supply of funds from Paris for the acquittal of the arrears of pay; he took possession of the mules bought in France for the army of Portugal, and accelerated the transport of the heavy artillery towards Ciudad Rodrigo. Ciudad Rodrigo, distant three or four marches from Salamanca, was situated in a vast, arid, desolate

plain, of some twenty or thirty leagues in extent. Masséna sent thither subsistence for the troops of Marshal Ney, which were about to assemble there, and ordered the establishment of all that was necessary for a siege. As it was possible that the English, who, since our entrance into Andalusia, had quitted Spanish Estremadura to retreat into the north of Portugal, might attempt to interrupt our operations, he ordered General Junot to quit Léon and Benavente, and to take up a position between Ledesma and Zamora, in order, if necessary, to be able to concentrate themselves upon the right of Marshal Ney. By these means Masséna began to assemble at Salamanca the matériel of a considerable army, and to concentrate around Ciudad-Rodrigo a portion of what was necessary to the prosecution of a long siege. Unhappily the route between Salamanca and Ciudad-Rodrigo was infested by guerillas who dared to show themselves despite the incessant presence of our troops, and often occasioned us serious disasters. Masséna, therefore, did not fail to send most urgent messages to Paris for the prompt arrival of the corps of General Druet, affirming that after his departure for Portugal the presence of numerous forces alone could keep open the means of communication.

Whilst preparations were thus being made for commencing the new campaign of Portugal by the siege of Ciudad-Rodrigo, a disputed point arose between Masséna and his lieutenants. The English were encamped at Viseu, three marches from the frontier. The accounts respecting their numbers varied very much, from the fact of the Portuguese troops being frequently reckoned with them, but no one supposed that the English themselves were more than 24,000. Their near neighbourhood inflamed the burning courage of Ney; he found it but tedious work, directing the noble ardour of his soldiers against stone walls. He considered that by making an unexpected attack upon the English with the 6th and 8th corps, and the cavalry of Montbrun, which would amount altogether to about 50,000 men, there would be a great chance of vanquishing them, and ensuring, by their defeat, the fall of the fortified places themselves.

Narshal Ney proposed this plan of operations to the general-in-chief with all his natural ardour, suggesting it, at the same time, by letter, to General Junot, in order that, receiving the same advice from both, Masséna might be, in a manner, forced to adopt it. But although the impetuous Junot added his entreaties to those of Ney, the firmness of the general-in-chief was not moved, for Napoleon's orders were precise; directing that the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo

and Alméida should precede every other operation ; that no advance into Portugal should be made, until after the intense heat should have diminished, and until provisions should have been got together sufficient for the subsistence of the army for fifteen or twenty days. But Junot and Ney spread abroad amongst their several corps that it was Masséna who, grown old, and no longer the same man, preferred wearisome and murderous sieges to an active and decisive campaign.

The plan laid down by Napoleon was evidently the wisest, and the designs of the English Generals afforded a full justification of his views. Sir Arthur Wellesley had acquired by his last operations a great reputation with the English government, and even with the English people, who, since General Moore's precipitate retreat, had never ceased to be haunted by the fear that their troops might be driven into the sea. On finding, however, that their new General, Arthur Wellesley, so far from being driven from the Peninsula, had, on the contrary, driven Marshal Soult from Portugal, they had begun to take confidence; but the services which he had already rendered to his country, and the high reputation which he began to acquire did not suffice to silence the attacks of the opposition, which desired peace, or the objections of the government, which was in continual dread of some disaster. Thus the British Government constantly kept at the mouths of the Tagus an immense transport flotilla, to be always ready to receive the army should it be beaten. The peace which France had made with Austria increased its apprehensions, for it believed that Napoleon would throw into the Peninsula his best army and his best general, namely, himself; and this idea filled all England with anxiety in behalf of Lord Wellington, and the army which he commanded.

The English public tormented the Cabinet, and the Cabinet tormented Lord Wellington, by the expression of unceasing terrors. But the latter endured this annoyance, whilst he saw more clearly than Napoleon himself the course of affairs in the Peninsula, simply because he was on the spot, and not misled by any of those illusions in which Napoleon, having entered on an ill judged line of action, loved to envelop himself. He saw that the resistance offered by national hatred, climate, and distance; by the want of method in operations conducted by different generals, and by the disagreement with Joseph, would prevent Napoleon from obtaining possession of certain extreme points, such as Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Lisbon, which were protected by their remoteness and the sea; and he declared that if England

continued to excite and to aid from these extreme points the hostility of the Portuguese and Spaniards, the struggle would exhaust the resources of the empire, that Europe would sooner or later revolt against Napoleon, and that he would only be able to meet that revolt with armies half destroyed by an interminable and destructive war. But in pursuing this line of conduct all depended on the resistance which should be opposed to the French at the extremities of the Peninsula, and Lord Wellington had sought with great care, and discovered with rare quickness of eye, an almost impregnable position, from which he flattered himself that he might defy all the efforts of the French armies. This position, which he thus rendered immortal, was that of Torres-Vedras, near Lisbon. He had remarked between the Tagus and the sea a peninsula six or seven leagues broad and twelve or fifteen long, which might be easily isolated by a line of almost invincible works, and behind which Lisbon, the transport flotilla, and the stores of the army might be safe from every attack. Having fixed upon this position he delineated to his engineers the works which he desired to have thrown up, and, Europe remaining in perfect ignorance of the fact, employed many thousand Portuguese peasants in constructing, under the direction of the English engineers, the celebrated lines of Torres-Vedras. More than six hundred cannon were prepared to arm the numerous redoubts which were thus thrown up across the peninsula of the Tagus.

From the time that the French had invaded Andalusia, Lord Wellington had hastened to quit Estremadura, and had retired into Portugal, with the desire of devoting himself exclusively to the defence of that country, for it was of little importance whether the English were in Spain or Portugal, their presence upon some point of the Peninsula being sufficient to sustain the hopes of the insurgents, and to perpetuate the war. With the bulk of his forces, namely 20,000 English, and 15,000 Portuguese, he took up a position at Viseu, at the entrance of the valley of Mondego; his plan being to watch from thence, the movements of the French, and to retreat if they advanced to give him battle, until having come to a strong position, and the enemy being exhausted with fatigue, he should be able to engage them with all the chances in his favour; but to risk nothing for the sake of saving the Spanish or Portuguese fortresses, or of protecting the countries of his allies from hostile ravages.

On the side of the French, therefore, that plan by which it was proposed that Ciudad Rodrigo should be first taken,

that great magazines should be established, and that no movement should be taken without the accompaniment of an ample supply of stores on the backs of mules, was the only practicable one, since Lord Wellington had resolved only to accept battle at his own pleasure, and to retreat and leave us to perish of hunger in his track.

About the commencement of June, Marshal Ney invested Ciudad Rodrigo. This fortress is situated upon the Agueda, a little river which falls from the Sierra de Gata into the Douro. It had an excellent governor, old indeed, but full of skill and energy; General Herrasti, aware of the preparations which had been made by the French for the attack, had long since taken every precaution; the fortress contained a garrison of 4,000 soldiers, together with a fanatic population of 6,000 persons, increased by the wealthy proprietors of the country, who having sought an asylum in the place for themselves and their moveable property, had furnished a good battalion of militia numbering 800 men. The artillery was numerous, and well served, and every preparation was made for affording Ciudad Rodrigo the means of making a long and vigorous resistance.

After having consulted with his engineer and artillery officers, Ney perceived very clearly the best point to make the attack, and chose the north side for the commencement of the siege works, that being the side on which there were only artificial defences, which could be battered down by artillery. On the night between the 15th and 16th of June, the trenches were opened at 500 metres distance from the place. The works were carried on during the following days with the utmost diligence, and in spite of the repeated sorties of the enemy, who were on every occasion driven back to the fortress with heavy loss.

The rain which had lasted during the whole month of May, and which now recommenced, caused us more damage than all the sorties of the enemy. It rendered the trenches uninhabitable, and delaying, by the effect it had on the roads, the arrival of the siege train, compelled our soldiers to work without the protection of artillery. Marshal Ney supplied the want of it, by forming six companies of the best marksmen of his army, and placing them in front of the trenches in great holes, which were made so as to be able to contain three men with provisions and ammunition for twenty-four hours. From this shelter our marksmen directed such a fire upon the enemy's artillerymen, that the inconvenience to our troops of working in front of unopposed cannon was very much diminished.

On the evening of the 24th June, the General-in-Chief

himself arrived in the French camp; after having inspected and approved of the works, he hastened the erection of the batteries, that an immediate attack might be made, to open a breach. On the following day, the 25th, was commenced the cannonade. The fire from forty-six pieces of artillery caused great havoc in the enemy's works. Nevertheless, the cannon of the fortress replied to ours, and occasioned us some damage. Many of our pieces were dismounted and a considerable number of our artillerymen slain. Marshal Masséna, thinking that our artillery was not served with sufficient energy, imperiously ordered Eblé to take upon himself its command. This was a new source of vexation to Marshal Ney, who took careful account of all his annoyances, whether inevitable or not. The speedy result of General Eblé's efforts, was that two breaches became practicable, and Marshal Masséna wished immediately to proceed to the assault, as the unhealthy nature of the soil exposed the troops to disease, and the English had passed the Coa, a litfle river parallel to the Agueda, and threatened an attack. He summoned General Herrasti to surrender, telling him that he had already done all that honour demanded, that he could not hold the breach against the courage of the army of Portugal, and that if he still persisted, he would expose the garrison to destruction by the edge of the sword.

The garrison, indeed, began already to despair, but the monks continued to excite the people, and the refugees from the country, who had taken into the town all that they possessed, were unwilling to surrender; one circumstance favoured their determination to hold out. The breach having been opened from a distance, and before the French had carried their works up to the border of the fosse, the counter-scarp remained untouched. Thus the breach which was practicable on the side of the town, was not so on the side of the country, for troops could only throw themselves into the fosse for the purpose of mounting to the assault, by precipitating themselves from a high wall; the defence might, therefore, according to the recognised rules, be still prolonged. General Herrasti, who was impelled, not by fanaticism, but by a sense of military honour, to maintain the defence to the utmost, made this circumstance a reason for refusing to comply with Marshal Masséna's summons to surrender, and sent a messenger to Lord Wellington with an earnest entreaty that he would come to his assistance.

This unexpected resistance excited Marshal Masséna's extreme displeasure, and selecting from the 8th corps an officer of distinguished merit, Colonel Vallazé, who had already distinguished himself at the siege of Ostarga, he

ordered him to continue the works so as to reach the side of the fosse as soon as possible. Hearing twelve days spoken of as the time this work would occupy, he demanded that it should be completed in seven or eight, for provisions began to fail, and the 6th corps had been already put on half rations.

As for the English, Lord Wellington having advanced as far as the Coa declined to risk an engagement. In vain General Herrasti sent messages for aid, in vain the Marquis de la Romana had visited Badajoz to entreat him to interrupt the operations of the French; he replied that he could only save the fortress by a battle, and he had resolved not to hazard the fate of the English army to preserve a place already almost lost. This stern answer, although founded on the strongest arguments, reduced the Spaniards to despair, and exasperated them with what they called the cold egotism of the English.

In spite of all Colonel Valazé's efforts the brink of the fosse had not been reached until the 5th or 6th of July; but at length on the 8th, the masonry which had been the cause of the delay, was thrown by means of gunpowder into the fosse, and the breach became practicable on both sides of the fosse, namely, on the descent as well as the ascent. On the morning of the 9th everything was arranged for the assault. At four o'clock in the morning our batteries hurled upon the unhappy town of Ciudad Rodrigo a hail of shot and shell. The enemy's artillery, which at first replied with some quickness, was soon silenced. The two breaches presented only a heap of shelving ruins, which would be easily accessible to the agility of our soldiers. Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon they were declared by our engineers to be perfectly practicable, and Masséna ordered the assault. But just as the chosen columns had reached the foot of the first breach and were preparing to throw themselves into it, a white flag, the token of surrender, appeared upon the second. An aged man, with white hair (General Herrasti), presented himself to discuss with Marshal Ney upon the ruined walls the terms of capitulation Ney accorded him all the honors due to his brave defence, permitting the officers to retain their swords, and the soldiers their knapsacks.

This first act of the campaign in Portugal had passed off well. The troops, notwithstanding the unyielding tempers of their generals, and the disorganisation which had resulted from their wretchedness, had displayed their accustomed courage. Ciudad Rodrigo being taken it was now necessary to attack Almeida. Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered on the 9th of July; offensive operations could not be commenced before the subsidence of the heat, and as that would not be until the

month of September, the months of July and August might be devoted to the siege of Almeida, which was said to be more strongly fortified and better armed than Ciudad Rodrigo.

Before quitting Ciudad Rodrigo Masséna ordered the breaches to be repaired, and all the defences to be put in an efficient state. As the town contained the richest inhabitants of the country, who had sought safety within its walls, he levied upon them a contribution of 500,000 francs, of which he was in urgent need for the liquidation of his artillery and engineer expenses, and then returned to Salamanca, where, in his absence, the most important matters had made but little progress. He immediately made the most vigorous exertions for the collection of provisions sufficient to last the troops for twenty days, besides what would be sufficient to provision Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida for several months.

In the meantime he had given directions for the investment of Almeida. Marshal Ney had advanced with the 6th corps, followed by the 8th, to attack the English on the Coa, a little river which, as the Agueda, flows from the Sierra de Gata into the Douro. Almeida is on the right of the Coa, and was consequently on our side. Lord Wellington persisting in remaining inactive in spite of the curses of the Spaniards, had encamped at Alverca, and quietly watched the progress of events. Marshal Ney, in obedience to the orders he had received, obliged the English rear-guard to make a precipitate retreat, and chased them before him as far as a fort called Fort Conception, a regular work on the route from Ciudad Rodrigo to Almeida, and at the summit of a plateau which commanded this route.

Almeida was a regular pentagon, perfectly fortified, completely armed, provided with a garrison of 5000 Portuguese, and built on a rocky soil in which it would be a work of great difficulty to open trenches. The first fortnight of August was occupied in collecting provisions, procuring the necessary matériel, and in awaiting the arrival of the siege train. On the 15th the trenches were opened. Whilst the approaches were being carried on, eleven batteries were constructed, armed with 64 pieces of heavy ordnance which had been brought from Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca. On the morning of the 20th of August, the artillery being ready, Marshal Masséna gave orders that the fire should be opened. The place, which was but small, although well fortified, was almost surrounded by the batteries of its assailants and suffered considerable damage. The enemy replied with vigour, but were not able to make head against our artillery, which was served with as much precision as quickness.

Many edifices took fire; towards night a shell, happily aimed, falling upon a powder magazine which was in the very centre of the town, caused a frightful explosion; many of the houses were thrown down, and almost 500 persons, soldiers or inhabitants, killed. Some of the cannon were thrown into the fosses, and portions of the ramparts laid open. On the following day, the disaster which the town had suffered was manifest in all its horror. The inhabitants in consternation, demanded that they should no longer be exposed to such dangers; and the garrison, indignant at the obstinate immovability of the English, also began to speak of surrendering. Masséna judging correctly how great confusion would prevail throughout the place, summoned it to surrender, writing to the governor to the effect that after the accident which had happened, it would be impossible for him to prolong his resistance. The governor therefore entered into a discussion respecting the conditions of surrender; but as he continued to dispute respecting the terms during the whole day, Masséna had the cannonade recommenced; a few rounds however, caused the conditions which we had dictated to be accepted. The conquerors found within the fortifications 5000 men, a great quantity of stores, and some very good ordnance.

The first part of the plan of the campaign, that which consisted in the conquest of the fortresses of the frontier was successfully accomplished; and a good base of operations was established, if only the conquered fortresses could be provisioned, hospitals and magazines formed, and sufficient troops afforded to cover the communications. It was now September, and he proposed to pass the frontier on the 10th or 15th. Napoleon, who was much rejoiced at the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, urgently pressed him to commence at length active operations, and to throw himself upon the English. "They are not more than 25,000," he wrote; "your troops must still, despite the sieges and the diseases of summer, number 60,000; and how are 25,000 English to resist 60,000 Frenchmen commanded by you? To hesitate, would be a scandalous weakness, which we need not fear on the part of the Duke of Rivoli, and Prince of Essling." Masséna needed no exhortation to attack the English, when once they should cross his path; but he perceived with grief Napoleon's illusions respecting the strength of the two armies, and had a vague presentiment that he would be the first victim of these illusions from which no one was entirely free but the British General.

Whilst resigning himself to entire obedience, Marshal Masséna wrote again to Napoleon, to assure him that his forces were insufficient, that the roads were dreadful, that he

could procure no provisions, that all his communications would be almost immediately intercepted, that it was scarcely possible to keep up any communication between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, that he could receive nothing, that it was a great problem how his soldiers would find subsistence when in the presence of the English army, provided with every necessary, and very much increased in numbers, and that he had no chance of success, unless a considerable body of troops were despatched to follow in his rear, with provisions and munitions of war.

But Napoleon, notwithstanding the letters which he received, still persisted, for he had been long since accustomed to hear his generals exaggerate the resources of the enemy, and diminish their own; he considered the English army, moreover, as amounting only to the number of those troops which were actually English, for he held the Spanish and Portuguese troops in no account. He was ignorant of the lines of Torres-Vedras, knew not what auxiliaries the enemy would find in the remoteness of the country, its climate, and the sterility of certain portions of it, and had contracted a habit of believing that everything would be accomplished just as he desired.

Masséna, therefore, determined to set out, and fixed on the 10th of September, for the passage of the frontier; he adjourned it to the 16th that he might be better prepared, and that the heat of the weather, which was still very great, might be somewhat diminished. When the moment of departure arrived, he found that he was only able to store four months' provisions in the two fortresses; that he must renounce his plan of forming magazines, in the rear of the army; and that he had been able to procure no more than sixteen days' rations for his troops. But the army, in spite of the ill humour of certain of its leaders, was rejoiced that the moment was at hand when it would arise from its long inaction, and at length attack the English. The infantry, badly clothed, but well shod, and well armed, ripe both in age and experience, was full of confidence. The dragoons, blackened by exposure to the sun, and thorough adepts in horsemanship, were armed with long Toledo sabres which gave mortal wounds at every stroke. If it were ever possible for valour to overcome the force of circumstances, this army was worthy of making the attempt. Had its Generals acted together with good will, they would have been equal to the accomplishment of such a task, and at the head of such troops would probably have accomplished it.

On the morning of the 16th of September Masséna set his army in motion. It debouched in three columns across the

frontier of Portugal. The first steps taken in this terrible country justified all previous fears. The troops had expected to find it barren, but they also found it devastated by fire and sword. Everywhere the villages were deserted, the mills idle; what the inhabitants had left undestroyed had been destroyed by the English. Not a single available guide could be found; a few old persons alone being met with, from whom but little information could be obtained; and it was only by means of three or four Portuguese officers attached to the army that it was able to make its way along roads scarcely fit for the passage of the roughest vehicles.

On the 19th the army arrived at Viseu, a little town of seven or eight thousand souls. The whole population had fled, with the exception only of some few whose decrepitude had detained them. But although the English had destroyed the bakehouses, the mills, and the granaries, and burnt the stacks of corn, the troops were able to obtain here a good supply of vegetables and even cattle.

The artillery and the transport corps were the most distressed portions of the army. The roads were almost impassable, and three days' marching had sufficed to exhaust the horses and to cause great damage to the gun carriages. On this account Marshal Masséna, who, anxious as he was to come up with the English, preferred to encounter them in a more open country, granted to the army two days' repose, to rally the troops which guarded the baggage train and to repair the artillery carriages.

On arriving at the bottom of the valley of the Mondego, it became evident that the English would there attempt to resist us, for both on the one side of the river and the other they held equally strong positions. Reynier and Ney considered, however, and very rightly, that they had not established themselves as yet very firmly on the ground, and that they ought to be immediately attacked, before they had time to do so. But Masséna was not, unfortunately, upon the spot. Delayed either by fatigue, to which he had begun to be very sensible, or by exertions to bring up the rear of the army, encumbered with an embarrassing waggon train, he did not arrive until the evening. His lieutenants not having dared to engage in a general action in his absence, had awaited his arrival.

Marshal Masséna, after having inspected the position of the enemy, was of opinion, as were his lieutenants, that the English intended to offer battle upon that ground. The nature of the country in advance rendered it necessary either to carry the position or to retreat. Opinions were divided as to the proper course to pursue. Marshal Ney, who had

at first considered that an engagement would be the most advisable step, now held the contrary opinion, saying that it was now too late, since the English had had time to establish themselves in their position, and it would be better to retreat than to lose a battle, and to have to retreat amidst such frightful gorges before a victorious enemy.

Masséna indignantly rejected the idea of retreating, which was an easy one for Marshal Ney, since the responsibility of a retrogade movement would not fall on himself; he declared such counsel unworthy of a Marshal, and maintained that it was necessary to give battle. Reynier, ordinarily very cautious, held an opinion on this occasion contrary to his character, as Ney's was contrary to his, and supported the advice of Marshal Masséna. He affirmed that, having well examined the position, he thought that he could take it. Masséna took his advice, and it was resolved that the battle should take place the next day. It was arranged that Reynier should endeavour at a very early hour to advance by the road on the left, named San Antonio, whilst Ney should advance by that on the right, named Moria, that Junot, who arrived late in the evening, should remain in reserve to protect the retreat, if the attack should not succeed, and that Montbrun, with all his cavalry, should hold himself in readiness at the foot of the heights to sabre the English, should they attempt to descend, and that the artillery should be placed on the various elevations from which it could throw its shot against the enemy. Masséna himself was to remain between the two attacking columns, to give such orders as the events of the day might render necessary.

The French Generals were not deceived in supposing that Lord Wellington intended to give battle on those heights. The English General, in fact, although very cautious, was unwilling to enter his lines as a fugitive, had resolved as soon as he should come to a strong position, to give battle on the defensive, by which he hoped to render his retreat freer from molestation, and to raise the spirits of his troops, for the defence of the lines of Torres Vedras, and by which, should its result be entirely advantageous, he would be spared the necessity of retreating upon Lisbon. Having formed this plan, he judged that the sierra Murcelha and the sierra Alcoba presented, either of them, such a position as he desired. Being ignorant which of the two the French would attempt to carry, he had posted on the sierra Murcelha General Hill's division, and had established himself with the bulk of his army, on that of Alcoba. On perceiving the direction taken by the French army, he had ordered General Hill's division to join him.

On the evening of the 26th the Anglo-Portuguese army was, therefore, assembled in its whole strength of 50,000 men on the plateau of the Sierra Alcoba. The French army consisted of nearly an equal number, and as it had found itself superior to the English on the plain, believed that its courage would compensate for the difficulties offered by the ground it was about to attack.

At daybreak on the 27th the corps of Reynier and Ney were formed, the one in front of San-Antonio, the other in front of Moira, ready to climb the sierra; the artillery took up a position on some heights in the face of the enemy; the cavalry were drawn up on the plain, ready to cover the army should it be repulsed.

At daybreak Reynier commenced the engagement. The division Merle led the way, followed by the brigade Foy and the division Heudelet. A thick mist covered the advance of our columns. After following for some time the route de San Antonio de Cantaro, the division Merle diverged to the right of this route, and commenced ascending the mountain through the trees and thickets by which it was covered, whilst the brigade Foy and the division Heudelet continued to march along the route. After an hour's toil the division Merle, protected for some time by the mist, arrived at the summit, exhausted with fatigue, and immediately on its arrival at the edge of the plateau threw itself upon the 8th Portuguese, which it routed, gaining possession of its artillery. But Picton's whole division was there supported on one side by Leith's division, and on the other by a strong battery and by Spencer's division. Scarcely had the division Merle attempted to deploy than it received in flank the fire from the artillery on its right, and in front the fire of the musketry of Picton's division, distant only fifteen paces. A great number of officers fell before this terrible fire, and General Picton, perceiving its success, charged, with the bayonet, our troops who were taken by surprise, exhausted by their painful ascent, and deprived of almost all their commanders. They were compelled to retreat to the edge of the plateau. At the same moment the division Heudelet, preceding Foy's brigade, debouched by the route on the left of Merle's division, and hastened to support it. But assailed, before it had time to form, by grape and musketry, and deprived of its Colonel Desmeuniers, it fell back. At length Foy's brigade appeared upon the plateau, having on its right and left the regiments of Merle's division which had been reformed by General Sarrut. But at the same moment Lord Wellington having directed Leith's division against our left, and Spencer's division against our right, with all his

reserves of artillery, fought with fifteen thousand men, perfectly fresh and established in a firm position, against our seven or eight thousand soldiers who were thoroughly exhausted and entirely unprovided with artillery. After having torn our ranks with grape Lord Wellington ordered the entire mass of his infantry to charge them with the bayonet. Our troops were compelled to retreat, carrying in their arms many of their generals killed or wounded.

In the meantime Ney had, on his side, met with difficulties no less serious; for towards our right the sierra forming a curve to rejoin that of Caramula, it was impossible to climb it without being exposed to a terrible convergence of the enemy's fire. The division Loison marched first, followed at some distance by the division Marchand, in close column. A third division, that of Général Mermet, was held in reserve.

After a brisk conflict of sharpshooters, in which we had the advantage of skill but not of position, Marshal Ney threw his troops upon the position. Loison quitted the road, with his two brigades, and endeavoured to escalade the flank of the sierra, whilst Marchand continued to follow the road. With the utmost firmness and courage two brigades, those of Simon and Ferrey, succeeded, in spite of the murderous fire of the Portuguese, in reaching the summit of the mountain; when suddenly General Crawford's artillery overwhelmed them with grape, and they were at the same moment charged with the bayonet, before they had time to form, and were forced to retreat. At this moment the division Marchand arriving at the point where the division Loison had turned off from the road, found itself in the midst of a semi-circle of fire pouring upon it from all the heights, and in a position from which it could neither advance nor retreat.

In this posture of affairs Masséna, who, had he commanded but a simple division, would have probably renewed the attack, and possibly have triumphed over every obstacle, by means of his unequalled judgment, considered, in his character of General-in-Chief, that 4,500 men were sufficient to lose in an unsuccessful attack, and without despairing of dislodging the English, he resolved to make the attempt in a different manner. He assembled around him his lieutenants, and without addressing to them any reproaches, listened to them with that imperturbable *sang froid*, which never failed him in moments of difficulty. He made no attempt to excuse the result of the day by accusing his lieutenants, but contenting himself with repelling indignantly the idea of a retrograde movement, ordered them to rally their troops at the

foot of the sierra, to bring in their wounded, and hold themselves in readiness to march, and then retired to determine upon his next movements.

Considering it very unlikely that the English would descend from the heights to the plain; and convinced in his own mind, notwithstanding the information which he had received to the contrary, that there was some outlet towards the right, he sent General Montbrun and Colonel Sainte-Croix, an officer of distinguished merit, to employ the night, taking with them a party of dragoons, in searching for it. Having adopted this course of proceeding he awaited patiently the result of the investigations he had ordered.

At noon, on the day after the battle, the 28th of September, Masséna was informed by General Montbrun and Colonel Sainte-Croix, that they had discovered amidst the sinuosities of the hills, which united the two sierras, a road which extended into the plain of Coimbra, and joined the high road of Coimbra, near a place called Sardao. The English had remained stationary, and seemed as paralysed as though they had not been victorious. Masséna, without loss of time, ordered Junot to march off in silence in the evening along the road which had been discovered, and to take possession of the plain beyond. He arranged that Ney should follow Junot, that the baggage train now loaded with three thousand wounded, but lightened of the provisions which had been consumed, should follow Ney, and that Reynier's corps should form the rear.

It was not until the evening of the 29th that the English General perceived the movement of the French army. He had remained during two days without moving from his position, or endeavouring to discover the enemy's movements, by means of well-directed reconnaissances. He only discovered what they had been, when the helmets of the French dragoons filled the plain of Coimbra with their glitter. Victorious on the 27th, he was in a manner vanquished on the 29th, and whilst Coimbra was illuminated for the pretended victory of Busaco, he passed through it in all haste, forcing the inhabitants to quit it, and destroy what they did not carry away.

Such was, under Marshal Masséna, this first encounter between the French and English armies; with respect to which, it may be observed, that if Marshal Masséna failed to obtain on the day of the battle the result which he desired, he obtained it on the following day; and that it was a grave error on the part of the English General not to have perceived from the aspect of the country and the position of

the villages, that some communication must exist between the valley of Mondego and the plain of Coimbra by the depressed portion of the Alcoba and Caramula sierras.

When the French entered Coimbra, they found the greater part of the population fled, and all the wealthy inhabitants embarked with their most precious possessions, on board vessels which left their moorings to descend the Mondego to the sea.

In marching from the north to the south towards Lisbon, along that depressed chain which is the prolongation of the Estrella, as the Estrella is itself the prolongation of the Guadarrama, and which becoming continually more depressed, ends at last between the sea and the mouth of the Tagus; there are three routes which may be followed, the route of the Tagus, which is reached by traversing the chain of the heights between Pombal and Thomar and following the river from Abrantes to Santarem, from Santarem to Lisbon; the middle route running almost from the crest of the heights by Pombal, Leyria, Moliano, Candieros, and descending thus upon the bank of the Tagus—by Alcoentra and Alenquer; and lastly the route on the sea coast which passes by Alcobaca, Obidos and Torrès-Védras. Having arrived at Pombal the English General sent General Hill with his division towards Thomar, directing him not to lose an instant in reaching the Tagus, whilst he himself with the bulk of his army, took the two other routes, making all possible haste to escape from the energetic pursuit of our advanced guard.

Montbrun and the brave Sainte-Croix were on the track of the English, and Masséna, uncertain of the direction taken by the British troops, since he perceived their traces on all the three routes, chose the middle road which was the shortest, by no means the worst, and which, even if wrongly chosen, would lead but a comparatively short distance from the enemy.

On the 9th the advanced guard reached Alenquer, took some prisoners, and killed as many more. On the next day, it entered Villa Nova, which it found well furnished with all sorts of provisions, and pursued even to the heights of Alhandra the rear guards of the divisions of Generals Crawford and Hill, which disappeared behind entrenchments of formidable aspect.

On the 11th, the various divisions of the army reassembled, and took up a position in front of Alhandra and Sobral. On every side the heights were seen to be crowned with redoubts; our Generals had heard *en route* that the English had thrown up some works in front of

Lisbon, but they were ignorant of their nature, and far from supposing that they would be capable of opposing any considerable resistance to our attack; and it was a painful surprise for our army, which had arrived full of ardour and confidence, by no means dispirited by the affair of Busaco, but convinced on the contrary of its superiority over the English, to find the enemy which it pursued suddenly escaping, and enclosing itself within so formidable an asylum; but it was still far from losing its confidence, and only saw in this obstacle, a difficulty over which it would speedily triumph by its courage; but the obstacle thus so lightly esteemed presented more serious difficulties than were yet imagined.

We may here give some account of these famous lines of Torrès-Védras, of which we have above mentioned the object, the site, and the name. As has already been said, it was towards the month of October, in the preceding year, that Lord Wellington had taken care to secure for his army, in the extremity of the Peninsula, an entrenched position, almost impregnable, in which he might be able to resist the attack of the accumulated French forces, and assist that decay of the Imperial system, which, according to him, was at hand. The promontory formed by the depressed extremity of the Estrella, extending between the ocean and the waters of the Tagus, seemed to him to be the site best suited for his purpose. In the first place, the various lines of works by which he intended to isolate this promontory, being some leagues in front of Lisbon, he would be entirely independent of its numerous and fickle population. Lord Wellington habituated to the institutions of his country, which he was wise enough to love, although he often suffered from them, detested those popular agitations which attended the first appearance of liberty on the continent. A man of strong understanding, sternly advancing towards his object, and never hesitating to immolate to the success of his plans the people whose independence he had come to defend, he wished to be entirely independent of the population of Lisbon, so as to be relieved even from the anxiety of providing for their support. The following is the plan of the works which he had thrown up:—

At nine or ten leagues in advance of Lisbon, between Alhandra on the Tagus, and Torrès-Védras towards the ocean, he had taken care to create a first line of entrenchments, which would cut off the promontory at a dozen leagues at least from its extremity in the sea. This first line was composed of the following works. On the bend of the Tagus, the heights of the Alhandra, on one side, falling

perpendicularly to the river, and on the other rising even towards Sobral, formed over a space of four or five leagues escarpments that were almost inaccessible, and washed in all their extent by the little river Arruda. The road which passes between the foot of these heights and the Tagus, and which leads to Lisbon by the bank of the river, was cut off by lines of cannon. Ascending from this point as far as Sobral, the English had artificially escarped all the hills which were not naturally inaccessible. In the hollows formed by the bed of the ravines and presenting little accessible hills, they established such redoubts and *abattis* as entirely closed the passages. Finally, they had raised on the principal summits, forts armed with heavy artillery, crossing fire with each other, and commanding from afar all the avenues by which an enemy could approach. At Sobral itself, a platform which had little natural strength, was covered with a multitude of works of the greatest strength, and on an eminence called Monte-Agraça, had been constructed a veritable citadel, which could only be taken by means of a regular siege. Beyond these extended a new chain of heights, which stretched as far as the sea, and were washed by the Zizambro. This little river passed Torrès-Védras in its windings, whence the immortal lines of Torrès-Védras have received their name. There as on the side of Alhandra, the heights had been escarped, the gorges closed by abattis and redoubts, the summits crowned by forts; and the course of the Zizambro was, moreover, rendered almost impracticable by the construction in its bed of barricades which retained the water, and would preserve the marshes along its banks through every change of season.

The well stored arsenal of Lisbon had been emptied, to supply these various works with artillery, and all the oxen of the country employed in carrying the guns to their appointed positions. The garrisons were permanent and those of some of the works amounted to a thousand men. Large and easy roads had been provided between the various positions that reinforcements might be conducted to any of them with extreme rapidity. A system of signals, borrowed from the navy, rendered easy the transmission to the centre of the line, of precise information of all that might be taking place at its extremities. At its very entrance, that is to say, vis-a-vis with Sobral, was a sort of battle field, which had been prepared that the English army might be able to advance in its entirety upon the weakest point, and add its defence to the thousand fold fire of the surrounding works. The fortifications were, of course, garrisoned by Portuguese,

there being amongst them three thousand Portuguese artillerymen, who had had considerable training and were well skilled. The English army, with the better part of the Portuguese troops, was destined to occupy the principal encampments which had been skilfully disposed near the most probable points of attack.

General Hill had retired along the bank of the Tagus, and taken up a position behind the heights of Alhandra; General Crawford was established with his light division, between Alhandra and the plateau opposite Sobral; General Picton, who had followed the road on the coast, occupied the banks of the Zizambro, and the heights behind it, as far as Torrès-Védras; General Leith guarded the entrance of this immense entrenched camp, supported by the divisions of Spencer, Cole, and Campbell.

Lord Wellington having ordered the Marquis de la Romana to leave Badajoz, the defence of which was of less consequence than that of Torrès-Védras, and to join him at Lisbon, had brought about eight thousand Spaniards, who were excellently fitted for that system of defence which it was intended to commit to their charge. The English General had, therefore, thirty thousand English, over thirty thousand Portuguese, and eight thousand Spaniards, with whom to defend the position in which he had established himself.

Three or four leagues behind the first line of works was a second, and behind this second a third, which consisted of a semicircle of heights, escarped and bristling with cannon, inaccessible on the side of the land, and affording by its concavity turned towards the sea, a position in which the whole English fleet might lie in safety. In the case of the two first lines of defence having been carried, this last might have been held sufficiently long to have enabled the troops to embark and escape from a victorious enemy.

The works which we have described were on the right of the Tagus; a few had been executed on the left, but they were of slight importance in spite of the urgent remonstrances of the Portuguese regency; for it caused Lord Wellington but little solicitude that from the left bank Lisbon could be bombarded and destroyed. It had been proposed to construct upon this left bank an entrenched camp, to be defended by the populations of Alentejo; but Lord Wellington regarded them as incapable of defending themselves, and feared that the capture of that camp, which he could not doubt would take place, would have a depressing effect on the defenders of the lines of Torrès Védras.

Lord Wellington on being consulted by the English gov-

ernment respecting his position, at the very moment when he took up his position behind the lines, and respecting the possibility of withdrawing the transport flotilla, which cost the country more than 75 millions a year, replied that he considered himself in perfect security, but that it would be more prudent not to withdraw the flotilla, as the French army might be largely reinforced, and that should he be attacked by such soldiers under the leadership of Masséna, he could not be certain of the result.

Such was the unexpected obstacle by which Masséna found the progress of his army checked; and which, as soon as he had made the proper arrangements for the encampment of his army, he reconnoitred during several days with his own eyes. All the information that he could obtain was unanimously to the effect, that after this first line of entrenchments there were a second and a third, the three being armed with 700 pieces of cannon, and defended by 70,000 regular troops at the least, without taking into account the militia and fugitive peasants. It was not, therefore, a simple entrenched camp, to be carried by a bold assault, but a series of natural obstacles, the difficulties of which had been extraordinarily increased by art; and whilst the English, moreover, by means of the roads which they had constructed and the system of signals they had established, were enabled to throw the entire mass of their forces on any one point, the French met, on their side, with an accidental formation of the ground which would preclude them from any manœuvre of this kind.

Everything being taken into consideration it appeared impossible, at least for the moment, to attack the position. Masséna perceived that it was by no means probable that an assault would be successful, and that a repulse must be attended with certain loss. He was far from having now the 50,000 men with which he had entered Portugal; indeed his army did not number more than 45,000 effective combatants. To take the lines would have required 90 or 100,000 men, and had Masséna attacked them with his 45,000, he would have uselessly sacrificed 10,000 in dead and wounded, and have been compelled to retreat before an enemy emboldened by success, through the midst of infuriated populations and a desolated country. It is probable that he would not have regained Almeida without the loss of his whole army, and his campaign would have ended in utter disaster.

Masséna could not hesitate, therefore, to renounce any immediate attack on the lines of Torrès Védras. But it did not follow because the attack was not immediate that it would not, nevertheless, take place; and it was, moreover, very

possible that the immense population of Lisbon becoming, in the course of time, subdued by famine, would open to our troops the gates of the city on the left bank of the Tagus, whereupon the lines of Torrès-Védras would, as a necessary consequence, speedily fall into our hands. Favourable chances would, therefore, be open to us by our remaining in front of the English lines; but it was necessary that whilst we strove to famish others we should provide for our own subsistence, and for this purpose it was indispensable that we should occupy both banks of the Tagus, in order to withhold from the enemy, whilst we procured them for ourselves, all the resources of the fertile province of Alentejo.

After a series of skilful and energetic manœuvres, which had for their aim the subsistence of his troops, and the preparations of means for enabling them to cross the Tagus either above or below Abrantès, Masséna fell back some leagues and established himself along the Tagus, from Santarem to Thomar, with a division at Leyria to watch the Estrella, and to guard the great road of Coimbra. This new position between Santarem and Thomar was calculated, by placing us at some leagues distance from the English lines, to afford us greater ease and security, whilst it by no means diminished our power to blockade them rigorously, at least on the right bank of the Tagus. We were thus relieved from the fatigue of having to engage in perpetual small skirmishes, and the distance between us prevented any serious attack from the enemy in the nature of a surprise.

On the 14th of November the change to the new encampment was speedily and skilfully accomplished. Reynier's division was established on the heights of Santarem; and Junot's encamped in the centre of the plain of Galgao, at Torrès Novas. Ney established his head quarters at Thomar, having his divisions so arranged as to cover the timber yards of Punhète, to threaten Abrantès, and to be able to throw himself upon Leyria, by a movement from left to right, should Wellington endeavour to turn us.

This position was impregnable, and at the same time adapted to the various objects Masséna had in view, and which were the passage of the Tagus, the capture of Abrantès, and the blockade of the English lines, until the arrival of reinforcements. Marshal Ney habitually discontented with the orders which issued from head quarters, had desired that the whole should be collected between Leyria and Coimbra. He regarded the movement which had taken place as a sort of retreat, as the abandonment of the banks of the Tagus, and the renunciation of affecting a passage across it, as also of the projects against Abrantès, without procuring any

additional security, or any greater chances of communication with Almeida; and declared that had we, on the other hand, kept only the cavalry and a brigade of infantry at Leyria, we should have been certain of regaining the Coimbra and Almeida roads at pleasure, without the renunciation of any essential object; moreover, that by having the posts upon the Zèzere, we should have been in a position to communicate with the Spanish frontier, by a route less infested with the guerilla bands.

Whilst the army awaited reinforcements which were expected by the way of Almeida, or from Andalusia by that of Badajoz, it employed itself in making the preparations necessary for the passage of the Tagus and the attack of Abrantès. In the meantime Masséna had hastened to take measures for making known at Paris his position and its necessities. For this purpose he had sent to Paris an intelligent and brave officer, accompanied by a little body of troops, since it was only by being so attended that he could hope to reach the Spanish frontier. He had chosen for this mission General Foy, a man of frank, attractive manners, possessing great powers of expression, and decorated with a wound received at Busaco. To him he confided the task of detailing to Napoleon the operations of the army, from its departure from Almeida to its encampment at Santarem. Independently of the despatches with which he furnished him, he instructed him to explain every thing verbally to the Emperor, to urge the immediate transmission of stores and reinforcements, as the means of putting a speedy termination to the war, whilst their non-arrival would be the source of the utmost disasters.

The two brilliant soldiers whom fate had now brought face to face at the extremity of Portugal, could not have pursued any wiser line of conduct, than that which they did, in fact, adopt; the one could not have desired any better means for the defence of that extremity of Portugal which alone remained to him of the Peninsula, and the other made those preparations for attacking his position, which were the best possible. On this extreme promontory rested the fate of the nations of Europe, for had the English been once expelled from Portugal, the universal tendency of affairs throughout Europe would have been towards peace, and on the other hand, were they once firmly established in this country, and Masséna compelled to retreat, the fortunes of the Empire would begin to succumb to those of Great Britain, as the first, perhaps, towards some immediate catastrophe; the crisis was, therefore, of the most serious nature, but its event

depended less on the two generals charged with its decision, than on the two governments whose duty it was to supply them with the means of doing so; the one of these countries being agitated by the spirit of party, and the other governed by a master whom prosperity had blinded.

Marshal Masséna's position was sufficiently serious, but that of Lord Wellington, on the other hand, was not without its own embarrassments; whilst the French General considered it difficult to carry the lines of Torrès-Védras, the English General considered that it would be difficult to defend them, if the French took the course naturally pointed out by the nature of attending circumstances. For Lord Wellington was threatened by two dangers; the first being the possible concentration of the French forces towards Lisbon to overwhelm him; and the second, that the English government, divided in its counsels, as every free government must be, on the consideration of an important question, should recall him from Portugal, or take those measures which would render his longer stay there impossible. These two dangers, each of them alike serious, although they were not alike probable, presented themselves so forcibly to the mind of the English General as to seriously disquiet it, steadfast as it was.

He had sufficient reason to dread the concentration of the French forces in front of Lisbon; there were many reports respecting the arrival of the famous divisions of Essling, and there was yet a more serious cause for apprehension in the withdrawal towards Lisbon, of the French troops in Andalusia, which, either partially or in mass, could join Marshal Masséna's army, by the left bank of the Tagus, thus securing to him the possession of both banks, and enabling him to attack the lines of Torrès-Védras, with formidable forces. This was the principal source of anxiety to the English General, and he entreated the Spanish regency to give the French all the occupation possible before Cadiz, to destroy the bridges of the Guadiana, and to render Elvas, Campo Mayo, and Badajoz, fortresses of such importance that they would not dare to neglect them to pass on to the siege of Lisbon. He was also anxious to devastate the province of Alentejo, that the French, should they invade it, might find it impossible to find subsistence there. But the Portuguese regency refused to comply with this demand, saying with some bitterness, that it would be better to combat the French with arms than famine, and better to deliver Portugal than to ruin it.

But the English General was not to be moved from his resolution, of risking no battle with the French, although the difficulty of procuring subsistence for his troops rendered

persistence in his plan a matter of considerable difficulty. In the meantime, there was considerable murmuring in the English army, notwithstanding its high state of discipline, and esteem for its General, at the hardships it endured and its state of inactivity. Many officers sent home letters full of bitter complaints, which contributed to increase the anxiety which prevailed throughout England respecting the fate of the British army.

In London few persons, even amidst the members of the government, believed in the possibility of maintaining a footing in Portugal; and an unfortunate event which took place in England at this time, increased the difficulties which had previously attended the position of the ministry, and consequently aggravated those which surrounded Lord Wellington himself.

The English monarch George III. suffered a relapse in his health, and was a second time subject to mental alienation. It was at first hoped that the attack might be but temporary, and a month was permitted to elapse before the proposal to Parliament of those measures which such a defect in the royal authority demanded. Both the Parliament and the public concurred in this course on account of their respect for George III., and their estrangement from the Prince of Wales, on whom the royal authority would devolve in the character of Regent. After having waited, however, as long as possible, it was at length necessary to address Parliament, and to ask it to bestow the Regency on the Prince of Wales. The Prince was the friend of all the heads of the opposition, and no doubt was entertained that he would bestow on them the ministerial offices. Mr. Pitt's party, therefore, which was the war party, made every endeavour to restrict the powers of the Regent, whilst the opposition made every endeavour to extend them. In accordance with that species of inconsistency which is frequently to be met with amidst political parties, it was the opposition which professed the most monarchical sentiments, and the government which maintained those which were least so. The opposition maintained that no law could be passed, since that concurrence of the three powers of the state which was necessary to the passing of a law was here impossible; and that, therefore, the Houses of Parliament should request the Prince of Wales to assume the royal authority, which accrued to him as of right during the incapacity of his august father, in all that entirety which was necessary for the preservation of the balance of the powers of the constitution. The ministry maintained, on the other hand, that the royal sanction could be supplied by an order of Parliament directing the keepers

of the Royal Seal to affix it to the bill; and that the authority of the Regent, which would be, it was hoped, but temporary, should not be as complete as though it were permanent; and that it would be inconvenient to give him the power of so far altering the state of affairs, that the King on regaining his health would find it impossible to resume the policy of his reign. The majority decided on bestowing by bill the regency on the Prince of Wales, with certain limitations. It was expected that the Regent would nominate to the offices of his ministry Lord Holland, Lord Grey, and Lord Grenville, all of Mr. Fox's party. But although he was personally averse to the existing ministers, especially Mr. Percival, he feared to effect so considerable a change, and one which would have involved the exchange of a war policy for that of peace. He wished to know, before taking any decided measures, whether the King's illness would be of sufficient duration to enable him to effect any important change in the state policy. With this view he had consulted the medical men, and imparted his doubts to Lords Holland, Grey, and Grenville.

This crisis in the domestic affairs in England took place in December, 1810, at the very time when Marshal Masséna and Lord Wellington were encamped opposite each other at the lines of Torrès-Védras. The opposition, perceiving that even a partial success would decide the Prince Regent, redoubled its attacks on the Cabinet; taking advantage not only of the incessant anxieties of the war, and the enormous expenses resulting from it, but also of the sufferings arising from a serious and extraordinary commercial crisis, which was the result of the measures taken by Napoleon, and certain peculiar circumstances. The Spanish colonies having refused to recognize the authority of Joseph, and taken advantage of the occasion to declare themselves independent, had opened their ports to British commerce. On receiving information of this the English manufacturers, with that blindness which is equally the attendant of avarice and ambition, had manufactured quantities of goods which far exceeded what all the Americans could either consume or pay for. They had sent immense quantities of merchandize to the Spanish colonies, and a part of this merchandize had returned unsold. That which had found purchasers had been paid for in colonial produce, which had added to the already encumbered state of the London warehouses. In fact the amount of unsold exotic produce had grown to that extent, that many cargoes of sugar, coffee, cotton, tobacco, wood, and indigo, were not of sufficient value to defray the expense of warehousing; the bills drawn on their value were for the

most part protested; and the necessary consequence was that the exchange on England suffered a still further depreciation.

It may be easily imagined how eagerly the opposition would avail itself of these circumstances. "See!" cried they, "how contrary to all reason this prolonged war has been conducted. By attempting to humiliate France we have urged it on to still increasing greatness and dominion over Europe, and given into her hands a part of Germany, together with Italy, Spain, and Holland; if we continue to act as we have hitherto acted, who can tell what will be the limit to her power? Our revenue," they added, "amounts to 37 millions stirling, and we expend yearly 56; a state of things which necessitates an annual loan of 19 millions. It is impossible to borrow such a sum every year without incurring actual ruin, and in the meantime the weight both of our direct and indirect taxation has reached its utmost limit. Besides this, the continually increasing mass of paper money will speedily render it equally impossible for us to carry on either commerce or war. Let us then put an end to this disastrous war by an honorable peace. The victories in which we rejoice are but decoys, and however well the British army may be manœuvred, its situation fills all patriots with alarm. Whilst we reward and decorate its generals, it suffers us to lose the important fortresses, Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; and after having on one day repulsed the enemy at Busaco, it permits him to seize on the next Coimbra and the rest of Portugal. Confined now to a tongue of land where its only source of maintenance can be what it receives by sea, and where it is exposed to an attack from the French, who will be very ill advised if they do not assemble the whole of their forces to overwhelm it, it exists but by a miracle, and may at any moment fall beneath some catastrophe. What will become of England if this army, in which lies our only hope against invasion, at length succumbs, or signs some capitulation, which shall constitute its troops prisoners of war? What political advantages, what territorial acquisitions can be placed in the balance, with such risk?" Such was the language constantly in the mouths of the opposition, and the temper of the nation was such, that any day some unexpected vote might induce the Prince Regent to change his ministers, and to substitute a peace policy for that of war.

The ministry, trembling beneath the pressure of the nation's fears, continually sent to Lord Wellington despatches breathing apprehension in every line; and also filled with complaints of the excessive expenses of the war. These

despatches were received by the English General with an intense scorn, to which, however, he gave but partial expression, complaining that his experience of two years' warfare, face to face with the French, in the Peninsula, should not have inspired more confidence; and declaring that on the appearance of any serious danger, he would not hesitate to retreat rather than compromise the British army and his own glory.

Such were the difficulties thrown in the path of a firm and able General by a free country, amidst whose people the longing for peace, and the desire for the continuance of the war, were almost equal and were continually opposed. It might have been expected that Marshal Masséna, on the other hand, having only to do with a man of genius, with Napoleon himself, would have readily obtained every kind of assistance necessary to enable him to solve that military problem, in the solution of which was involved the destiny of the world. In the course of the following book, we shall perceive how far this was really the case.

General Foy, sent from Santarem to make known at Paris the requirements of the General Commanding-in-Chief, and to reply by word of mouth to all the Emperor's questions, performed his perilous journey, at the most favourable moment. Accompanied by four hundred picked men, he set off by the route which lies along the valley of Zezère, and after a journey of six or seven days passed amidst dangers of all kinds, arrived in safety at Ciudad Rodrigo.

General Foy continued his journey through Old Castille, now desolated by the guerillas, whose boldness increased every day, and found the Spaniards as full of confidence as the French were discouraged, at the length to which the war was protracted, in spite of the numerous reinforcements which had arrived, and at finding the only result of the Andalusian expedition to have been the capture of Seville, whilst the only fruit of the campaign of Portugal had been a march to the Tagus. He found that General Drouet had but one of his two divisions at Burgos, and was awaiting the second; and that General Dorsenne had the greatest difficulty with fifteen or eighteen thousand men, in protecting the road from Burgos to Valladolid. He urged General Drouet to proceed towards Coimbra and Thomar, and then continued on his road to Paris, which he reached towards the latter end of November, about twenty days after his departure from the banks of the Tagus. Immediately after his arrival he obtained an audience of the Emperor.

BOOK XI.

FUENTÈS D'ONORO.

TENDENCY of Napoleon's ideas at the period of General Foy's arrival in Paris—His interviews with the latter—Necessity for the despatch of a reinforcement of sixty or eighty thousand men to Spain, and the impossibility of sending so many—Napoleon's last encroachments on the coast of the North Sea—Annexation to the Empire of the Hanse Towns, of a part of Hanover, and the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg—The Emperor Alexander's displeasure on hearing that his uncle had been deprived of the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg—Instead of conciliating the Emperor Alexander, Napoleon insists, with threats, on his compliance with his commercial regulations—The Czar resists, and whilst being undesirous of war, prepares for it by ordering the construction of some works on the Dwina and the Dnieper—Napoleon, informed of the course of affairs in St. Petersburg, hastens to make preparations for war whilst Russia, being fully occupied in the East, may be unable to reply to his armaments by immediate hostilities—First idea of a great war in the North—Immense preparations made by Napoleon—Unwilling to diminish the forces under his own command by sending reinforcements to the Peninsula, he contents himself with ordering Generals Dorsenne and Drouet and Marshal Soult to proceed to the assistance of Masséna—Napoleon's illusions respecting the efficacy of this aid—General Foy returns to the army in Portugal—Protracted encampment of this army on the Tagus—Its industry and sobriety—Excellent temper of the troops, and despondency of the Generals—Firm attitude assumed by Masséna—General Drouet traverses the province of Beira and arrives at Leiria—Delight of the army at the appearance of General Drouet's corps—Abatement of this delight when it is discovered that this reinforcement amounts only to seven thousand men—The Generals assemble at Golgao to consult respecting the execution of the orders sent from Paris, and resolve to remain on the Tagus, and to attempt to cross it for the purpose of obtaining the resources of Alentejo—General Eblé's admirable efforts to create means for crossing the river—Events in Spain during the period of the encampment on the Tagus—Results of the sieges conducted by General Suchet in Aragon and Catalonia—Tortosa invested at the close of 1810, and captured in January 1811—Preparations for the siege of Tarragonia—Events in Andalusia—Dispersion of the army of Andalusia amidst the provinces of Grenada, Andalusia, and Estremadura—Embarrassments of the 4th corps compelled to contend at the same time with the insurgents of Murcia, and those of the mountains of Ronda—Efforts made by the 1st corps with

a view to the commencement of the siege of Cadiz—Operations of the 5th corps in Estremadura—Marshal Soult demands a reinforcement of 25,000 men—The order to advance to the assistance of Masséna having arrived in the meanwhile, he positively refuses compliance with it—Instead of marching upon the Tagus he undertakes the siege of Badajoz—Battle of Gevara—Destruction of the Spanish army which endeavoured to raise the siege of Badajoz—Distress suffered by the army of Portugal during the siege of Badajoz—Masséna is at length compelled to retreat upon Mondégo, in order to establish himself at Coimbra—The retreat commences on the 4th March, 1811—Successful march of the army, and pursuit of the English—Masséna desires to make a pause of two days at Pombal, for the purpose of giving his sick and wounded and the baggage time to escape—Unfortunate quarrel with General Drouet—Marshal Ney's fears for the safety of his corps, and his disputes with Masséna on this subject—His retreat upon Redinha—Marshal Ney precipitately evacuates Cordeixa, whereby the whole army is compelled to fall back upon the road of Ponte-Murcelha, and to renounce the idea of establishing itself at Coimbra—Retreat upon the sierra of Murcelha—A false movement of General Reynier compels the army to re-enter definitively Old Castille—Appearance of the army on its return to Spain—Masséna's obstinate determination to recommence offensive operations immediately, and to return to the Tagus by Alcantara—Marshal Ney's refusal of obedience—Masséna sends Ney to the rear of the army—Difficulties which prevent Masséna from executing his project of returning to the Tagus—His army in a frightful state of destitution—Empty promises of Marshal Bessiéres, the commander-in-chief of the provinces of the North—Advantageous position of Lord Wellington after the retreat of the French, and triumph of the war party in the British Parliament—Lord Wellington leaves a portion of his army before Almeida, and sends the remainder to raise the siege of Badajoz—The capture of Badajoz by Marshal Soult—Marshal Soult proceeds to Cadiz after the capture of Badajoz for the purpose of supporting Marshal Victor—Marshal Soult demands, in vain, aid of the army of Portugal—The English invest Badajoz—Plan formed by Masséna during this period—Although very ill-supported by the army of Andalusia, he conceives that it would be excellent policy to throw himself upon the English who blockade Almeida—He begins to put this project into execution on the 2nd of May, instead of on the 24th of April as originally proposed—In consequence of this delay Lord Wellington has time to return to Estremadura to put himself at the head of his army—The battle of Fuentès d'Onoro on the 3rd and 5th of May—Masséna's energy during this memorable battle—Daring escape of the garrison of Almeida—Masséna re-enters Old Castille—The battle of Albuera—Great loss suffered on each side, and continuance of the siege of Badajoz—Noble defence made by the garrison—Difficult position of the French in Spain—The circumstances which rendered fruitless their efforts during the campaigns of 1810 and 1811, and decided the fate of Spain and of Europe—Errors of Napoleon and his lieutenants—Masséna unjustly disgraced.

BOOK XL.

General Foy, since so celebrated as an orator, united to great bravery, an exalted mind, and brilliant but too often ill-regulated imagination, which shone in lines of fire from his strongly marked and open countenance. The General and Napoleon were mutually charmed. The information thus received was the only news which had been received of the army of Portugal; those interested having hitherto been reduced to search for it in the English journals. General Foy found Napoleon perfectly convinced of the question which was about to be decided on the Tagus, for no one had so thorough a comprehension of the general situation, and he was persuaded that to vanquish the English, or even to hold them in check for some time before Lisbon, was the surest means of obtaining peace for Europe. But General Foy found him still full of illusions respecting the circumstances of the Peninsular War, and still unjust towards Masséna, whom he preferred to blame for not having performed the impossible, to blaming himself for having ordered it; and still persisting in considering the French army as consisting of seventy thousand men, and the English of only twenty-four thousand. After having incessantly ordered engagements with the enemy, he now blamed the attack at Busaco; and he who had desired that the English should be thrust into the sea, now complained that a halt had not been made at Coimbra. And the difficulty was not how to convince him of his error on these points, so much as how to persuade him to admit the truths which were opposed to his calculations.

General Foy maintained that those movements which had been condemned, had been forced on Masséna by circumstances; that the attack of Busaco was necessary to the honour of the French arms, and had not an altogether unfavourable result; that to have halted at Coimbra would have been a most calamitous confession of weakness; and that all would still be well, if, in accordance with the lessons of past experience, the means employed were henceforward in pro-

portion to the end in view. Napoleon did not take leave of the General, without learning to a great extent, what was the true state of affairs, and being well aware what steps it was necessary to take.

Having now become acquainted with Masséna's true position, he resolved to send in his direction all the disposable troops of Old Castille, and he prepared the most formal orders for the Generals to concur in the conveyance of troops in the direction of Portugal. The moment was a suitable one for the sacrifice of secondary objects, to the grand one of succouring Masséna, had not Napoleon unfortunately, during the progress in the Peninsula of the events above related, given serious provocation in the north, and excited a serious crisis of affairs by that exorbitant ambition which tyrannised over him, as he tyrannised over Europe.

We have seen how, on the termination of the campaign of Wagram, he desired to render Austria his sincere ally, to appease Germany, to distribute all the territories which yet remained in his hands, in order to be able to evacuate the countries beyond the Rhine, to devote his whole attention to the prosecution of the Spanish war, and to force England to make peace by the twofold means of the continental blockade, and the infliction of a great reverse on the army of Lord Wellington; and how, notwithstanding these pacific intentions, he had, for the purpose of rendering more effectual the continental blockade, annexed Holland to the Empire, extended his military posts upon the coasts of the north sea, as far as the frontier of Holstein, devised a vast scheme of taxation of colonial merchandize, which was a source of great gain to him and his allies, but extremely vexatious to the various populations, and had ordered some governments, and recommended others, to adopt its almost intolerable provisions. Already, as was inevitable, this policy, of which peace was the aim, but the instruments of which were military occupations, usurpations of territory, violent confiscations, and ruinous exactions, had aroused all that distrust which Napoleon had desired to dissipate. To convert indeed into French departments, not only Rome, Florence, le Valais, but also Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Groningnen, was not the best method of reassuring those who believed that it was Napoleon's intention to subject the whole continent to his rule. Nor had Napoleon stopped at this point; for he had already entertained the idea that the extension of the territory of the Empire, which was already carried as far as the Ems, by the annexation of Holland, to the Weser and the Elbe, by the annexation of Bremen, Hambourg and Lubeck, would be exceedingly advantageous; since he would thus

envelop in the vast extent of his coasts those seas from whose bosom Great Britain rose. What difficulties opposed the execution of this design? The Hanse Towns were in his power; Hanover, of which it would be necessary to take a certain portion, belonged to his brother Jerome, and the possessions of certain German princes, which the fulfilment of this plan would absorb, were as much at his disposal as those of any French subject. The Prince of Oldenburg, uncle to the Emperor of Russia, might be compensated for his territories which lay between Friesland and Hanover, the mouths of the Ems and those of the Weser, by the grant of Erfurt, which still remained in Napoleon's hands. As for the portion which would be required of the Duchy of Berg, lately granted to the young son of Louis as a compensation for the crown of Holland, that would be a matter for family arrangement, and need be no cause for anxiety. Napoleon had no sooner entertained the idea of this plan than he hastened to put it into execution.

By a decree of the 13th December, 1810, Napoleon converted into three French departments, the Duchy of Oldenburg, the territory of the Princes of Salm and Arenberg, a portion of Hanover, the territories of Brêmen, of Hambourg, and of Lubeck, and at the same time took possession of Valais, which he converted into a French department by the name of the department of the Simplon. A simple intimation of the above facts were addressed to the dispossessed Princes; the Prince of Oldenburg being informed, however, that out of regard for the Emperor of Russia he had been recompensed by the grant of the city of Erfurt. Napoleon felt strongly tempted to add to the above acquisitions the principalities of Mecklenburg, which would have given him an ample extent of coast upon the Baltic, and placed Swedish Pomerania in his power; but he dared not, as yet, take so extreme a step. He contented himself with demanding of the princes of Mecklenburg assistance in the execution of his plans against England, under penalty of annexing their states to the Empire.

Russia,—treated most cavalierly on the occasion of the Austrian marriage, offended and alarmed by the refusal to sign the convention relative to Poland, very exactly informed of the gradual augmentation of the garrison of Dantzig, and filled with consternation at beholding the French frontier successively extending over Holland, Hanover, Denmark, touching Sweden, and thus approaching Memel and Riga, was deeply offended at the informal and rude manner in which a kinsman was treated, in whose welfare it had always displayed considerable interest.

The neglect of his decrees relating to false neutrals and colonial merchandize, had occasioned Napoleon to address Russia in language of considerable bitterness, and it was simply as an addition to some of these reproaches that Napoleon briefly announced at St. Petersburg, the annexation of Oldenburg to the Empire, and the confiscation of Erfurt, which had been granted, he declared, out of regard for the Emperor Alexander.

These disquieting and offensive proceedings, accompanied as they were by language so little calculated to extenuate them, and following the disdainful rejection of a matrimonial alliance, which was at first eagerly sought, as well as the just but peremptory refusal of any satisfactory engagement with regard to Poland, profoundly affected the Emperor Alexander, and proved that with Napoleon there was but a short interval between estrangement and actual warfare. The Emperor Alexander was not inclined to pass over this interval quite so rapidly, having sufficient reasons to avoid, or at least to delay, a war, which to avoid seemed now almost impossible. Great as was his reliance on his resources, he was by no means anxious to tempt once more the dangers he had incurred at Eylan and in Friedland. He was, moreover, the originator of the policy of forming an alliance with Napoleon, which had occasioned bitter criticisms, and it was painful to him to give his censors a triumph by so speedily deserting that policy for war. But if he were reduced to this extremity, he was anxious not to break off the alliance before it should have produced the fruits he had expected from it, and to obtain which was the only means of disarming the harsh judgments passed against him. Finland was gained but the Danubian provinces were not, and he desired to have them in his possession before exposing himself to the terrible chances of a war with France. The campaign of 1810 against the Turks had been successful, although the progress of the Russian Generals had been very slow. The Turks had not as yet, however, definitively lost the line of the Danube, and a much greater degree of success would be necessary to wring from them the great sacrifices of territory which Russia demanded, and which extended not only over Moldavia, but also Wallachia, reaching to the bed of the old Danube, and which stretched from Rassova to Kustendjé, besides the sovereignty of Servia, a portion of territory along the Caucasus, and the payment of the expenses of the war. To obtain such concessions as these from the Porte at least one more campaign was necessary, and that of a very prosperous nature.

The Emperor Alexander, therefore, was by no means

desirous of a war with France, and was especially anxious, should it indeed be inevitable, to defer it. But there were certain sacrifices, namely, those relating to commerce, to which he was fully resolved not to submit. He was reconciled to those which had necessarily resulted from war with England, because they were the price of that alliance with France, which was a necessary condition to the attainment of those two great conquests at which he aimed, of Finland in the north and the Danubian provinces in the south. But he was most unwilling to deprive his subjects, already deprived of all commerce with England, of the commerce which was still carried on by means of the Swedes and the Americans. He had, indeed, as a token of his strict observance of his treaties with Napoleon established a tribunal charged with the duty of condemning those American vessels which had, too manifestly, not come from America, and those Swedish ones which carried in too open a manner English merchandize. But whilst he was willing that Russian commerce should be limited and cramped for a time, it was far from his intention to suffer it to be destroyed. He would yield so far as was necessary to preserve him from a rupture with France until, at least, the war with Turkey should have been brought to a conclusion; but he would choose war rather than suppress the commerce of his kingdom.

Fearing, however, that the greatest precautions might not suffice to prevent a quarrel with one of so obstinate a disposition as Napoleon, he resolved to take some military precautions which should be efficacious whilst entirely free from any appearance of menace. Being desirous of making no movement in the neighbourhood of the Polish frontier, which was in some sort the French frontier also, he abandoned the line of the Niémen, and selected a line of defence further back, on the Dwina and the Dnieper, rivers which after rising at no great distance from each other, trace, as they flow, the former towards the Baltic and the latter to the Black Sea, that which is the true defensive line of the Russian interior. Before so impetuous an opponent as Napoleon it would be necessary to place the point of resistance within the empire. Alexander, employing himself in the company of experienced men, in the consideration of military details, ordered the construction of fortifications at Riga, Dunaberg, Vitepsk, Smolensk, and, above all, at Bobruisk, a place situated in the midst of the marshes bordering on the river Bérésina. In addition to these defensive works, which ought not, he maintained, to be considered as of any more threatening nature than those which Napoleon had erected at Dantzig, Modlin, and Torgau, he took some measures

with respect to the organisation of his troops. There had remained in Finland, since the war with Sweden, a certain number of regiments belonging to the divisions ordinarily stationed in Lithuania. He replaced these regiments in Lithuania, and employed himself, moreover, in placing on a war footing all those divisions which were stationed on the frontiers of Poland, and had remained for the most part in the same cantonments since the peace of Tilsit.

Having taken these measures Alexander was careful to adapt his language to his policy. He resolved to enter into explanations with M. de Coulaincourt on all those subjects which Napoleon had made grounds of complaint, with great gentleness, and at the same time with that firmness which should show that he was well informed respecting the Emperor's own proceedings, and that whilst he was by no means desirous of war, he would choose it in preference to making sacrifices to which he had determined never to submit.

He had displayed some coldness towards M. de Coulaincourt since the failure of the marriage negotiation, and the rejection of the convention relative to Poland, but in a manner which showed that it was directed against the French government and not against M. de Coulaincourt himself. He knew that M. de Coulaincourt, finding his position a difficult one, had demanded and obtained his recall, and being unwilling to send away discontented a man whom he had esteemed and loved, and also being desirous of giving to his language that amicable character which was wanting to his actions, he had affected to restore the French ambassador to all that favour he had formerly enjoyed at St. Petersburg, and held with him frequent and long conversations; the Emperor's own share in which generally consisted of gentle complaints, that Napoleon had not acted in accordance with the spirit of the alliance with himself.

The occupation of Oldenburg, he said, insisting more especially on this point, had touched him nearly, apart from any personal feelings, on account of the deplorable effect it had produced on his court and people. As for compensation in the shape of Erfurt, its acceptance, he declared, could only cover him with ridicule; and indeed, whilst he refused that he asked nothing else, for Napoleon had nothing to offer him but what he must first have torn from some poor innocent German Prince, and he was unwilling to place himself in a position to be accused of taking part in those violent confiscations which had so greatly disgusted, during the last twenty years, the moral sentiment of Europe.* Of course, he continued, it was unnecessary to say that he should not de-

clare war on account of the Duchy of Oldenburg, but he wished it to be understood that its seizure had wounded and even afflicted him, and that he earnestly hoped, whilst he neither demanded it, nor intended to do so, that some reparation would be made which would satisfy the offended dignity of the Russian nation.

Speaking of Napoleon's anger at the imperfect enforcement in Russia of those additional commercial restrictions on which he laid so much stress, the Emperor Alexander would exclaim :—By what right does Napoleon demand of Russia these sacrifices? Does he demand them in the name of treaties? Russia has faithfully executed that of Tilsit. She undertook at Tilsit to make war with England, and without expecting to derive any benefit from it for herself, she has done so, and proscribed the English flag. But are those decrees by which Napoleon has been pleased to declare denationalized all vessels that shall have touched at England, obligatory upon Russia? Must an alliance between the two countries necessarily infer that they are under the government of the same sovereign? And was Russia bound blindly to adopt Napoleon's measures, when he himself had contradicted his own decrees by adopting the system of licenses, by which any ship was enabled to enter the English ports, and, under certain conditions, to return from them loaded with British goods? And whilst France knew not how to bear, in a cause which was her own, the privations resulting from the continental blockade, were other nations to make unexampled sacrifices for the sake of a cause which was but very indirectly their own? It is impossible justly to reproach me with having been unfaithful to the alliance. I am, on the contrary, anxious to maintain it. It has worked me both good and ill, but having once entered into it, both my dignity and my interest demand that I should continue true to it. I acknowledge that it has already gained me Finland, and will most probably be the means of my obtaining possession of Moldavia and Wallachia; but these acquisitions are far from being equal to Spain, the Roman States, Tuscany, Westphalia, Holland, and the Hanse Towns. Nevertheless, without making any comparison of the advantages which it has brought to the one and the other of us, I wish that it should still exist between us, and obtain for us that peace with England which will assure to us the peaceable possession of all our acquisitions. Let us remain united in a firm bond of concord, mutually excusing necessary and inevitable actions, and carefully abstaining from dissensions which would be speedily noised abroad, to the great injury of the alliance and diminution of the chance of a general peace.

For my part, I know very well what is being done at Dantzig, and I know what the Poles say; but I will take no step in that direction; if we are to direct our cannon against each other, the first shots shall come from you. In that case I will appeal to God and my people and all Europe to judge between us, and I and my whole nation would rather perish sword in hand than submit to an unjust yoke. However great may be Napoleon's genius, however valiant his soldiers, the justice of our cause, the energy of the Russian people, the immensity of the distances to be traversed, all concur to give us the most favourable chance in a war which on our side will be a defensive one.

Each time that Alexander indulged, and he very often did so, in this course of observations, he spoke with an accent of truth, and with mingled grace, gentleness, and force. He touched and confused M. de Coulaincourt, who knew not how to reply to reasoning which was partly true and wholly plausible.

For my own part, as a sincere historian, loving my country better than anything else in the world, but unable to sacrifice truth for its sake, I must declare that, after having perused all the documents relating to the subject, my decided impression is, that the Emperor Alexander was sincerely averse to war. Whilst distrust of Napoleon's character impelled him to prepare for it, he would have done anything to avoid it, for besides the great dangers with which it threatened him, it would be a condemnation of his policy, an avowal that he had committed an error in adopting the French alliance at Tilsit, and compel him to renounce Wallachia and Moldavia.

Such was the disposition of the Russian court at the time when territorial aggressions had carried the French frontier as far as Lubeck, and Napoleon put forth his new demands relative to the observance of the continental blockade. M. de Coulaincourt sent a perfectly true account of the state of affairs to Paris, and expressed his own opinion that the Czar was far from being desirous of war. He was silent only because ignorant of them, respecting the military preparations which Alexander's distrust of Napoleon had induced him to make, but these had been speedily perceived, and loudly announced, by the Poles of the army, and the grand Duchy.

Napoleon on learning from M. de Coulaincourt the replies made by the Emperor Alexander to his remonstrances respecting the ill observance of the continental blockade, was much displeased with the Ambassador, declaring that the arguments used by him in his discussions with the Russian

Emperor had been extremely weak. But when he heard of the works constructed on the Dwina, and the Dnieper, and the movements of the troops of Finland in Lithuania, he saw in those simple precautions of the Russian Emperor both the declaration and the commencement of war. That which he demanded of Russia was not indispensable to the success of his designs, but he was accustomed to command as absolute master, and irritated at meeting with opposition on the part of a power which he had vanquished although not destroyed, he determined to give it another and a final lesson. He suddenly gave himself up to the idea that by striking one of those terrible blows in the north, which he knew so well how to strike, he should attain the solution of all his difficulties, and found himself regarding a new war with Russia as a matter fully determined on, without being at all conscious of the day or the hour when his resolution had been first formed.

This idea having once taken hold of his mind, he took the measures necessary to its realization with incredible promptitude; and indeed, having determined to reduce Russia to as absolute a state of submission as Prussia and Austria, he had certainly good reason to take his measures as speedily as possible and before she was free from the war with Turkey.

The chief difficulty to be overcome in a war with Turkey consisted in the enormous distances which would have to be traversed. To convey five or six hundred men from the Rhine to the Dnieper, with an enormous pontoon equipage to provide for the passage of the rivers on the line of route, and with the extraordinary supply of food, not only for men but also for horses, which would be necessary on a march through countries which would most probably be found as completely devastated as Portugal was found devastated by Masséna—was an undertaking which presented difficulties never yet surmounted by the art of warfare; for when the barbarians threw themselves on the Roman Empire, or the Tartars on China and on India, barbarism invaded civilization and was able to find subsistence amidst its fertility; but when civilization would invade barbarism it has to surmount the serious difficulty of having to carry with it all the necessaries of existence.

Perceiving that the distances which would have to be traversed would offer the most serious obstacle, Napoleon determined to place his base of operations no more on the Rhine, but on the Oder or the Vistula, and even, if possible, on the Niémen, that is to say, at three or four hundred leagues from the frontiers of France. He determined, therefore, as quietly as possible and under false pretexts, to

assemble an immense number of troops from the Rhine to the Elbe, from the Elbe to the Oder, from the Oder to the Vistula, and from the Vistula to the Niémen; and at the moment when pretexts became of no more avail to make a rapid march from Dantzig to Koenigsberg, so as to place behind him and secure from the Russians the rich country of Poland and Old Prussia.

The principal point in his plan of operations was Dantzig, destined to be a vast depôt of all the immense matériel of our troops. After Dantzig the fortresses of Thorn and Modlin on the Vistula, of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau on the Oder, and of Magdebourg on the Elbe, merited the chief attention. These places Napoleon gradually stored with troops and every kind of war matériel. In addition to these preparations he established between the Oder and the Rhine at Hamburgh, a depôt, which was as vast and secure as that of Dantzig.

Besides providing a sufficient amount of matériel for the future army of Russia, he had also to consider the means by which men were to be provided to fill its ranks. The year 1810 was the first which he had suffered to pass, for a long period, without the levy of a conscription. It is true that the class of 1810 had been levied in 1809, in accordance with the habit which had been contracted, of taking each class a year in advance; but the eyes of the people had been spared during the whole space of that year from the afflicting spectacle of the levy, and the class of 1811 remained at the commencement of that year intact, not having been called out before its time.

Napoleon now resolved on its immediate levy. As it was unlikely that hostilities would commence before 1812, he was able to calculate among the number of the forces with which he would be able to take the field, the conscription of that year also. These additions to the effective troops already stationed in various parts of Europe would enable him to have an army consisting of three hundred thousand French troops and a hundred thousand allies on the Vistula, a reserve of a hundred thousand French on the Elbe, and 135 battalions at depôts, which would be employed in the interior of the empire in instructing recruits and guarding the frontiers, whilst the forces devoted to the prosecution of the Peninsular war would remain unweakened.

Napoleon did not, however, confine his attention to military measures, but also took care to make his diplomatic policy subserve his projects, especially in all that related to Turkey and Austria.

Since the conferences of Tilsit and Erfurt, all the details

of which the English had related to the Porte with much exaggeration, the Turks had considered themselves as entirely given up by the French to the Russians, and entertained so violent a feeling of distrust towards us that they scarcely endured the presence of our representative at Constantinople, and only addressed him to complain of what they called our treason. Napoleon hoped, however, that when they found we were in a state of hostilities with Russia, they would begin to regard us once more as friends, and be ready to listen to proposals of alliance; and he accordingly directed the French legation at Constantinople to lose no opportunity of making friendly advances to the Turks, of intimating the estrangement between France and Russia, and of making the Porte comprehend that as Russia would soon be obliged to direct her forces elsewhere than on the Danube, they ought to avoid concluding a disadvantageous peace, but rather to continue the war, forming in the meantime a firm alliance with France.

Overtures of the same nature, and in an equally cautious manner, were made to Austria. But there was less embarrassment to be encountered at Vienna than at Constantinople. Both the courts and the populations of the two kingdoms had been somewhat reconciled by the marriage. Napoleon had sent by M. de Metternich a most amicable letter to his father-in-law, and the renunciation of the most important article of the last treaty,—that which limited the Austrian army to 150,000 men. Napoleon, abandoning the Russian alliance as abruptly as he had embraced it at Tilsit, ordered M. Otto in his conferences with M. de Metternich to express a feeling of disgust towards the Russian court; and extreme regret with regard to the subject of the Danubian provinces which France had engaged to suffer to fall into the hands of Russia. In the meantime M. Otto was directed to behave towards the Russian Embassy with great reserve and the utmost caution.

It was impossible that such military preparations as these, and these diplomatic manœuvres should long remain hidden from Russia. Napoleon had, nevertheless, determined to dissemble the object of these proceedings as long as he possibly could, and only to avow their real meaning, when it could no longer be concealed. He therefore directed his agents, in their communication with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, to say with regard to the garrison of Dantzig, that it had been rendered necessary by the direction of an immense English armament towards the Sound, and that as the troops in question were German, it was impossible that the matter could be any just cause of offence. As for the conscription,

they were to say that, none having been levied in 1810, and the Spanish war absorbing a great number of men, a portion of the class of 1811 had been called out for the purposes of this war alone. When all these excuses should have been exhausted and found unavailing, M. de Coulaincourt was authorised to declare, that in fact it was possible that France was arming against Russia, as well as England, feeling some natural distrust of the former, since the withdrawal of her troops from Finland to Lithuania, and the construction of entrenchments on the Dwina and the Dnieper.

In his anxiety to put himself in an advantageous position with regard to Russia, Napoleon gave but a divided attention and slender resources to the conduct of the war in the Peninsula. He no longer thought of carrying it on in person, and it was impossible to send to Torrès-Védras a reinforcement of sixty or eighty thousand men for the purpose of crushing the English, when he was wholly occupied in preparing three armies between the Rhine and the Vistula. It only remained therefore to make the best use of the resources already existing in the Peninsula. Napoleon had already organised a division of reserve for Catalonia, as a means of hastening the progress of the sieges of Tortosa and Tarragonia. He had also organised another division of reserve for the provinces of Castille; by means of these resources, together with the corps of General Drouet, and the army of Andalusia, he hoped to furnish Marshal Masséna with sufficient reinforcements to enable him to triumph over the English; and he immediately sent the necessary orders for the concentration of all the forces in the Peninsula towards the Tagus, accompanying them with declarations that no object in the Peninsula was of equal importance to Santarem and Lisbon, on which depended the fate of Europe.

After having shown him every mark of favour, Napoleon sent back General Foy to Marshal Masséna, to inform him of the arrangements he had made for his reinforcements, and to convey to him Napoleon's instructions for his future movements. Whilst the events above narrated were taking place in the north, Marshal Masséna passed the winter of 1810-11 on the banks of the Tagus, between Santarem and Punhète, making unheard of efforts to support his army and preparations for the passage of the river, had remained for five months without receiving communications of any kind from the government, and displayed the whole strength of his character in his endeavours to preserve alive a good spirit, not amidst his troops, who bore their strange position with complete equanimity, but amongst his superior officers, some

of whom were discontented because they had not the chief command, whilst the rest were disgusted with a campaign which afforded no opportunities for the performance of brilliant actions.

The chief want experienced by the army was in the article of clothing, almost all the garments of the troops being in complete rags. But the officers alone were really worthy of pity; nothing could exceed their state of destitution, for they had no means of subsistence, but that which was afforded them by the affection of the soldiers, and not having the ability possessed by the latter, of mending their own tattered garments, or manufacturing sandals of the skins of beasts, to supply the place of their worn out shoes, they were compelled to pay enormous prices to the few workmen who remained at Santarem and some neighbouring villages.

In the meantime General Eblé was solving the problem involved in the construction of a pontoon equipage without tools, without wood, and almost without workmen, with a perseverance and fertility of invention, worthy of all admiration. But whilst he advanced most successfully in the execution of his task, a most disadvantageous result of its performance was the ruin of the horses belonging to the artillery and the baggage train. There was but a very insufficient supply of food for them, and they died in great numbers.

The last great difficulty to be overcome, consisted in the necessity of obtaining a supply of cordage and means of effecting moorings, such as anchors, grappling irons, &c.

With incredible energy General Eblé had established manufactories of cordage, which were supplied partly with hemp and partly with old ropes found at Santarem. He had also, as anchors could not be procured, had grappling irons forged, with which the boats of the bridge might be fastened to the banks. But how the bridge, when completed, was to be launched, in the presence of the enemy, was the great question in all minds.

The bridge was being constructed at Punhète, situated on the Zezère, at some distance from the point at which this river falls into the Tagus; on the left and at no great distance was Abrantes, whither Lord Wellington had sent Hill's corps, and on the right, but much lower, Santarem, to which Lord Wellington had carried his own advanced posts. It was now a matter of doubt whether the bridge should be thrown across the river near Abrantes or Santarem. There were excellent reasons both for and against the choice of either of these positions. The comparative narrowness of the river at Abrantes would render the launching of the bridge there

easier, but the operation would have to be performed in the presence of a numerous and well established enemy, and only a portion of the French forces could be made available for its defence. At Santarem the river presented many natural obstacles, but sufficient forces could be concentrated there for the defence of our lines, and the protection of the passage.

On this as well as other questions respecting the passage of the river great difference of opinion prevailed both among soldiers and generals, and no inconvenience would have resulted from this had it not been accompanied by bitter expressions directed against the General-in-Chief, as though he had been responsible for the strange position in which the army found itself on the Tagus, and were not the first victim of an inflexible will, which took its resolutions at an immense distance from the theatre of war, and in a most complete forgetfulness of facts. This state of things even reached such a point that Ney, since the occupation of the new position on the Tagus, had never visited Marshal Masséna, and remained at Thomar, as though he had been the General Commanding-in-Chief, and Thomar head quarters. These things somewhat irritated Masséna, who was not of course left in ignorance of them, but ensconcing himself in his accustomed negligence and disdain, he contented himself with presenting to his lieutenants an example of firmness and coolness which they should have imitated, but did not. This infringement of good discipline, however, did not infect the troops. They, unaffected by the envious declarations of their immediate generals, but on the contrary full of confidence in the character, the fame, and the good fortune of Masséna, and confidently expecting the arrival of reinforcements from Napoleon, hopefully awaited the hour when they should perform those great deeds which had been promised as the result of this campaign. But whilst they were perfectly ready to sacrifice themselves for the attainment of any important object, the sad state of the hospitals had taught them to regard a sick or wounded soldier as a dead man, and made them demand to be spared the risks of skirmishes which were of no apparent necessity.

The army being in this position we may readily understand how apropos, how useful, and agreeable to the real state of affairs, were the Imperial instructions transmitted to Masséna, by which he was directed to insure the power of manœuvring on both banks of the Tagus by throwing, not one, but two bridges across it; to establish vast magazines of provisions and war matériel, in order to be enabled to prolong his sojourn under the walls of Lisbon; to capture Abrantès, where vast resources were certain to be found;

to harass the English incessantly, and to endeavour to entice them beyond their lines to risk a general engagement, &c.

Repeatedly urged by Napoleon, and especially by the last instructions received from him, to enter Portugal, and to reopen, at all hazards, communications with Masséna, General Drouet at length set off with his nine thousand men by the route which lies through the valley of Mondego, taking with him neither provisions nor war matériel, of which indeed he was entirely destitute; having been even compelled during his sojourn in Old Castille to subsist on the stores in the two fortresses, Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, which was a great misfortune, since there was great probability that those places would sooner or later be invested by the enemy.

General Drouet traversed, almost without meeting any obstacle, the sierra Murcelha, and debouched upon Leyria, his troops obtaining such subsistence as they could find on their road. In the meantime the army of Portugal experienced the utmost impatience for the arrival of a French troop, were it to consist even of only a few hundred men. At length a troop of dragoons led by General Gardanne, joined Ney's advanced posts between Espinhal and Thomar, and were received with the greatest demonstrations of affection. General Gardanne gave information that General Drouet was on his way with a strong division, and that another division followed him, that the ninth corps could not number less than twenty or thirty thousand men, that it was accompanied by abundant stores, and that when communications were once reopened, provisions and war matériel would arrive with the utmost ease. Shortly afterwards the news of General Drouet's arrival filled the whole army with enthusiasm. Calculating on the almost immediate arrival of thirty thousand of their comrades, Masséna's soldiers delivered themselves up to the most flattering hopes. Winter had now given place to spring; the lines of Torrès-Védras no longer appeared insurmountable.

Masséna had an interview with General Drouet, and received from him a mass of despatches which should have arrived earlier. Some of them no longer had any bearing on the actual condition of affairs, and others, the more recent ones, and written since Napoleon's interview with General Foy, contained some criticisms on his movements, at which Masséna could only sadly smile, as proofs of the erroneous impressions in which Napoleon was determined to remain. These despatches were chiefly useful as showing what were the means which Napoleon furnished for the accomplishment of his great object, and which was, either to force the position held by the English, or to blockade them until they should

be compelled to abandon it. And here all was deception and vexation. The ninth corps, announced as consisting of thirty thousand men, scarcely amounted to fifteen thousand; and of these eight thousand had been left at Viseu, sixty leagues distant, to maintain the communications.

At the very moment when the army was full of joy at the arrival of this reinforcement, Masséna was a prey to bitter disappointment, and completely disabused as to the reality of the succour which had been promised him. For even of the nine thousand that had arrived, Gardanne's detachment alone was to remain, for General Drouet's seven thousand were soon to depart again to keep open the communications with the frontier of Spain, and had only come, in fact, as an escort of insignificant despatches, and to fill the army with a false joy.

Masséna resolved, however, not to allow General Drouet to depart. His departure, after a short stay, would have thrown the army into despair, and would have deprived it of courage even to attempt the passage of the Tagus. Masséna might have simply, in his character of General commanding-in-chief, have ordered General Drouet to remain, but he preferred to reason with him, and obtain his free assent. But General Drouet, without any feeling of ill will, alleged his instructions, with which he was deeply impressed, and which were, unfortunately, extremely precise; directing him to carry succour to the army of Portugal but at the same time not to allow himself to be cut off from Almeida, and by no means to lose his own communications for the sake of establishing those of Marshal Masséna. The General commanding-in-chief contended, on the other hand, that he ought not, for the purpose of fulfilling one part of his instructions, to neglect another which was of more importance, that namely, which directed him to convey succour to the army of Portugal, and concluded his arguments by declaring that if General Drouet were now to desert the army of Portugal, he would be personally responsible for all the future evils which might result from that step. General Drouet no longer hesitated to remain, and Masséna directed him to take up his position at Leyria, on the further side of the Estrella, where he would defend the army from being turned by the road along the coast, whilst it was encamped on the route of the Tagus.

Although the reinforcements which had arrived only consisted of about nine thousand men, as the army now numbered about fifty three thousand, Masséna saw in it the means, not of attacking the English lines, but of rendering the passage of the Tagus infinitely less perilous. By leaving twenty three thousand men on the right bank, whilst he crossed over with thirty thousand to the left, he would have

comparative little cause for anxiety for the fate of the two portions of the army, separated from each other by a great river; the danger however remaining very serious for both, should the bridge between them be broken, as that on the Danube at Essling. The peril incurred in dividing the army on the two banks of the river was much diminished by the reinforcements which had been received, and Masséna finally resolved on putting his plan of crossing the Tagus into execution, for when the army should have once entered the province of Alentejo, it would be able to find subsistence sufficient for three or four months in the environs of Santarem, to obey the instructions of Napoleon, by which he enjoined the continuance of the blockade of the lines of Torrès-Védras, and thus to await the expected arrival of the army of Andalusia. When this reinforcement should arrive, the army of Portugal would be enabled to leave the defensive for the offensive, and to terminate under the walls of Lisbon the long war which for twenty years had devastated Europe.

When the army learned the true nature of the reinforcement which had been received, it passed from enthusiastic delight to a state of despondency, and blamed the Emperor who had left them in such a situation, without provisions, war matériel, or reinforcements. It began to be imbued, as were all the troops which were sent to Spain, with the feeling that they were sacrificed without mercy, without the chance of glory, to the ungrateful task of creating *royautés de famille*. It needed but a few more sources of dissatisfaction to excite insubordination in its ranks.

In the meantime General Foy arrived with a new detachment of two thousand men, with Napoleon's verbal instructions, and the inspiration drawn from his numerous interviews with the Emperor. At Ciudad-Rodrigo he had taken advantage of an opportunity which offered for sending to Marshal Soult a letter, urging upon him the necessity of uniting the whole or part of the army of Andalusia with the army of Portugal. He described to him the situation of Europe, especially that of England, and the indubitable hope which existed of changing the war policy of Great Britain to a peace policy, if one serious disaster could be inflicted on Lord Wellington's army. He put forth these views not so much as his own as those of Napoleon himself, and declared that he understood the Emperor to express his decided will to be that the army of Andalusia should march upon the Tagus.

On the 5th of February General Foy arrived at head quarters. His arrival produced a great sensation in the army, because, being full of impressions received at Paris in his inter-

views with the Emperor, he brought with him the conviction that the army of Portugal was the instrument of great designs, and that but a little patience was necessary to enable it to accomplish its glorious task. This had the best possible effect on the spirit of the army, and compensated in some degree for the ill effect produced by the weakness of the last reinforcements. Unhappily, however, the arrival of General Foy added to the embarrassments of General Drouet, for he brought with him a packet of despatches containing the most formal instructions to assist Masséna, only so far as he could do so consistently with securing himself from being cut off from Almeida and Ciudad-Rodrigo. But by remaining with the army of Portugal, General Drouet would be as completely cut off from those places as Masséna himself; it was a new argument to urge with the Commander-in-Chief. But as the moment for effecting the passage of the Tagus had now arrived, he consented to remain still at Leyria, in the rear and on the flank of the army of Portugal.

Masséna now submitted to the generals serving under him the following questions; was it necessary to cross the Tagus? at what point should it be crossed? and in what manner should the operations be conducted? And would it not be more prudent, should the difficulty attending the passage of the stream in the face of the English be found too great, or the division of the army on the two banks of the stream too dangerous, to retreat, since it would be impossible to obtain subsistence for any length of time in the present encampment, upon the Mondego, whose valley had escaped devastation, whilst the city of Coimbra would then be the principal point of a position in which the army could hold the English in check, and await the necessary reinforcements from France.

The last proposition was unanimously and instantly negatived, as though to entertain it would be a kind of crime, since it was contrary to the wishes of the Emperor. It remained, therefore, to attempt the passage of the Tagus, however perilous it might be. The idea was at first entertained of selecting Punhète as the point from which to attempt it, and Junot supported this project; but General Loison, who knew better than he the nature of the place in question, having been encamped there, pointed out some dangers which would attend such a choice, and the project was then entertained of passing lower down, namely at Santarem, which offered, according to General Reynier, who knew the place well, an almost invincible position, since, should an hostile force attack it in front, they would be destroyed at the foot of the heights, and should they attempt to turn it, be enclosed and taken. There was one disadvantage attending the choice

of this point, from whence to attempt the passage of the stream, which was, unfortunately, a fatal one; and consisted in the expansion of the river before Santarem, and the incessant variation of its size according to the rise or fall of its waters. However, by sacrificing some of the advantages attending the proximity of Santarem, sufficiently great facilities were offered by an island situated at the mouth of the Alviela, a little river which throws itself into the Tagus, under the protection of the heights of Boavista. This island being placed beyond the principal breadth of the river, there remained, after it should have been reached, but a small arm to be crossed. By occupying it during the night with the necessary forces, it would be easy to fasten to it the bridge of boats which would thus rest on a fixed point, easily defended.

There was but one objection to this plan, which unfortunately appeared a far more serious one to General Eblé than it really was, and consisted in the fact that the materials of the bridge were at Punhète. According to General Eblé to transport them by land to the mouth of the Alviela would require means which we did not possess, since the horses were worn out, and a length of time which would be sufficient to betray our plan to the enemy; and that to descend to the Tagus by water would occupy more than a night, and compel us to pass along the enemy's bank of the river under so close a fire from the English, that the boats would run great danger of being destroyed.

The great authority of General Eblé, who had accomplished a sort of miracle by the creation of the materials for this bridge, supported by General Masséna's opinion, determined the neglect of this isle, which would doubtless have been for us a second Lobau.

However this might be, as the proposal of passing at Santarem had been rejected, as well as that of making the passage near Abrantes, it now remained to be considered from what point it should be really attempted. As first one plan was proposed and then another, General Foy said that in all probability the 5th corps would within eight or ten days appear on the left of the Tagus, and that then all difficulties would vanish of themselves, for that the English at the sight of the 5th corps would not remain opposite Pouhète, that the left bank would be thus cleared, and that the passage of the Tagus could be then made at that point with perfect ease. The arrival of the 5th corps appeared so probable, that all the generals assented to General Foy's reasoning, with the exception of Reynier, who declared that his soldiers would die of hunger before Soult's arrival, and Masséna, who never

flattered himself that Soult would come to his aid. He knew too much of Spain and of men to expect such a thing. He entertained the idea, therefore, of retreating upon the Mondego, for he could see no probability of any succour arriving from the direction of the south, and General Drouet's arrival had taught him to expect none on the north. In the meantime the army awaited the arrival of the reinforcements which it expected from Andalusia.

That we may judge of the probability of the arrival of these reinforcements so earnestly expected, we must direct our attention to the course of affairs in Andalusia and Aragon. After General Suchet had taken Lerida, the capture of which has been described in the preceding book, and Mequinenza, a small but very important place, since it commanded a part of the course of the Ebro, there remained for him to take Tortosa and Tarragonia, the two strongest fortifications of Catalonia, or perhaps even of Spain, if we except Cadiz. Tortosa is situated on the lower Ebro, near its mouth, and commands the direct route between Catalonia and Valentia; Tarragonia, situated more to the north, between Tortosa and Barcelona, on the sea coast, in the centre of a fertile country, was to the north-east of the Peninsula what Cadiz was to the south, and Lisbon to the south-east.

On the 19th of December General Suchet opened the trenches before Tortosa; the point of attack having been chosen on the south. The trenches had been opened boldly very near the enceinte, and were pushed on so vigorously that within a few days they had reached the foot of the enemy's works. The enemy made numerous sorties with the design of compelling us to relax in our exertions, and on the 28th of December a body of three thousand men boldly led, vigorously attacked our men employed in carrying on the works, killed many of our engineer officers, and began to destroy the trenches, when Generals Hubert and Abbé coming up with a body of troops drove them back with a loss in killed or prisoners of 400 men. On the following day, the 29th of December, after some indispensable repairs had been completed in our works, forty-nine cannon of heavy calibre threw into the place a hail of shot and shell. On the 30th two large breaches were visible and gave promise of affording in about a couple of days free access to the courage of our soldiers. On the 1st of January the assault was about to commence amidst the shouts of our troops, when a white flag announced a desire to capitulate. General Suchet refused to grant the terms demanded by the Governor, and as he threatened that if the place were not immediately surrendered he would put the garrison to the

sword, on the 2nd of January the gates were opened, and 9,400 prisoners defiled before him, laying down their arms. This successful siege had cost the army of Aragon seventeen days, and five or six hundred men. The siege of Tarragonia would most probably be both as difficult, and as long, and everything tended to show that the army would be detained in Catalonia during a portion of the year 1811. It was, therefore, impossible that it should afford the army of Andalusia any immediate succour.

During this period, that is, from June, 1810, to January, 1811, the army of Andalusia had been no less occupied than that of Aragon.

The Central Junta having resigned, as we have seen, in favour of a Royal Regency and the Cortès, the Cortès had assembled at Cadiz with much solemnity on the 24th of September, 1810, and immediately passed decrees declaring that the national sovereignty was in the Cortès, and the royalty in the house of Bourbon. After having promulgated these decrees, the assembly at Cadiz had demanded of the Regency, that it should accept them, and swear to observe them. These preliminaries having been completed, the assembly betook itself on the laws of the kingdom, with a view to the reform of the Spanish monarchy. In the meantime the Regency, General Castanas being the most prominent in this matter, concerted with General Blake, with the other generals of the army, and with Henry Wellesley, brother of Lord Wellington, the scheme of military operations.

Cadiz and the Isle of Leon were abundantly provided with troops and all kinds of resources. Besides seven thousand English troops, it contained seventeen or eighteen thousand soldiers, the remnants of all the regular Spanish armies. In addition to this force assembled at Cadiz, there was in the province of Murcia a body of twenty thousand men, composed of the troops which had retreated from the defiles of the sierra Morena towards Grenada, and of the insurgents of Murcia. In the centre between Grenada and Seville, there were, besides the fierce mountaineers of Ronda, the contrabandists of the environs of Gibraltar, who were at this period unemployed, and very apt in assuming the character of guerillas. Finally on the left, at the mouth of the Guadiana, in the country of Niebla, there were other bold contrabandists, and higher up, upon the Guadiana between Badajoz, Olivença, Elnas, Campo-Mayor, and Albuquerque, was the army of Romana, consisting of 27,000 or 28,000 men, of whom seven or eight thousand had joined Lord Wellington under the Marquis de la Romana.

It was with these forces, aided by situation and season, that Generals Castanas and Blake had resolved to paralyse the three corps which formed the army of Andalusia.

General Sébastiani, occupied alternately in the Ronda or in the Alpuxarras, had been obliged sometimes to direct his whole force against Blake, whom he had vanquished at Baza, at another time to give battle at Fuengirola, to the English, whom he had forced to re-embark; and had finally been compelled to burn the principal villages of the Ronda without having suppressed the insurrection, although he had succeeded in driving into Gibraltar the troops which fomented incessantly the disturbances amidst these mountains.

The campaign of the 1st corps, although it had cost fewer men, had not been less laborious. Marshal Victor, aided by Sénarmont, the skilful General of Artillery, had embraced within a series of redoubts, most accurately placed, and adapted in the best possible manner to their object, all the space which extends from Puerto-Santa-Maria to Puerto-Real, from Puerto-Real to Santi-Petri; and had wrested from the enemy Trocadero and the fort of Matagorda, which, forming an advanced point in the roadstead, could overwhelm Cadiz with the fire of its artillery. To arm this fort Marshal Victor had had an immense number of mortars of a peculiar construction founded at Seville. He had also collected a hundred and fifty gunboats, and a sufficient number of boats for the transport of 10,000 men, which he had conveyed partly by water and partly by land to Puerto-Real. The preliminary works were therefore in an advanced state; but there was still the want of sailors to manœuvre the flotilla, of artillerymen, of matériel for the ordnance, and a reinforcement of infantry. Had these wants been supplied it is most probable that the whole state of affairs in the Peninsula would have been changed. But, in fact, not only were these wants left unsupplied, but Marshal Victor was, also, entirely unaided by Marshal Soult.

In the meantime the career of Marshal Mortier was no less laborious than that of General Sébastiani in Grenada, or Marshal Victor before Cadiz. Sometimes obliged to march with the 5th corps to Badajoz against the troops of Romana, sometimes against the insurgents of Niebla and the detachments which made sorties from Cadiz, and sometimes to Jaen to aid General Sébastiani, his troops were thoroughly worn out with fatigue. He had been successful, doubtless, but on reentering Seville towards the end of the year 1810, there were only eight thousand men out of his whole force capable of taking the field.

Napoleon severely blamed Marshal Soult, who was

General-in-Chief of the army of Andalusia, for a want of vigour and a defect of combination in the manœuvring of the troops; and indeed, instead of directing all his forces upon Cadiz, and being contented to hold simple posts at Cordova and at Seville, for the purpose of keeping open the route of Madrid, by which mode of operations Cadiz would have been readily taken, and the whole of Andalusia speedily reduced to subjection, he had endeavoured at one and the same time to threaten Valentia and Murcia, to occupy Jaen, Grenada, Malaga, to reduce the Ronda to submission, to blockade Gibraltar, to guard Seville, and to besiege Cadiz, Badajoz, Elvas, and Campo-Mayor, whereby he had exhausted the army of Andalusia with fatigue, and destroyed it by exposure to disease, and reduced himself to the necessity of sending to Napoleon for a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand infantry, a thousand marines, a thousand artillerymen, and a fleet; with these reinforcements he promised speedily to take Cadiz, and to reduce the whole south of the Peninsula from Carthagena as far as Ayamonte.

Having made these demands for reinforcements, Marshal Soult was surprised, we may even say filled with consternation, at receiving a formal order to send the whole 5th corps, together with a siege train to Abrantes, and to sacrifice every other object, except the siege of Cadiz, to this supreme one; for this was to order him to perform what was both extremely difficult and extremely perilous, and to aid the undertakings of another at the expense of his own. He resolved, therefore, to defer obedience to those Imperial orders, on the ground that to obey them would probably involve the loss of the 5th corps itself, and to implore that an officer might be sent to examine and confirm the truth of this assertion; adding that, being anxious to aid Marshal Masséna, he intended to throw the whole 5th corps, together with some detachments of the two others, upon the Guadiana, in order to undertake the siege of Badajoz, of Olivença, and Elvas, which movement would most probably prove to be a most advantageous diversion in favour of the army of Portugal. He had, accordingly, set out at the commencement of January 1811, with the division Girard, followed by the division Gazan, which was to march more slowly, in order to escort the siege train.

On the 11th of January he reached Olivença, and invested it without delay. This fortress, situated on the left of the Guadiana, had during two ages belonged sometimes to the Spaniards and sometimes to the Portuguese, and since 1801 had been the property of the Spaniards. It contained a population of five thousand souls, a garrison of four thousand, and

had a feeble governor. It was well fortified, and might have opposed a certain amount of resistance, had the governor taken due precautions and been careful to arm the exterior works. Our officers and soldiers of engineers, well aided by the infantry, carried on the approaches with great boldness, and within ten days the breaching batteries were enabled to open fire and overthrow a large portion of the wall. At the sight of our columns ready to mount to the assault, the populace, which had at first displayed much ardour, was terrified; the garrison and the governor made no endeavour to prolong the defence, and on the 23rd of January the gates were opened to our troops.

On the 26th Marshal Soult departed for Badajoz, the second fortress situated on the left of the Guadiana, and the only important one. On the right bank of the Guadiana, almost *vis-a-vis* with the castle of Badajoz, is the fort of St. Christoval, which serves as a protection to an entrenched camp established on the heights of Santa-Engracia. The river Gevora, which falls into the Guadiana, washes and protects this camp of Santa-Engracia, and here, at this period, was the Spanish army of the Marquis de la Romana, which after having been dispersed by the 5th corps had speedily reformed, as was usual with the Spanish armies, and had been rejoined by the seven or eight thousand men, who had been sent to Lisbon. The whole army after having left in Badajoz a garrison of nine or ten thousand men, presented on the opposite bank, in the entrenched camp of Santa Engracia, an army of twelve thousand men; and as a stone bridge, in the enemy's possession, joined the two banks at that spot, it was possible that the besiegers might at any moment be attacked by twenty thousand men. Besides an excellent governor, the fortress contained provisions for six months, and fortifications in a perfect state of defence. To the twenty thousand Spaniards spread over the two banks of the Guadiana, the French army could only oppose nine or ten thousand, until the arrival of the division Gazan, which would increase it to fifteen or ten thousand. It should be observed that our troops had no means of crossing from the one bank to the other, if we except a small craft which could only carry a few men at a time.

Happily the quality of our troops compensated for their inferiority, and it was with a less number that General Suchet had taken places infinitely stronger within a space of fifteen or twenty days. On the 20th of January the trenches were opened, and at the same time was commenced the construction of some batteries, as though it were intended to commence the bombardment almost as soon as the approaches. In the

meantime continual rains retarded our operations, and the lot of our troops became worthy of commiseration, for as all the horses had been employed in the draught of the heavy Artillery, it had not been possible to carry the foraging excursions to any great extent, and the soldiers were in want of bread. For many days together their only food was flesh, and from the use of such a diet sprang several distressing maladies.

The progress of the works was at first very slow, by reason of the unfavourable state of the weather, the absence of the division Gazan, and the want of any energy in the conduct of the siege. The Governor, Menacho, on the other hand, resolved to delay our proceedings by means of numerous sorties with strong bodies of troops. On the 31st of January, in particular, he directed one against our central works of attack which caused us considerable loss in men; but our works were too distant and in a stage too little advanced to suffer much. During the following days the rains were so violent that work of any kind became impossible. At length, fortunately, the division Gazan arrived with about 6,000 foot soldiers, together with heavy ordnance and tools. Our troops now numbered, therefore, about 12,000 infantry, 1,200 sappers and miners and artillerymen, and about 2,500 cavalry. A little more energy was now thrown into the conduct of the siege, but several days were occupied in repairing the damage done to the trenches by the rain, and there was made but little real advance.

On the 6th of February news was received in our camp of the arrival of the enemy's army of succour. This army, which had been partly drawn from Lisbon, as we have before mentioned, and which consisted of 10,000 infantry, and 2,000 cavalry, took up a position on the right of the Guadiana, in the camp of Santa-Engracia, from whence it was in communication with the fortress by means of the stone bridge of Badajoz; and the enemy could now therefore by uniting the army and the garrison, throw a force of 21,000 men on any selected point, and, it was not at all impossible, by such a movement succeed in raising the siege.

The first employment which they made of their forces was to attempt, on the 7th of February, a great sortie. After having made a feigned demonstration against our left, they debouched upon our right, and boldly advancing in a compact mass of seven or eight thousand men, arrived even as far as our lines, whilst those detachments of our troops which strove to resist them failed to do so. As commonly happens in sorties, the enemy held the ground for an instant, and destroyed some works of little importance; but Marshal Mortier soon succeeded in driving them back in disorder,

leaving 700 killed or wounded. Unhappily the ardour of our troops l ading them to expose themselves to the fire of the fortress itself cost us on our side about 100 killed and 300 wounded.

Marshal Soult now conceived the project of attacking the enemy in the camp of Santa-Engracia, and depriving him of the possibility of renewing such attempts by the destruction of the army of succour. But to effect this purpose it was necessary to obtain means of crossing the Guadiana, which would be a feat by no means of easy accomplishment, on account of the fullness of the stream; and in the meantime he directed his attention to the object of disembarrassing himself from the Spanish army, encamped beyond the Guadiana, and the removal of which would render our siege operations much more rapid. There was never any difficulty in overcoming the Spaniards in the open field, and they had, in spite of Lord Wellington's remonstrances, neither erected a palisade nor removed a square foot of earth; they guarded their camp, moreover, in the most careless manner, and with secrecy and promptitude seven or eight thousand troops might easily surprise and take it.

This movement projected by Marshal Soult, was as well executed as conceived. On the 18th February his engineers had provided means of crossing the Guadiana sufficient for six thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry. On the night of the 18th, Marshals Soult and Mortier effected the passage of the river, with troops chosen from the two divisions Gerard. At the break of day on the 19th, they found themselves on the further bank of the Guadiana; and as they had crossed it above Badajoz, it was necessary to descend the right bank of this stream, in order to arrive at St. Christoval, and the heights of Santa-Engracia, on which was established the Spanish camp. A thick mist favoured the march of our little army.

The bank of the Gevora was soon reached, and before the Spaniards had made any preparation for disputing its passage with us. The cavalry crossed it at some distance to the right, and dispersed without difficulty the Spanish cavalry, which covered the camp on the side of the plain; whilst our infantry, led by Marshal Mortier, plunged through the Gevora, the water reaching breast high, and speedily arrived in the best order, at the foot of the escarpment of Santa-Engracia at the moment when the mist dispersed.

Our soldiers, who had but little fear of Spanish troops, boldly attacked the height of Santa-Engracia, under a terrific fire, which caused them serious loss; but in a few moments they reached the summit of the escarpment, whilst two

battalions which had been sent to the left intercepted the road of the fort of St. Christoval, and the cavalry, which had been thrown to the right, on the plain, gained the rear of the enemy. The Spaniards finding themselves threatened in front by our infantry, in flank and rear by our cavalry, formed themselves into two firm and imposing squares, which, however, were immediately broken and dispersed by the charge of our infantry and dragoons. Of the twelve thousand men with whom the Spaniards had commenced this action, at the most only five thousand escaped, by taking flight in every direction

Marshal Soult took advantage of his victory to invest completely the fortress on the right of the Guadiana; and being now freed from the proximity of the Spaniards quietly and slowly proceeded with the operations of the siege of Badajoz. In the meantime Lord Wellington and Marshal Masséna awaited, with very different sentiments, the result of this siege. Lord Wellington regarded his position as a difficult one, considering that if the French were to assemble in force, under Marshal Masséna, he would have much cause for fear, even in his position behind the lines of Torrès-Védras. He never ceased, therefore, to urge the Portuguese to devastate Alentejo, and to carry into Lisbon as much of its resources as possible. His entreaties, however, had but little effect, for the Portuguese were by no means inclined to prevent the French from seizing their property, by destroying it themselves. He was far from intending to give battle to Marshal Soult had he quitted Andalusia to come to the succour of the army of Portugal, and had ordered Marshal Beresford, who commanded at Abrantes, to defend the *affluents* of the Tagus, which traverse the province of Alentejo, just so far as might avail to retard the progress of the French, but not so far as might entail the risk of losing a battle; to avoid which, he was to enter the lines of Torrès-Védras. The route was thus entirely open to Marshal Soult, but he was ignorant of the fact, and the phantom of the English army, moreover, withheld him from the idea of marching upon Abrantès.

Masséna held this phantom in less account, and was only withheld by the want of every kind of provision and matériel of war; and he had, moreover, to struggle against the increasing disgust of the army, the first symptoms of which had sprung from the arrival of General Drouet with no more than seven thousand men. As the famine amongst the troops grew more severe, and the hope of their being reinforced by Marshal Soult entirely vanished, it was scarcely possible to restrain them within the bonds of discipline, the more especially as they were under the influence of commanders

who gave full licence to their tongues. At length when the month of March arrived, with no appearance of Marshal Soult, with no hope of effecting the passage of the Tagus, with an impossibility of obtaining subsistence, resulting from the impossibility of crossing the Tagus, and with only fifteen days provision of biscuit remaining, Masséna took the resolution of executing that retrograde movement upon the Mondego, which he had always regarded as the wisest step he could take, and from which he had only been withheld by Napoleon's formal command, that he should remain on the Tagus as long as possible. He gave orders for such preparations as would enable the troops to be in full retreat on the 4th or 6th of March.

It was absolutely necessary that the retreat of the army should be preceded by the sick, the wounded, and the heavy baggage at least two days in advance, to avoid confusion; and the inconvenience attending this movement, would be that it must necessarily excite the notice of the English, and too soon draw them in pursuit of us. This danger existed but to a slight degree on the route of the Tagus, but with respect to the route along the coast it was to be feared that if they should be informed of our retreat they would march rapidly to Leyria, Pombal, and Condeixa, and thus anticipate us in our movement on Coimbra and the Mondego. In this case it would be necessary to renounce our intention of taking up a position at Coimbra, and perhaps even that of following the valley of the Mondego, and to resolve upon a short but disastrous retreat by the valley of the Zezère, which is on the south of the Estrella. It was possible to avoid all these inconveniences by occupying Leyria in force, by means of a well-combined and well-timed movement. Such a movement Masséna conceived and executed with rare precision.

On the 4th of March the sick and the heavy baggage were sent forward, and on the evening of the 5th the whole army was ordered to commence its march. Reynier, who was at Santarem, in a position very near the enemy, destroyed the bridges of the Rio-Mayor, and then pursued in silence the route of Golgao. Junot took the road of Torrès-Novas, Chao de Magans, and Ourem. This excellent man, unhappily less talented than brave, had received, in a recent skirmish, a wound in the forehead which could scarcely fail, sooner or later, to be fatal, and always devoted to his duty although somewhat untractable, he was anxious to superintend the retreat on horseback; but Masséna, to spare him this fatigue, had placed himself in person at the head of the 8th corps. Ney, on his side, threw himself on Leyria and Ourem, in order to watch the great road of Coimbra.

The arrangements made by Marshal Masséna were carried into execution with extreme precision. On the 6th the army was in full march, without being pursued by the English; on the 7th it had reached a line from which it might have given battle, Reynier being at Thomar, Junot at Ourem, Ney at Leyria; whilst Loison remaining at Punhète, awaited the close of day, to set fire to those bridge materials which were the marvellous and useless result of the exertions of General Eblé.

It was not until the morning of the 6th that Lord Wellington received exact information respecting the retreat of our army. The movements which had taken place on the 4th, and certain information which he received, had prepared him for the event, but as he could obtain no certain information, his customary prudence withheld him from hazarding any movement; and indeed, the retreat of the French was in itself so great a triumph for him, that he had good reason not to compromise this success by any precipitate action, which might expose him to some serious reverse. Receiving information at this time that Badajoz was reduced to the last extremity, he sent a message to the governor of this place, promising immediate succour, and urging most earnestly the protraction of the defence; and immediately despatched Marshal Beresford with the troops of General Hill, from Abrantès, to save a place which was the key of Alentejo. These arrangements having been concluded, he proceeded to follow in the track of our army, resolving at the same time to conduct his movements with the most extreme circumspection, since he had conceived for Marshal Masséna's talents, even after this campaign, which has been subsequently so much blamed, the most profound esteem.

On the 9th of March our rear guard, the 6th corps, was at Pombal, between Leyria and Coimbra, under Marshal Ney; and as it was a position possessed of some resources and means of defence, various strategical reasons induced Marshal Masséna to remain at Pombal, during the 9th and 10th. On discovering this proceeding on the part of the French, Lord Wellington conjectured that they had resolved to make amends for their retreat, by giving him battle; and being somewhat intimidated by this idea, he countermanded his orders with respect to some of the troops which he had directed Beresford to take to the aid of Badajoz, and assembled around himself, by the high road of Coimbra, the greater portion of his forces.

Ney discovering from Pombal the concentration of the English army, informed Masséna of it on the evening of the 10th, and demanded that either he should be permitted to

leave his position, or that he should be supplied with sufficient reinforcements to enable him to make head against the enemy. Masséna hastened to Ney's head quarters, and took pains to reassure him, whilst he urged him to maintain his position at Pombal until the next day, and on the succeeding day to make a stand at Redinha, so as to give the necessary time for the occupation of Coimbra and Mondego, by the troops of Junot. Ney was by no means so easily convinced of the security of his position as Masséna desired, but promised to hold it as long as possible. To increase the embarrassment of the moment, General Drouet, who was charged with the duty of supporting Ney, was seized once more with the desire of seeking what he considered his proper position, and announced his immediate departure, which would have reduced Ney's force to two divisions. Masséna committed the error of not decidedly commanding him to stay, and permitted himself to be satisfied with Drouet's promise to retire slowly. Ney promised to maintain his position at Pombal, but did not say for how long. Masséna was guilty of a twofold fault on this occasion, for he failed to command with sufficient vigour, and omitted to take advantage of this position of Pombal to inflict a severe blow on the English.

On the morning of the 11th Ney, posted at Pombal on the right bank of the little river Arunça, saw the English descending by the left bank in order to cross it below Pombal, and immediately ordered a retreat without attending to the remonstrances of the chief of the staff, Fririon, who endeavoured to induce him to maintain his position. Contenting himself with sending a few battalions under General Fririon's command to check the immediate advance of the English, which duty they effectually performed, he quietly commenced his retreat, descending the right bank of the river in the face of the English who occupied the left. He halted at night-fall at Venda da Cruz, at the point where the road quits the valley of the Arunça to take its course along that of the Soure.

On the following day, the 12th, Ney commenced his march before daybreak, in order that he might not have the enemy at his heels, in the defiles through which he would have to pass. With his seven or eight thousand men he slowly retreated, followed by twenty-five thousand English, formed into three columns, the one on the right composed of the troops of General Picton, and the Portuguese under General Pack, the central one composed of the troops under General Cole, the third, on the left, consisting of the light infantry of General Erskine. The cavalry of General Slade, that of the

Portuguese and the sharpshooters, formed the connecting links between these three columns. Ney, as a lion pursued by hunters, kept his eyes fixed on his assailants, prepared to hurl himself upon the one that should be most rash. When one of these columns pressed too closely, he swept it with musketry, or charged it with the bayonet, or hurled his dragoons upon it, employing each arm in turn according to the varying nature of the ground, with admirable skill and irresistible vigour. He thus employed half the day, whilst he gave way, at the most, no more than two leagues, and prepared for the English on the bank of the Soure a final and warm reception, which would form a worthy conclusion to the exploits of the day.

Ney had now reached the chain of heights which border the Soure, and at the foot of which, on the very bank of the river, is the village Redinha. His position now, therefore, rested on the bed of the Soure and Redinha, whilst in front of him there was a little plain, through the midst of which the English advanced with awkward movements. It was an advantageous position to defend, since it commanded on every side the ground occupied by the enemy, and even offered the opportunity of a decided success, since it would be possible, whilst repulsing the English, to drive them headlong into the defile which had been traversed by each army in the course of the morning, and to precipitate them from thence into the valley of the Arunca. With twelve thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry at his disposal, Ney was almost certain of success in such a mode of proceeding, but prudential reasons restrained him from making the attempt, for in the position which he now occupied, he was exposed to the danger of being driven into the Soure, and also of being pursued into a frightful defile which lies between Redinha and Condeixa; he took up his position therefore on the heights which he was determined to defend, and having taken ample precautions for securing a retreat in the case of a reverse, he awaited the arrival of the enemy.

Generals Picton and Pack attempted to climb the heights on the left, in order to be able to dispute with Ney his retreat upon Redinha, whilst Generals Cole and Spencer advanced in the centre, and Erskine's light infantry endeavoured to cross the river on our right. But Ney, employing each arm of his forces with the same ready skill, directed an overwhelming fire upon Picton's troops, and forced them to make an oblique movement for the purpose of avoiding it. Having at length, however, succeeded in climbing the heights, after having suffered considerable loss, they advanced upon Ney's

flank, and had arrived within musket range of it, when he overwhelmed them with grape from six pieces of cannon, and then charging with the bayonet drove them to the foot of the heights. Lord Wellington then carried his centre forward, for the purpose both of rallying and covering his right, and with the intention of attacking the front of the French position. Ney, permitting this mass to approach, first received it with the fire of his artillery, then with that of his musketry, and finally charging with the bayonet, drove it down the declivity of the ground. He then sent forward the 3rd hussars, which broke the first line of the English, and sabred a great number of their infantry. At this moment the confusion in the whole mass of the English troops became extreme, but Ney being anxious not to compromise the safety of his troops, called them back, and drawing them up in battle array, remained in position during more than the space of an hour, continuing to hurl shot against the English, and thus causing them the most serious losses.

It was now four o'clock in the afternoon; Lord Wellington, deeply chagrined at finding himself thus baffled by a handful of men, drew together his whole army, formed it into four lines, and advanced with the manifest intention of forcing the position at any price. The moment had now come when it was proper for Marshal Ney to retreat, for it had not been his intention to maintain, but to dispute his position, and he conducted his troops with great skill, and in good order to the other bank of the Soure. The English having reached the heights which we had just abandoned, hastened to descend to the bank of the river, with the purpose of attempting to cross it, but perceived our troops posted on the opposite bank, covered by a cloud of sharpshooters who prevented any approach.

The various circumstances of this engagement were of a nature to render the English very cautious and the French very confident. Ney had retreated into the defile, which led from Redinha to Condeixa, and abutted on heights which might be easily defensible. It was the last step which had to be traversed on the high road from Lisbon to Coimbra, and had to be so taken as to afford Junot time to establish bridges on the Mondego, and to occupy Coimbra, which is on the other bank of this river.

On the evening of the 12th, after the splendid battle of Redinha, Masséna complimented Ney on his triumph, but at the same time expressed some regret that he had not maintained the position in front of the Soure, and implored him to resist to the utmost, as the nature of the ground would well enable him to do, on his way to Condeixa. Marshal

Ney appeared to be but slightly moved by the exhortations of the General-in-Chief, and offered to do his best, without promising success. He seemed to be particularly anxious respecting the movements of the English on his left, demonstrations which, if serious, might have separated him from Loison and Reynier, that is to say, from the bulk of the army; to provide against all danger on this side, Masséna had directed the movements of the divisions Loison and Clausel, so as to connect Ney's left with Reynier, and believing that he was thus sufficiently supported, and would obey the orders given by his General-in-Chief, Masséna proceeded on the morning of the 13th to visit Loison, and from the position which he occupied to endeavour to learn the true projects of the enemy.

Scarcely had Masséna departed than Ney began to employ himself in making observations on the least movements of the English, with a strange distrust of the position which he occupied, and in which there was nothing to give just cause for alarm. A movement made by General Picton on his left thoroughly persuaded him that all his fears were about to be realized, and that he was on the point of being isolated from the main body of the army, perhaps even surrounded. Hurried on by this terror, and perhaps also by a desire to quit the land of Portugal, which he had learned to hate, he disputed but for a few moments the heights of Condeixa, and then hastened to quit them, taking a road which led along a defile to Miranda de Corvo, and would enable him to rejoin Loison, Clausel, and Reynier.

In adopting this important resolution, after the formal orders he had received to maintain a position at Condeixa, he took too much responsibility upon himself, and for the sake of avoiding an imaginary or at most doubtful danger, he exposed the army to certain peril. But however this may be, Ney entered the defile above mentioned, and as he perceived that he thus exposed Montbrun, who held a position on the bank of the Mondego, to being cut off and taken, he informed him of his own movements, and ordered him to retreat immediately with his cavalry, ascending the banks of the Mondego, by a movement parallel with his own.

In the meantime Masséna had repaired to Fuente-Cuberta, where Loison, supported by Clausel, was the link which united the divisions of Ney and Reynier, and was prepared to defeat every attempt which the English might make to penetrate between the two principal masses of the French army. From the elevated point at which he now was Masséna could perceive the movements of General Picton, and saw in them no cause for apprehension, when therefore it was announced to him

in the middle of the day that Ney had evacuated Condeixa, and had thus taken upon himself to decide the issue of the campaign, he expressed aloud his indignation to Fririon, the chief of the staff, and was so greatly angered as to entertain for a moment the idea of depriving Ney of his command; but perceiving the inconvenience which must result from the loss of the services of one of his lieutenants, he restrained himself to a cold expression of his discontent, at the same time drily ordering Marshal Ney to stop as soon as he should have issued from the defile in which he then was, in order to give Montbrun and the heavy baggage an opportunity of effecting a movement similar to that executed by the 6th corps. Marshal Ney's precipitate retreat had, to a certain degree, imperilled Masséna himself, who had under his own command the divisions Loison and Clausel, for being now uncovered on his right he might, had the English been more active, have been cut off from the 6th corps. But he immediately set his troops in retreat, marching by moonlight during the whole night, and debouching in the morning between Casal-Novo and Miranda de Corvo, behind Marshal Ney.

Marshal Ney on emerging from the defile which ran from Condeixa towards Miranda de Corvo, stopped at the village of Casal-Novo. On the following day, the 14th, in spite of a thick mist, he commenced a series of manœuvres in the presence of the English, with a dexterity, precision and skill, which excited general admiration. And now the two armies slowly proceeded, the one behind the other; the French only yielding their ground step by step, after a well planned resistance at every point, and the English advancing with difficulty under a murderous fire, and against positions in which they attempted to come up with the enemy, and as petpetually failed to do so. At the close of the day they were compelled to halt in the presence of the French army, which was assembled in force in an almost impregnable position.

No loss had resulted from the movements of Marshal Ney, but the failure of the execution of the plan which had been so wisely formed by the General-in-Chief, of establishing the army on the Mondego. All the corps of the army were reunited, together with their matériel, after a loss of men inferior by three-fourths at least to that suffered by the English, and after having successfully passed the most difficult portion of their road. The English roughly handled at Redinha and Casal-Novo, showed no impatience to attack our troops, and appeared rather to escort than to pursue them.

Our army had passed the night of the 1st on the bank of the river Ceyra, which it had crossed; but Ney, with too much confidence, had permitted two of his divisions to pass the night on the same side of the river with the English. Masséna had intimated to him the danger to which he thus exposed himself, but he disregarded the hint, in the belief that the English would not have the audacity to attack him. Lord Wellington, however, who was determined, with all his prudence, to lose no opportunity of destroying us, if we were so foolish as to afford any opportunity, perceived that a considerable portion of the 6th corps had remained on his side of the Ceyra, and on the morning of the 15th hastened to envelope it with masses of troops. Our soldiers, surprised by this unexpected attack, ran to arms, a portion of them (the division Mormet) proceeding to occupy the heights which surrounded the ground on which they had been encamped during the night, in order to hold in check the enemy, whilst Marshal Ney directed the retreat of the remaining portion (the division Marchand) by the narrow pass of the bridge of the Ceyra. Whilst the troops were crossing the bridge, several slight circumstances concurred to create a panic amongst them, which turned their retreat into a disorderly flight. Ney endeavoured in vain to rally them, and could not even make his voice heard amidst the confusion. After some moments of this tumult, however, he succeeded in rallying a battalion of the 27th, and some companies of Voltigeurs, and with this handful of men he ascended the heights, where General Mormet with his second brigade was maintaining a desperate struggle against the English. The presence of the feeble reinforcement brought by Marshal Ney reanimated the courage of our troops, and charging the English they compelled them to retire with loss. In the meantime the tumult at the bridge had subsided; the fugitives perceiving the heights behind them to be securely occupied by French troops, became reassured, and defiled across the bridge in tranquillity. The second brigade, after having held the heights as long as was necessary, descended, and crossing the bridge rejoined the rest of the 6th corps.

The army took up its position behind the Ceyra, without being disturbed, for Lord Wellington had learned that this army, always so great in the hour of danger, could not be easily crushed; on the 17th, it advanced to the Alva. Masséna suffered cruelly, as may be well supposed, at being forced to this retreat, by the error of his master, who had assigned to him the performance of an impossible task, by the error of his lieutenants who had thwarted all his plans, by the error of the other generals in the Peninsula, who had

failed to succour him, and finally by the conspiracy as it were, of circumstances against him. He was deeply distressed, and endeavoured to give the movement the character of a manœuvre rather than of a retreat. It was with this motive that he had formed the plan of establishing a position on the Mondego; and being deprived of this resource by Ney's precipitancy in quitting his post at Condeixa, he would have wished at least to remain upon the Alva, which flows along the sierra Murcelha; but this position was a very insecure one, since the English could turn it by ascending the right bank of the Mondego, and it was distant, moreover, many days march from Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, which contained the resources of the army. It would be, therefore, rather a consolation to his honourable pride than a manœuvre, the success of which was important.

On the 18th the French army reached the Alva. Junot was on the right (in respect to the enemy), near the point of junction of the Alva with the Mondego; Ney was in the centre behind Ponte Murcelha, Reynier on the left towards the mountains and on the sides of the Estrella, whence the Alva takes its source; and Drouet, whom the orders of Masséna could no longer detain, on the Almeida road. Masséna had particularly urged upon Ney the importance of defending the Ponte-Murcelha position, and he had both promised and intended to do so.

But this time, so great a fatality seemed to pursue the army of Portugal, the disobedience was to come from the most obedient of Masséna's lieutenants, General Reynier. Marshal Ney established on the Alva, in the position of Ponte-Murcelha, endeavoured to ascertain by reconnaissances whether his wings were well guarded, and whether there were no risk of being again surprised by the enemy. On the right he had found the posts of Junot's division closely connected with his own; but on his left he failed to find those of Reynier's division precisely at that part of the Murcelha sierra which, being but slightly connected with that of the Estrella, could be passed. Ney, uneasy at finding himself almost completely unprotected on his left, made earnest complaints to Masséna on the subject. The General-in-Chief sent officers after officers to make enquiries of Reynier, and he was found far from the sierra of Murcelha, on the sierra of Moita, another detached branch of the Estrella, and situated very much in the rear of the actual position of the army. The source of this conduct was some ill humour which Reynier had conceived against the General-in-Chief, in consequence of certain reprimands the latter had found it necessary to give him; and now, far from obey-

ing the order he received to place himself on the left of the army, he replied to it by detailing the plan of an attack on the English, which, according to him, must have great results; and whilst he was discussing these operations, Ney, finding himself completely exposed, and distinctly perceiving the advance of the English, on the other side of the Alva, against his left, was compelled by many prudential considerations to abandon Ponte-Murcelha, and thus once more, although involuntarily, to frustrate the projects of Marshal Masséna. The position of the Alva was from that time no longer tenable, and that this was the case could only be a subject of regret on account of Masséna, to whose pride it was a consolation. To regain the Spanish frontier was all that now remained to be done.

The English, on their side, as their provisions began to fail on account of the difficulty of transporting them so far from the sea, and as they despaired of crushing an army which defended its retreat so vigorously, perceived the necessity of making a halt of some days duration; the Portuguese troops, whose subsistence was never cared for till the English troops had been supplied, began to die of hunger, and complained bitterly. Lord Wellington resolved, therefore, on a halt of three or four days between Ponte-Murcelha and Coimbra. The French army continued its march in three columns without being pursued, arrived about the 22nd of March at the line of heights which separate the valley of the Mondego and that of the Coa, and found himself within sight of the frontiers of Spain, from which he had departed six months before to invade Portugal

The old Marshal re-entered Spain with a heavy heart. Although his retreat had not, indeed, been like that of Junot from Lisbon after a capitulation, nor that of Soult from Oporto with the loss of his artillery; although he had maintained his position on the Tagus during six months, without succour of any kind or even communications with France, in one of the most difficult positions in which a General could be placed; although he had performed a march of sixty leagues through a sterile and devastated country, pursued by an army twice as numerous as his own, without the loss of a single cannon, wounded man, or baggage waggon, and inspired the enemy with so much respect that it had relinquished its pursuit; although his movements had, in general, been such that he could find in them no cause for self-reproach, yet it was cruel at his age, after so much toil, after so many triumphs, to add to his numerous campaigns one which, however meritorious in the eyes of the well-informed and the thoughtful, could not but be regarded by the public

in general, which only judges of actions by their results, as a failure. The aspect of his army, moreover, was calculated to affect him deeply. The discipline of the troops was still admirable, but half of them were constantly scattered in every direction in a search for provisions. The greater number of the draught horses were either dead or thoroughly worn out, and scarcely sufficient remained to manœuvre a few pieces of cannon in front of the enemy. The soldiers, blackened by the sun, attenuated, ragged, shoeless, but vigorous, inured to fatigue, haughty, arrogant, and licentious in their manners as their language, failed to endure the state of distress in which they were with that resignation which sometimes so highly ennobles the miseries of warfare. Masséna himself had by this time, unfortunately, been deprived of his accustomed prestige partly by the indiscreet observations made respecting him by the Generals under him, and partly by his own errors. In the season of victory soldiers smile at the faults of their leaders, but in the hour of adversity they regard them as crimes. But the General-in-Chief was still far from being overwhelmed by circumstances under which most men would have been crushed, and resolved on the execution of new operations, calculated to give another character to his retreat. He proposed to refresh and provision his troops, and then, by Guarda and Belmonte, to cross the sierra of Gata, to descend upon the Tagus by Alcantara, and thus to recommence the campaign of Portugal. He had still, after the withdrawal of Drouet, 40,000 men under his command, of incomparable valour, and proof against fatigue and fear, and with such a force, acting in connection with the army of Andalusia, he flattered himself that he might penetrate into Portugal by a new road. But when orders having for their aim the execution of this project emanated from head quarters, they were the object of violent criticism throughout the army, and universal indignation.

Full of this project, which consoled him for his disappointments, Masséna, on arriving on the frontier of Old Castille, directed his three corps towards the sierra de Gata, and assigned to each the cantonments it was to occupy after the march they were about to perform. He appointed Belmonte, which is situated at the sources of the Zezère, as the position to be occupied by Reynier's corps; whilst Junot's corps was to establish itself at Guarda, which is at the sources of the Mondego, and Ney's corps at Celarico, a stony, arid, desolate district, which separates the waters of the Coa from those of the Mondego. As soon as Masséna's project became known the Generals of the various corps raised their voices against it, declaring that it would be

impossible to remain forty-eight hours in the positions to which they had been ordered, and that it was impossible to recommence operations without a supply of clothes, shoes, money, and horses. Marshal Ney especially was dissatisfied at the idea of making another campaign under Marshal Masséna. Encouraged by the complaints which arose around him, and the popularity he enjoyed in his corps of the army, he permitted himself to indulge in an action of insubordination; writing to the General-in-Chief a letter in which, declaring the sufferings endured by his corps, the impossibility of procuring subsistence at Celorico, the necessity of leaving it to fall back upon the Coa, and enumerating the inconvenience which would attend a new campaign on the Tagus, he formally demanded the production of the orders of the Emperor, and declared that if those orders did not exist, as he believed was the case, he should find himself compelled to disobey the commands lately laid upon him.

Marshal Masséna was convinced that the insubordination of his lieutenants had alone hindered him from carrying the enemy's position at Busaco, from crossing the Tagus at Punhète, from seizing the line of the Mondego at Condeixa, and finally, from being able to make a stand on the line of the Alva. He had hitherto smothered his anger that he might not cause any commotion in the army, which would be dangerous during the progress of a retreat; but now, aroused from his habitual calmness by this last act of Marshal Ney's, he determined to deprive him of his sword in the presence of the whole army. He repeated his commands to him, and demanded to be informed whether he still refused to obey. Marshal Ney began to perceive that he had made a false step, but he dared not now recede, and once more, although in more moderate terms, insisted on the communication of the Emperor's own orders.

Masséna no longer hesitated; but ordering Marshal Ney immediately to quit the 6th corps and to retire into the interior of Spain, there to await the Emperor's commands, he directed General Loison to assume the command. The flatterers who had enticed him on to his insubordination, now quailed before the energy of the General-in-Chief, and endeavoured to persuade Marshal Ney to yield. And this he did; atoning for a moment's error by a most praiseworthy submission.

This sad sacrifice having been made to discipline, the language of the troops became less insubordinate, but they were still as disinclined as ever to renew those attempts on the Tagus which they regarded as both calamitous to the army and useless to the designs of the Emperor. They

were resigned to obey, but hated those who demanded such obedience. Although Masséna had too little consideration for the sufferings of his troops, he had consented that the 6th corps should approach Almeida and Ciudad-Rodrigo for the purpose of obtaining provisions from the stores which they contained; unhappily the country in which the troops now were was as destitute as themselves.

A new measure taken by Napoleon at this period, namely, the nomination of Marshal Bessières to the command of all the north of Spain, still further aggravated and complicated the unsatisfactory state of affairs. The Emperor, perceiving the inconvenience of having distinct commands at Burgos, Valladolid, Léon, and Salamanca, and being discontented with General Kellerman, had been anxious to consign the command of all the troops scattered throughout the north of Spain to a single Commander-in-Chief, to whom would also be committed the government of the Provinces of Biscay, Burgos, Valladolid, Zamora, and Léon; Marshal Bessières was selected for this exalted post, because he had served in the north of the Peninsula, and was at the head of the Imperial Guard; he was already established at Burgos when the army of Portugal entered Old Castille. Masséna had written to him announcing his arrival, his necessities, and his plans, and requested immediate supplies of provisions, munitions, and horses. Bessières had in return been prodigal of assurances of the most complete devotion, but failed to send anything to the succour of the army of Portugal more substantial than promises.

After having waited on the frontier of Old Castille during some days, Masséna, finding that no succour arrived, receiving very unsatisfactory information respecting the resources of Estremadura, and perceiving the stores of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Almeida diminish with fearful rapidity; seeing that his cavalry and artillery were without horses, and taking into consideration that the whole army was exasperated at the idea of a new campaign on the Tagus, Masséna finally renounced a project which, since the successive loss of the lines of the Mondego and the Alva, had been his sole consolation.

Marshal Masséna immediately sent a confidential officer to inform Napoleon of the events of the retreat, the causes which had prevented him from establishing himself on the Mondego, and those which had withheld him from again marching on the Tagus, and of the deplorable quarrel which had occurred between himself and Marshal Ney. This officer was also directed to demand supplies and orders, and all that would be necessary to the immediate recommence-

ment of the campaign. In the meantime Masséna led the army into Old Castille, and having placed it in cantonments at Almeida, Ciudad-Rodrigo, Salamanca, and Zamora, went himself to Salamanca, in order to inspire by his presence some activity into the administration of the army.

In the meantime Marshal Soult had continued and accomplished the siege of Badajoz; this siege had been conducted at first with great slowness and afterwards with great rapidity. The news received from all sides on the state of affairs, at length lent an impulse to the works, which triumphed over every obstacle. Information was received from Andalusia that Marshal Victor was in the greatest peril, being threatened by an Anglo-Spanish army that had been formed in front of Gibraltar, and to oppose which he had only seven or eight thousand men; that General Sébastiani, instead of holding himself in readiness to succour Marshal Masséna, had on the contrary directed his principal forces against the kingdom of Murcia; that there was great danger that the siege of Cadiz would be raised, and the immense matériel collected for the purposes of this siege destroyed. From the neighbourhood of Lisbon news was received that the English threatened the fortresses of Estremadura, and that an English army, probably that of Lord Wellington himself, was advancing to raise the siege of Badajoz, and this, amongst other reports, gave rise to the belief that Marshal Masséna had at length been compelled to retreat from the Tagus.

On the receipt of this news, Marshal Soult visited the trenches in person, accompanied by his chief engineer and artillery officers, and declared that he hoped to be in Badajoz within forty-eight hours. Finding that before a breach could be rendered practicable, the removal of the summit of the wall of the counterscarp would be necessary, and that to effect this in the usual manner would require a space of two days, he determined that a detachment of soldiers should pull it down by hand, under cover of the night.

On the 10th the breach was declared practicable, and Marshal Soult, who had received from Andalusia and Portugal news even still more disquieting, was anxious not to lose an instant, and had the place summoned to surrender. The governor perceived the danger of resistance, but endeavoured to enter into negotiations, for he had been informed of the approach of the English. Marshal Soult, however, refused to allow himself to be tricked, and ordered that the assault should take place at four o'clock in the afternoon; but at the moment when our columns were about to throw themselves into the breach, a white flag announced that the fortress had surrendered. On the 11th of March our troops

entered Badajoz, forty-two days after the first opening of the trenches. Having devoted two days to the repair, arming and provisioning of Badajoz, that it might be able to resist the English, Marshal Soult hastened to proceed towards Cadiz, feeling great anxiety with respect to what was taking place in that quarter.

The following had, in the meantime, been the state of affairs in the neighbourhood of Cadiz. Being in constant dread of the concentration of our troops on the Tagus, the English had resolved to make such manœuvres between Murcia, Grenada, Gibraltar, and Cadiz, that the French troops which were in Andalusia would not dare to leave it even though they had taken Badajoz. The plan was well conceived, and the errors committed on our side rendered its execution easy. Murat at Naples, after having made every preparation for a descent on Sicily, had renounced his project and dispersed the troops he had collected for its execution, thus leaving the English at liberty to send four or five thousand of their best troops to Gibraltar. These troops, together with some others which were already at Gibraltar, and a part of the garrison of Cadiz, were assembled at the camp of Saint-Roch, and formed an army of about 20,000 men, eight or nine thousand English, and twelve thousand Spaniards. So large a proportion of English rendered this army formidable, and the junction of General Sébastiani with Marshal Victor was necessary to oppose it. But unfortunately the movements of General Blake in Murcia had drawn General Sébastiani thither, and a few feeble columns which he had despatched to Tarifa and Ronda were not calculated to be of any assistance to Marshal Victor.

Marshal Victor had no more than 8,000 effective troops at his disposal. He left at the various posts of the line of investment as few as possible, sent 2,500 men of the division Villate towards Santi-Petri, to hold in check the garrison of Léon, and with the 5,000 men of the divisions Leval and Ruffin which remained, and with 500 horse, he marched by his left, in the direction of Gibraltar, to meet the enemy's army, of the strength of which he was ignorant.

On the 3rd of March General Villatte surprised the Spaniards, who had thrown a bridge over the extremity of the canal Santi-Petri, and had already passed across, and drove them back into the isle of Léon, with the loss of a hundred killed, a hundred drowned, and about 400 prisoners. He then took up a position near the canal, awaiting the appearance of the English army, which Marshal Victor had gone in search of. On the 4th information was received that it was on the sea coast, and on the 5th that it had been seen in a

position on the sandy heights, with the sea behind it, its left being towards Santi-Petri, and its right towards the tower of Barrossa.

On the morning of the 5th Marshal Victor had no hesitation in taking the offensive, with the five thousand men whom he had under his orders. Leaving on his right General Villatte, who by occupying the banks of the canal, was the object of attack to a portion of the enemy's forces, he made a vigorous movement towards the sandy heights occupied by the Anglo Spanish troops. When the attack commenced, the impetuosity of our men obtained them some temporary success, but there was no probability that five thousand men could vanquish twenty thousand, especially when nine thousand of them were English. Marshal Victor, therefore, took up a position somewhat withdrawn, and then awaited General Villatte, whom he had sent for, and ready, in spite of all perils, to renew the struggle, should the disembarked army endeavour to quit the sea coast to penetrate into the interior of Andalusia.

The enemy, fearing that if Marshal Victor should be reinforced, they might be driven into the sea, determined to retreat, and to renounce the endeavour to raise the siege of Cadiz.

When Marshal Soult returned to Andalusia, he found every thing retrieved, and the siege of Cadiz continued, and that a most decisive triumph might have been obtained, had he known how to concentrate at the proper moment the forces of General Sébastiani and Marshal Victor. He found himself, however, in a most critical position; the battles in which he had engaged had left Marshal Victor scarcely sufficient troops to maintain the blockade of Cadiz; Marshal Mortier, left at Badajoz with some thousand men, was reduced to the alternative of either departing from it, or shutting himself up within its walls; it was tolerably certain that the English would attack it almost immediately, and snatch it from our hands, unless succoured by an efficient army; and Soult himself had at his disposal no more than seven or eight thousand effective men. Devoured by anxiety, Marshal Soult hastened to write to King Joseph and to Masséna for succour, and to send to Paris earnest entreaties for reinforcements, and that orders might be given to the army of Portugal to join him in Estremadura.

Information of the greater number of these events was carried to Napoleon by General Foy, who was personally well received, but scarcely listened to, when he attempted to present the defence of his General-in-Chief. Napoleon had no pity for his illustrious Lieutenant, and, even as the blind

public only judged by results, and took not into account the nature of attending circumstances. "Why?" exclaimed Napoleon in each of his interviews with General Foy, "Why give battle at Busaco? Why, instead of stopping at Coimbra, march upon Lisbon? Why remain so long on the Tagus without doing anything? Why quit the Tagus when Marshal Soult was in the act of marching upon Abrantes? Why retreat so precipitately and so far?" We have already repeated these reproaches, and shown how far they were founded in reason. Without paying any heed to the truth, Napoleon spoke so severely against Masséna, that General Foy, intimidated, defended him but badly. After numerous interviews with the General and the officers who had recently arrived, Napoleon gave the following orders to his Generals commanding in Spain:—

Perceiving the impossibility of making Ney serve under Masséna, he replaced the former by Marshal Marmont, still committing the error of placing Marshals under other Marshals. Napoleon ordered Marmont to enter immediately upon the task of reorganizing the composition of the 6th corps. He annexed General Drouet's corps to the army of Portugal, and ordered Marshal Bessières to furnish it with horses, mules, provisions, and war matériel, and to enable it, in short, to accomplish that descent upon the Tagus by Plasencia and Alcantara. Being ignorant as yet whether it would be possible to make a new campaign in Portugal, Napoleon regarded the army of Portugal as that which, constantly watching the movements of Lord Wellington, and following him in all his movements, should make head against him in Castille, if he remained on the Mondego; in Estremadura, if he descended upon the Tagus; and should give him battle on the first opportunity, whilst the army of Andalusia, having been reinforced, carried on the siege of Cadiz.

But whilst with an inexhaustible fertility of mind, and unfortunately also, with an equal abundance of illusions, Napoleon re-arranged all his plans; he had foreseen, even before the arrival of the couriers from Andalusia, the embarrassments in which Marshal Soult must find himself. It was not probable in fact, that the army of Marshal Masséna could reach the Tagus before the lapse of a month, and in the meantime every thing foretold that the English would throw themselves en masse in the direction of Estremadura, for the purpose of retaking Badajoz, or at least would direct to this quarter a large detachment which Marshal Soult would find it impossible to resist. Napoleon, therefore, ordered the army of the north to send immediate reinforcements towards

Andalusia; he ordered General Belliard, who was directing under Joseph the movements of the army of the centre, to restore to Marshal Soult all the detachments which belonged to him; and directed Marshal Bessières to send away all the battalions belonging to the fourth, first, and fifth corps, and consequently to the army of Andalusia. He had already sent towards Castille a division of reserve, which was formed of battalions intended to recruit the armies of Andalusia and Portugal; he now recommended Bessières not to retain it, pointing out to him that he might weaken the strength of his forces without danger, since he was protected on the side of Old Castille by the entry into that province of the army under Masséna. He considered that these measures, strict obedience to which he imperiously commanded, would be the means of affording Marshal Soult an immediate reinforcement of twelve or fifteen thousand men, which would repair his losses, and enable him to oppose some resistance to the English, on the frontier of Estremadura.

It was to be feared, however, that before these orders could be put into execution, serious events must take place, either on the frontier of Old Castille, or on that of Estremadura. Lord Wellington's position had become a much stronger one since Masséna's retreat than it had previously been, and both the Portuguese and English had been compelled to acknowledge that he alone had comprehended the kind of warfare which was best suited to oppose the French in Spain. The opposition party in the English Parliament had done homage by the mouth of Lord Grey to his military strategy, and declared that he had proved the groundlessness of all their fears and surpassed their highest hopes. From this time the war party was completely in the ascendant, and definitely in the possession of power; commercial suffering was still, doubtless, very great, and the financial difficulties very embarrassing; but the anxiety which had oppressed all hearts was removed. The Prince of Wales, who had intended to change his ministers as soon as his father's illness should have been considered likely to endure, no longer thought of so doing, although the malady under which George the Third suffered had been declared incurable. The favourable chance which had been offered to Napoleon had vanished, and Lord Wellington, covered with honours, saw all the obstacles which had obstructed his road to fortune crumble before his steps. He now proposed, whilst the bulk of his forces remained in sight of the fortresses Almeida and Ciudad-Rodrigo, to attempt with the remainder the recapture of Badajoz, and the re-establishment of things in Estremadura on their old footing.

The plan of the English General was only too well suited to existing circumstances; Masséna, in his anxiety to put the army on an effective footing had, as we have said, repaired to Salamanca; and was there surrounded by a demonstrative host which promised much and did nothing. Marshal Bessières, indeed, was so far from fulfilling the promises which he had made of affording succour to the army of Portugal, that he had in some cases even deprived it of resources which were on their way to it. In the meantime Marshal Masséna had been compelled to scatter his army from the summit of the sierra de Gata even to Benavente, near the Asturias, in order to enable it to find subsistence. Two powerful reasons, however, made Masséna anxious to concentrate the army;—it was necessary to prevent the investment of Almeida and Ciudad-Rodrigo, and there was now an opportunity of striking a vital blow at the English army, since its General-in-Chief and a portion of its strength were absent.

As soon as he had become inspired with the hope of effecting these two objects, Masséna was a different man; where he could command he gave the most absolute orders, and where he could not command, he employed the most earnest entreaties, to the end that he might obtain what was necessary for putting the army into an effective state; but the time employed in collecting supplies, sufficed to permit the English to remain two or three weeks under the walls of Almeida, and it was compelled to surrender.

At length Masséna, who began to put no trust in the promises of Bessières, and to disregard the opposition of his lieutenants, gave orders for the concentration of the army. By means of the good services of the excellent General Thiebault, Governor of Salamanca, and the money provided for the pay of the troops, Masséna had procured a certain amount of biscuit and salted meat, which he intended to introduce into Almeida.

The idea of encountering the English in a pitched battle inspired the soldiers with hope, as it had the General-in-Chief. They were only about forty thousand men, it is true, and carried with them no more than forty pieces of cannon, but they were capable of every heroic effort. Unhappily, with the exception of Montbrun and Fournier, who commanded the cavalry, the generals did not share the ardour of the troops. Loison, always brave, was disconcerted at the distrust felt with regard to him, by the 6th corps, which had not ceased to regret the departure of Marshal Ney. Junot was suffering from the effects of a wound; Reynier, who had not recovered from his fatigues and anxieties, had not a

spirit equal to a great crisis. And Drouet, who had been hitherto of so little use, declared that he was about to quit the army of Portugal. Napoleon, indeed, always more anxious for the army of Andalusia, had ordered that the 9th corps should depart immediately for the Guadiana; but whilst urging Masséna to dismiss it as speedily as possible, he had left to him to decide upon the moment of its departure; Masséna had, therefore, ordered Drouet to follow him, but the latter was as little disposed to attempt any energetic action as the others.

Masséna, relying on himself and his excellent troops, made all wills on this occasion bend to his own, and proceeded towards Ciudad-Rodrigo, with about thirty-four thousand men, having left the division Clausel on the Salamanca route, to preserve his communications; for it was by this route that he expected to receive provisions, munitions of war and reinforcements. But whilst the sturdy aspect of his troops was inspiring Masséna with the hope of obtaining a prompt and brilliant success, he received information of an event, which he might have easily expected, and which diminished without destroying his hopes. Lord Wellington, to whom the rumours of Marshal Masséna's preparations had intimated the nature of his designs, had returned to his army, to prepare it for the contest, to concentrate and reinforce it. But still the French General-in-Chief marched forwards, confident in his own superiority, and in that of his soldiers. On the 1st of May he was on the point of quitting Ciudad-Rodrigo, without awaiting the arrival of some reinforcements promised by Marshal Bessières; but at that moment Bessières himself appeared, and announced that 1500 horses, a battery of six pieces, and thirty teams would reach the camp in the evening.

The certain hope of this succour, more especially the cavalry, sent a gleam of satisfaction into every countenance. It was resolved to delay the march until the morrow; in the evening the promised reinforcements arrived, and the night was employed in making preparations for departure on the following morning.

The army defiled by the bridge of Ciudad-Rodrigo, over the Aguéda. Whilst traversing the Aguéda, our troops found the English advanced posts on each side of a little river called the Azana, and behind which they retreated after having lost some men, who were either sabred or taken by our cavalry. Their real position was at some little distance on the banks of a stream, the Dos-Casas, deeply intrenched, and presenting those natural defences against an attack, such as the English loved to defend. The English army posted

behind this stream consisted of about forty-two thousand men, of whom about twenty-seven thousand were English, twelve thousand Portuguese, and two or three thousand Spaniards. Lord Wellington had arrived at his camp on the 28th, and personally superintended all its arrangements. On his extreme right, towards the village of Pozo Velho, at the sources of the Dos-Casas, he had placed the Spaniards under their commander Don Julian, that he might have means of readily ascertaining the movements which might be made by the French on that side. Nearer his centre, at the village of Fuentès d'Onoro, he had established his light division under General Crawfurd, with a portion of the Portuguese troops, and a little further back, three strong divisions of infantry under Generals Spencer, Picton, and Houston. The point at Fuentès d'Onoro was important, for it covered the principal communication possessed by the English with Portugal, namely the bridge of Castelbon over the river Coa. Had they been deprived of this bridge, there would only have remained to them one below Almeida, very insufficient for the passage of an army in retreat, especially when vigorously pursued; this explains why Lord Wellington had collected such a mass of troops in front of and behind Fuentès d'Onoro. On his left, near Alaméda, at a point of the Dos-Casas where it was of a depth that would render its passage a matter of difficulty, he had écheloned the 6th division under General Campbell, farther back towards fort Conception, was the 5th, under General Dunlop, and finally the remainder of the Portuguese so disposed as to form a connecting link between Fort Conception and Almeida. As this position occupied from its one extremity to the other less than three leagues and a half, should Masséna, instead of proceeding directly against Fuentès d'Onoro defile before him, with the purpose of descending upon Fort Conception and Almeida, the English General would be able to cross the Dos-Casas and throw himself upon the flank of the French. And even without crossing the Dos-Casas he would be easily able to concentrate his forces around Fort Conception, which was but partially destroyed, and would prove a valuable point in the manœuvres of a battle. There was but one inconvenience attending this position of Fuentes d'Onoro, and that consisted in the existence of a stream behind it of much the same character as the one in front of it. This stream was the Turones, and was calculated to be either an additional support to the English army, were time afforded for forming behind it in good order, or a source of danger should it be driven towards it in confusion.

Masséna after having remained during the night of the 2nd of May a little in advance of the Azava, took up a position on the morning of the 3rd on the Dos-Casas, in the face of the English. Reynier on the right of the Dos Casas, opposite Almeida; Salignac, with the only division of the 8th corps was on the field; and Drouet with the ninth occupied the centre, between Alaméda and Fuentès d'Onoro, a little in the rear of the Dos-Casas. Loison with the 6th, and Montbrun with the cavalry, were posted directly in front of Fuentès d'Onoro.

When Masséna had reconnoitred the enemy's position, he paused to consider whether, defiling by his right, and executing a flank march, he should follow the course of the Dos-Casas as far as Fort Conception, and there penetrate to Almeida; or whether he should vigorously attack with his left the English right, established at Fuentès d'Onoro, with the view of cutting it off from Castelbon and the Coa, throwing it back upon their left and centre as far as Almeida, then to drive them altogether upon the lower Coa, where their retreat would be very difficult and probably very disastrous. As the first plan involved the peril of a flank march in the presence of the enemy, and of finding in Fort Conception a formidable obstacle, Masséna much preferred the second plan, which offered the opportunity of gaining a victory, the probable result of which would be the retreat of the English to Coimbra, or even as far as Lisbon.

On the 3rd, therefore, about the middle of the day, Masséna ordered General Ferrey, who commanded the 3rd division of the 6th corps, to attack Fuentès d'Onoro, whilst Reynier on the right should throw back the English upon Almeida, and Salignac and Drouet, holding posts of observation in the centre, united the two portions of the army. General Ferrey, preceded by the light cavalry of General Fournier, advanced by the chief road upon Fuentès d'Onoro. General Fournier vigorously charged the English cavalry and light infantry, and drove them in confusion to the village of Fuentès d'Onoro, which General Ferrey then immediately attacked with about three thousand men. This little village of Old Castille, which has become so celebrated, is situated partly on one side of the Dos-Casas, and partly on the other, on the slope of a height; it was surrounded by an enclosure very capable of being well defended, and filled with sharpshooters. It was occupied by Colonel Williams, with four battalions of light troops, and the second battalion of the British 83rd. In addition to the natural barriers which rendered its approach very difficult, the English had closed the principal entrance.

General Ferrey attacked Fuentès d'Onoro with 1,200

men, and left in reserve his second brigade of almost 1,800. Carrying at the bayonet's point all the barriers which had been raised in the principal avenue, he at once drove back the English beyond the Dos-Casas, and followed them to its left bank. Colonel Williams was wounded. Lord Wellington brought up reinforcements, and our troops were forced to retreat. At five in the afternoon Masséna ordered a second and more serious attack to be executed by the whole division Ferrey, and a brigade of the division Marchand. This was an error. The enemy were now on the alert, and Fuentès d'Onoro should have been attacked by the three divisions of the 6th corps led by the brave Loison.

In the second attack our troops speedily obtained possession of the lower part of Fuentès d'Onoro, the right bank as well as the left bank of the stream, and advancing to the foot of the height attempted in their impetuosity to climb it. Overcoming one obstacle after another they arrived almost as far as the summit, and there being exposed to a terrible fire of musketry and artillery found how unequal were their numbers to the accomplishment of such an enterprise. They were driven back to the bottom of the height, and were on the point of being forced to retreat in disorder on the line of the Dos-Casas, when General Ferrey, rallying the troops which had been engaged in the morning, together with the Hanoverian legion and a regiment of the division Marchand, attacked the English with the bayonet and compelled them to regain the position from which they had descended. The result of these actions was that the English remained masters of the upper part of the village, whilst the French had possession of the lower, and of both banks of the stream, and that either side had lost six or seven hundred men in killed or wounded.

If Masséna were not endowed with that foresight and energy which seem to have been possessed by Napoleon alone in modern times, he nevertheless never failed to retain his presence of mind on the field of battle, where most Generals ordinarily lose it; and he was so far from being discouraged by difficulty that the strength of his character was always manifested most clearly and exactly in those circumstances in which other persons usually lose theirs. After having passed the day on the field of battle of Fuentès d'Onoro, he had perceived that in ascending towards his left, and consequently towards the English right, the bed of the Dos-Casas became less deep, and that at this point a slightly undulated plain formed the only separation between us and the enemy. He supposed therefore that on this side he might easily attack and even turn the English, and, driving

their right upon their centre, their centre on their left, realise his first and well considered project of throwing them on the lower Coa, and depriving them of the road which leads to the bridge of Castelbon.

On the evening of the 4th of May, therefore, he executed with the whole army a movement from right to left, from Fuentès d'Onoro to Pozo Velho. He left Reynier before Almeida, with instructions to occupy the attention of the English, by an attack more or less vigorous according to events. He left General Ferrey in the low part of Fuentès d'Onoro, giving him the whole 9th corps to assist him in taking this village as soon as sufficient progress had been made towards Pozo Velho, to render this operation practicable; he sent the divisions Marchand and Mormet of the 6th corps, all the cavalry, and the division Salignac of the 8th corps, (about 17,000 men in all) over against the open ground of Pozo Velho.

On the next day, the 5th of May, the troops had executed their movements betimes. Reynier was in front of Almeida, extending his left towards Fuentès d'Onoro; Ferrey was in the low part of Fuentès d'Onoro, and Drouet behind him with the 9th corps ready to march to his support. The divisions Mermet and Marchand of the 6th corps, and all the cavalry with the exception of that of the guard left a little in the rear, were at the height of Pozo Velho. The division Salignac of the 8th corps was appointed to act as their reserve; the army full of confidence and ardour believed that it was marching to victory.

In the meantime Lord Wellington had divined Masséna's project, and had adapted his movements so as best to meet it. Sending back the light division towards Fuentès d'Onoro, he left Picton with the 3rd division on the heights of Fuentès d'Onoro, and Spencer a little in the rear with the first; he sent towards Pozo Velho, Ashworth's Portuguese brigade, two English battalions, a part of his cavalry, and the whole of General Houston's division, the 7th. Finally he posted Don Julian and his Spaniards more to the right at Nave de Avel. He took great precautions with regard to his right, but they were not such as could effectually oppose the 17,000 men whom Masséna was about to send against him.

On the morning of the 5th, at daybreak, the movement of the French army commenced. Loison marched towards Pozo Velho, having Montbrun on his left with 4,000 dragoons and 1,400 *hussards* and *chasseurs*. Montbrun wished in the first place to disperse Don Julian's Spaniards, and attacking them with his light cavalry, he drove them beyond the Turones. In the meantime, Marchand, deploying by his

left towards the village of Pozo Velho, which, surrounded by a little wood, was guarded by the Portuguese and by a part of the division Houston, directed an attack upon it which was entirely successful, the enemy being driven away with a loss of about two hundred prisoners and a hundred in killed or wounded. The brigade Maucune pursued the English beyond the village, and on issuing from it met the cavalry of Montbrun.

At the sight of the English line which was protected by two regiments of cavalry, Montbrun, burning with ardour, could no longer hesitate to attack them; and having obtained from Masséna four pieces of cannon he advanced upon the division Houston, having in front a squadron of the 5th hussars deployed to conceal his cannon, the dragoons being in the centre, a squadron of the 11th chasseurs on the right, and one of the 12th on the left. A hundred sharpshooters advanced in front of these troops in order to provoke the centre of the English line. The 51st (English) made a movement in advance, and was speedily broken by the fire from our guns and the charge of our cavalry. Our troops continued their march against the division Houston, and driving it back separated it from its artillery, which it was on the point of taking, when an unexpected and well directed fire from some of the enemy's sharpshooters enabled the division Houston to retreat behind the Turones, where it found Don Julian. At the same moment it was replaced on the ground it had quitted by Craufurd's light division, which advanced in all haste.

Masséna, perceiving that the English right was broken and driven back beyond the Turones, ordered General Loison to advance his divisions Marchand and Mermet, in order that, debouching from Pozo Velho, they might second the effort of the cavalry, and proceed to the environs of Fuentès d'Onoro. This movement, conducted with vigour, would result in the right wing of the English being thrown back upon their centre, as Masséna had planned. At the same time he threw Montbrun's cavalry upon Crawfurd, who prepared to receive it by forming his troops into three squares, with artillery in the intervals between the three.

Our cavalry, led with the most admirable vigour and precision, advanced under a terrible fire from the cannon placed between the English squares. The charge of our light regiments speedily broke the squares on the left and the centre, and fifteen hundred English infantry, with their colonel, surrendered themselves prisoners. The square on the right, however, being protected by the nature of the ground which it occupied, escaped this disaster. Taking

advantage of a momentary confusion amongst our soldiers, arising from a groundless supposition that General Fournier had been killed, a portion of the English who had surrendered recommenced their fire; and Montbrun, perceiving the ravages caused in his ranks by the grape of the English cannon, and seeing that the whole English cavalry was advancing against him, made his light cavalry retreat, and sent to demand the assistance of the cavalry of the guard, and the support of a body of infantry.

The cavalry of the Guard, however, could not act without an order from Marshal Bessières, and remained immoveable. The infantry, badly led by Loison, had penetrated into the woods which surrounded Fuentès d'Onoro, chased away the English, arrived at the foot of the ravine which separated it from Fuentès d'Onoro, and commenced a useless fire against Picton's troops, whilst Ferrey renewed his attack from the Avant Veille.

Montbrun, however, being left unsupported, was unable to renew his attack upon the English infantry, which had this time to reform and replace themselves in line. Spencer with the first division, rallying the Portuguese, placed himself beside Crawfurd and presented an imposing front supported by a numerous artillery and the whole of the English cavalry. On his left he was in communication with Picton, who defended Fuentès d'Onoro, and on his right with the division Houston, which was on the other side of the Turones.

This being the state of affairs Montbrun, after having long supported the fire from the English artillery, withdrew his cavalry behind a protecting slope, and thus awaited the recommencement of the battle to renew his exploits of the morning. In the meantime Reynier, believing that he had before him masses of the enemy which in reality were not there, and considering that the task of gaining the battle was not his, confined his operations to insignificant skirmishes. Ferrey furiously attacked Fuentès d'Onoro, and aided by two regiments of the division Claparède, seized the heights above the village, but not being supported he was compelled to abandon them again. Loison, full of good will but erring in his march, and having directed it towards the right instead of towards the left, was stopped by a ravine, which separated him from Fuentès d'Onoro

Masséna's invincible determination, however, repaired every misadventure. Formidable as was the English right, composed of Spencer's and Crawfurd's divisions, the Portuguese and the cavalry, he did not despair of forcing it with the divisions Marchand, Mermet, and Salignac, Montbrun's heroic cavalry, and the effects of the execution of the orders

which had been given to Drouet to make a desperate attempt upon Fuentès d'Onoro, and to Reynier to make a serious attack on Alaméda.

It was in such moments as these that Masséna's keen judgment and determined character displayed all their strength. Montbrun, Loison, Marchand, and Mermet were eager to second his exertions. But at the very moment when the attack was about to be renewed and one last blow struck for victory, General Eblé was compelled to announce that there remained very few cartridges, Bessières having failed to supply them. Even this difficulty, which would have been considered fatal by any other man, did not make Masséna despair; he deferred the attack until the following morning, believing that the English would remain in the same position, and being convinced that they could receive no reinforcements, for Picton with the 3rd division was indispensable to the defence of Fuentès d'Onoro, Campbell with the 6th to that of Alaméda, Dunlop with the 5th to that of Fort Conception. He ordered that the baggage waggons brought by Bessières should be sent in all haste to Ciudad-Rodrigo for cartridges and provisions. But Bessières resisted this order, alleging that his baggage train having been on the march for many days without rest was too exhausted to execute the proposed task. What was now to be done? Was Masséna to deprive Bessières of his sword as he had deprived Ney of his? There are difficulties before which the most determined men are forced to yield. To prevent the scandal of any further disturbance, Masséna consented to defer until the morning of the next day the despatch of the waggons to Ciudad-Rodrigo.

Such was this battle of Fuentès d'Onoro which so many obstacles, and so many acts of indocility rendered undecisive, and which the courage of our troops, guided by the skilful generalship of Masséna, must have converted into a brilliant victory, decisive in respect to Spain, and most probably equally so as regarded Europe had they only been properly seconded. The position of the two armies on the following day was singular. From Alaméda to Fuentès d'Onoro the corps of Reynier and Drouet formed a continuous line, opposite the English army along the Dos-Casas. At Fuentès d'Onoro our line was bent and forming almost a right angle, held in blockade beyond the Dos-Casas the right wing of the English turned back upon its centre. Lord Wellington had drawn together his best forces upon this point, and had supplied what the position wanted in natural strength by art, having employed his soldiers, although very much fatigued, in throwing entrenchments through the whole of the night.

Masséna saw with dismay that the time granted for repose to Bessières teams was much more usefully employed by the enemy. Relying, however, on the ardour of his troops he determined to renew the contest. But Generals Fririon, Lazowski, and Eblé, who were as devoted to him as to the honour of their arms, revealed to him those sad truths he would fain have ignored, and informed him that many officers, some of them worn out with fatigue, others summoned to serve in different armies, were not sufficiently resolved to do their duty to be safely relied on in a desperate attack. Reynier was in a state of terror, believing that the whole force of the English was about to overwhelm him; Drouet was on the eve of departure; and Bessières conducted himself as an ambitious man in the presence of one whose fortunes were on the decline.

The General-in-Chief was dissuaded therefore from the course of action he had proposed, and determined to destroy the fortress of Almeida in place of re-victualling it. To effect this purpose it was necessary to find some men who would undertake to carry the necessary order across the English army. Three volunteers for this office presented themselves whose names history ought to preserve; they were Zaniboni, corporal in the 76th of the line, Noel Lami, a suttler of the division Ferrey, and André Tillet, a chasseur in the 6th light. Each of them carried an order to General Brenier to destroy the fortification, and then to make his way across the line of the English posts as far as the bridge Barba del Puerco on the Aguéda; and he was directed to fire a hundred guns to announce his receipt of the General-in-Chief's order.

During the next day, the 7th, Masséna remained in position before the English, who continued immoveable behind their entrenchments. In the evening was heard the signal which testified the receipt of the order sent to Almeida. On the 8th Masséna, in order to give General Brenier time to complete the destruction of Almeida, made a threatening movement against the centre of the enemy's position; he continued this pretended movement on the following day, and the English remaining cautiously within their lines, concentrated means of defence on the threatened point, without doubting the intention of the French General.

On the 10th the army, following the example of some of its chiefs, and being ignorant of the Marshal's real intention, began to murmur at being uselessly detained before the enemy, and as General Brenier had now had time to complete his task, Masséna consented to retreat upon the Aguéda. The English followed our troops with extreme caution, fixing their whole attention on the bulk of the army, and paying

no regard to Almeida, which they believed destined to a speedy surrender.

At midnight the army heard during its march a dull explosion, and thus learned that the fortress of Almeida had been destroyed. Reynier left General Hendelet in advance of the bridge Barba del Puerco to receive the fugitive garrison. The next day was expected with the greatest anxiety, for the garrison had eight or nine leagues to pass before it could reach the Aguéda.

General Brenier had some time since undermined the principal works of the fortress, and having received the order on the 7th completed all the necessary preparations on the 10th. At 10 o'clock in the evening he sallied forth with the garrison, leaving 200 sappers under Morlet, the commander of the battalion of engineers, to fire the mines, and rejoin him afterwards by a remote by-way. The departure from the place was made from the quarter least liable to observation, and which was that leading to the Aguéda. The garrison proceeded two leagues without falling in with the enemy, then it met with the advanced posts of Campbell's division and Pack's Portuguese brigade. The latter, wholly giving themselves up to plundering the convoy which followed our troops, permitted them to pass, but General Pack pursued them with the English cavalry of General Cotton. At daybreak they reached Villa de Cuervas, not far from Barba del Puerco, and joined Morlet and his sappers, who after having fired the mines had also arrived to force the line of the enemy's posts. In spite of the attacks of Pack on the one side and Cotton on the other, our brave fugitive garrison succeeded in escaping, and in throwing themselves into the midst of the troops of General Hendelet, which came to meet them. It is said that when Lord Wellington heard the particulars of General Brenier's exploit, he declared that it was equal to a victory; and, with an injustice little worthy of him, laid the blame of the misfortune on General Campbell, who certainly was not more in fault than the rest of the army or the General-in-Chief himself.

Masséna, continuing his retreat, left four months provisions in Ciudad-Rodrigo, remained and reinforced its garrison, and then re-entered Salamanca, to refresh and reorganise his army.

In the meantime, his companion in arms, Marshal Soult, to whom he had rendered a great service, by freeing him from the presence of Lord Wellington, and from that of one or two English divisions, had been even more unfortunate than himself. Scarcely had Masséna's retreat commenced when Lord Wellington sent Hill's corps towards Estre-

madura, and had added to it various detachments, with the intention of giving succour to Badajoz, or by retaking it by a new siege, should the French have already reduced it. An English division accordingly proceeded to invest Badajoz, which was defended by a garrison, determined to resist to the utmost; whilst another body of English, Portuguese, and Spanish troops took up a position on Albuera in order to cover the siege. The 5th corps, under the command of General Latour-Maubourg, was posted a little in the rear, awaiting with impatience succour from Seville, for consisting at most of only eight or nine thousand men after the departure of Marshal Soult, it was reduced to almost nothing when it had furnished the garrison to Badajoz.

Such were the events which had taken place in Andalusia, whilst Masséna was fighting the battle of Fuentès d'Onoro and having Almeida destroyed. Marshal Soult having found security re-established in front of Cadiz by the vigour with which Marshal Victor had repulsed the English, and the return of a part of the 4th corps to the province of Seville, had given his attention to the cries of distress which had proceeded from the garrison of Badajoz, which defended itself with the greatest courage, and determined to proceed thither. On the 10th of May he set out with eleven or twelve thousand men to join the remainder of the 5th corps on the road from Seville to Badajoz.

After having rallied the 5th corps Marshal Soult found himself at the head of about 17,000 excellent troops, including 2,500 of the best cavalry. He arrived on the 15th of May at Santa-Martha, within sight of the English army, which was posted at some leagues in advance of Badajoz, on the hills which border the Albuera. Although the Anglo-Spanish army numbered thirty and odd thousand men, and his own amounted to only 17,000, Marshal Soult did not hesitate to attack it, for it was the only means of saving Badajoz, and avoiding the humiliation of seeing the capture of this place, which was his only conquest.

Marshal Beresford commanded the allied army, which comprised Stuart's division (English), the three Portuguese brigades of General Hamilton, and the troops drawn off from the siege of Badajoz.

The Anglo-Spanish army was posted behind the little river Albuera, which might be very easily crossed. Its left was on the village of Albuera, its centre consisting chiefly of English and Portuguese, on the low hills, and its right, comprising all the Spaniards, on the spurs of these hills, but slightly behind them, so as to be scarcely visible. The troops drawn from the siege of Badajoz, passing actually

behind the English line, served for its prolongation and support.

Marshal Soult determined to attack the English on the morning of the 16th of May. He made arrangements for cannonading vigorously, and feigning a serious attack upon the village of Albuera, which was on the enemy's left; but it was against the enemy's right that he determined to make the greatest effort, for he hoped that the English being attacked on their right, which covered their communication with Badajoz, would be the more easily alarmed and beaten, and that the infliction of a reverse upon them in this direction would have the most important results.

Unfortunately he did not have his arrangements put into execution under his personal inspection, and detained too long by his side General Gazan, who, commanding a division, filled also the functions of chief of the staff, and was one of the most energetic and experienced infantry officers in the army. There was, therefore, a want of completeness and precision in the execution of the manœuvres. The detachment on our right which was to cannonade the village of Albuera, took up its position in good time along the stream, and commenced a fire which was equally destructive to the village and to the English troops themselves. The two divisions Girard and Gazan, forming a mass of 8,000 infantry, also duly entered into action, and advancing in close column passed the stream, whilst the cavalry of General Latour-Maubourg threatened the enemy's right. But unhappily a certain want of uniformity in the execution of the manœuvres, occasioned an hour of inaction to the troops beyond the stream, which gave the English time to concentrate the bulk of their forces on the threatened point. The signal of attack having been given, the division Girard rapidly ascended the heights, followed by the division Gazan. The division Girard had scarcely arrived on the height when it found the enemy reaching it almost simultaneously; but although exposed to a most murderous fire this brave division continued to struggle vigorously forward, and succeeded, with the aid of a vigorous charge of our cavalry, in completely routing the enemy's first line, which was composed of English and Spaniards. But at the same moment Marshal Beresford had carried towards his right a strong body of troops which took the division Girard in front and flank, and overwhelmed it with a true and well-sustained fire. In a few minutes almost all the officers were either killed or wounded.

The two divisions were, unfortunately, too closely crowded together to render possible the manœuvres which would have enabled our troops to return the enemy's fire, and they

were, accordingly, compelled to retreat. Fortunately Latour-Maubourg's cavalry coming up in mass and deploying on the English flank held them in check; and General Ruty having skilfully dispersed his artillery on the heights which were opposite those occupied by the enemy, inflicted on them a loss almost equal to that which we had sustained from the fire of their musketry, the Anglo-French army losing about 3,000 in killed and wounded, and the French about 4,000.

Marshal Soult having thus lost 4,000 men out of 17,000, was not anxious to risk a second engagement with theEnglish. He brought in his wounded and took up a position somewhat in the rear. He wrote immediately to Madrid, to Salamanca, and to Paris, to make known his difficulties to Joseph, Marshal Masséna, and Napoleon. Although he had not raised the siege of Badajoz, he had proved to the garrison that he was far from being unmindful of it; and the unskilful manner in which the siege had been first conducted by the English, had added to the hopes which were natural attendants of the courage of the soldiers of the garrison, of the energy and ability of their commanders.

Such was the condition of affairs in Spain in the month of May 1811, such the result of the great exertions made by Napoleon after the peace of Vienna.

In Portugal Marshal Masséna, after the capture of the frontier fortifications, and after six months passed in front of the lines of Torrès-Védras, had been compelled to retreat, and that he might not be forced to behold the capture of the two fortresses, which were the only trophies of his campaign, under his own eyes, he had fought the bloody and indecisive battle of Fuentès d'Onoro. Of the 70,000 men he should have had, he had never in reality had more than 55,000, and these were now reduced to 30,000 exhausted and irritated troops which required to be entirely reorganised.

In the south of Spain, Marshal Soult after having invaded Andalusia, occupied Cordova, Grenada, and Seville, almost without striking a blow, had employed fifteen months in front of Cadiz, in no more important occupation than erecting some batteries around the roadstead. He had captured it is true, the fortress of Badajoz, but had been compelled, even as Masséna, to fight a bloody battle, to save this his only conquest. The 80,000 men he had once had, were now reduced to 36,000, as worn out as those of the army of Portugal, but less disorganized perhaps, because having made war in a rich country, they had not been exposed to such great privations, and because they had not been exposed to such evil example on the part of their immediate commanders.

The army of the centre, under Joseph, was far from numerous, had performed no important operations, and had but just sufficed to maintain communications with Andalusia, to disperse towards Guadalaxara the bands of Empecinado, and to keep the province of Toledo in a state of tranquillity. The army of the north had been perpetually harassed by the guerillas of the two Castilles. One province alone presented an appearance of order and repose, and that was Aragon, where the protracted resistance of Saragossa seemed to have exhausted the hatred of the inhabitants, and where the good policy of General Suchet seemed to have reclaimed their spirits, thoroughly worn out by a great calamity. General Suchet, after having obtained possession of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, had made preparations for besieging Tarragona, the strongest of all the fortifications of Spain. But the surprise of Figuères by the enemy somewhat counterbalanced the satisfactory state of affairs in this part of the country.

To the sad picture presented by the state of the French military affairs in the Peninsula, must be added another not less afflicting, of the court of Madrid. Shut up in his capital, only having command over the army of the centre, consisting of no more than 12,000 effective men, and treated with the greatest disrespect by the various Generals, deprived by the want of finances, of the consolation of bestowing benefits on his favourites, rendered wretched by the reports he received from his two ministers from Paris, and hearing even at Madrid, the echo of his brother's railleries, Joseph—almost overwhelmed by despair, sometimes entertained the idea of abdicating as his brother Louis had done; and being beset on the one side by disgust at the circumstances under which he was at present forced to reign, and on the other by the greatest repugnance to ceasing to reign, he demanded permission to visit Paris, under pretext of the accouchement of the Empress. Napoleon had consented, and Joseph had set out in April in as desponding a state as though the enemy had finally driven him from his capital. This, then, in the month of May 1811, was the result of Napoleon's exertions in regard to Spain.

Why had these two campaigns of 1810 and 1811, from which so much had been hoped, so little answered the expectations which had been founded on them?

To the fault of desiring to rule, to enslave, to transform the world, Napoleon had added the desire of putting his intentions into immediate execution. He had endeavoured, accordingly, to subdue at the same moment both the north and the south of Spain, Valentia, Andalusia, and Portugal.

With this view he had dispersed from Grenada to Badajoz 80,000 of his best troops, and had left the army of Portugal without those reinforcements on which it had reckoned, and without which it was unable to accomplish its task. Besides this unfortunate dispersion of troops must be mentioned the desperate tenacity with which he clung to certain illusions, and which he made the basis, although he was partly aware that they were false ones, of his various plans, and orders to his lieutenants But as he could not divest himself of some doubt respecting the reality of the forces which he chose to presume were under his Generals' command, he did not dare to give them absolute orders,—knowing well that in giving such at so great a distance from the scene of action he might be ordering what was impossible or what would lead to absolute disaster, he left his commands so undefined that full scope was given for their evasion either from ill will or timidity.

How can we wonder or complain that the errors of the master were increased by those of the lieutenants? What wonder that these distinguished and courageous men should be sometimes careless, inattentive, disunited, jealous! when Napoleon's own great spirit was itself subject to these things,—jealousy, rancour, perturbation, error? How blind and improvident is he who does not foresee that these things will exist, and fails to shape his plans accordingly! That alone is a well judged policy which remains unshaken by the errors of its agents.

If then the great European question, which he had so imprudently transferred to Spain, was not solved in 1810 and 1811, notwithstanding the immense resources devoted to that purpose, we should accuse, not the genius of Napoleon, but his policy, which engendered both his own military errors and those of his lieutenants. After having failed in obtaining the solution of this question in Spain he endeavoured to attain it in the north, and we shall see in the future volumes of this work what was the result of that endeavour.

Genius often adds to its errors the fault of being unwilling to acknowledge them and a desire to attribute them to some other person; and Napoleon, accordingly, recalled Masséna, and disgraced this faithful old companion in arms, who had rendered him so many services, and who had displayed in this campaign, although its issue was unfortunate, rare qualities of character and spirit, and had only succumbed to the force of circumstances.

The old warrior re-enterd Frome, a broken spirited, deserted man; his glory tarnished, his energy gone; and no longer capable of command. Napoleon should have regarded him

with compassion rather than anger, and in his destiny read his own: for Masséna was the first victim demanded by fortune, and Napoleon himself was to be the second; with this distinction, that Napoleon deserved his fate and Masséna had not. For Masséna was but the reluctant instrument of those gigantic designs which were to bring upon their author so terrible a punishment, and Napoleon was the author himself. We must add, however, that Masséna also deserved to share in this chastisement, for having consented to take part in the execution of that of which he disapproved. But such is commonly the unfortunate effect of unlimited and irresponsible power—by creating the habit of submission it suppresses the idea of resistance, even on the part of the firmest and most clear-sighted men.

END OF VOLUME XII.

LONDON:
M. S. MYERS, PRINTER, 64, LUPUS STREET, PIMLICO.


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

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